How severe is GHSA-f9vr-g2g2-x9fg?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-f9vr-g2g2-x9fg yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-f9vr-g2g2-x9fg?

GHSA-f9vr-g2g2-x9fg affects the following packages: hackney (Hex). Ecosystems affected: Hex.

How do I fix GHSA-f9vr-g2g2-x9fg?

Update hackney to 4.0.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-f9vr-g2g2-x9fg is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-f9vr-g2g2-x9fg in my Hex dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for hackney. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-f9vr-g2g2-x9fg if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-f9vr-g2g2-x9fg?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-f9vr-g2g2-x9fg is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-f9vr-g2g2-x9fg actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-f9vr-g2g2-x9fg yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-f9vr-g2g2-x9fg?

GHSA-f9vr-g2g2-x9fg has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.5%, placing it in the 44th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-f9vr-g2g2-x9fg?

GHSA-f9vr-g2g2-x9fg is classified as CWE-93 (CWE-93). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation.

When was GHSA-f9vr-g2g2-x9fg published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-f9vr-g2g2-x9fg was published on June 26, 2026 and was last updated on June 26, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

💧 Hex

Not in CISA KEV

GHSA-f9vr-g2g2-x9fg

Fix: benoitc/hackney@52310ca

GHSA-f9vr-g2g2-x9fg is a CWE-93 vulnerability in hackney. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-f9vr-g2g2-x9fg is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Hackney has CRLF / header injection in WebSocket upgrade request

Also known asCVE-2026-47072EEF-CVE-2026-47072

Published

Jun 26, 2026

Updated

Jun 26, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Sep 7, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-f9vr-g2g2-x9fg.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk0.00%

Lower risk than most CVEs44th percentile — riskier than 44% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

💧hackney

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Hex packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

CRLF injection in hackney's WebSocket upgrade request builder (src/hackney_ws.erl). init/1 copies the host, path, headers, and protocols options from the caller-supplied opts map verbatim into #ws_data{}, and do_handshake/1 splices them directly into the raw HTTP/1.1 upgrade request by binary concatenation with no \r\n or \0 stripping. A caller that passes any of these fields from untrusted input can inject arbitrary header lines into the outbound upgrade request.

Details

do_handshake/1 builds the upgrade request at several concatenation sites:

Host header (lines 583–590): the host binary is written straight into Host: <host>:<port>\r\n.
Sec-WebSocket-Protocol (lines 601–602): protocol tokens are joined with , and appended as a header line.
Extra headers (line 606): caller-supplied {Name, Value} tuples are concatenated as Name: Value\r\n with no sanitization of either component.
Request path (line 611): the path is interpolated into the GET <path> HTTP/1.1\r\n request line.

None of these sites reject \r, \n, or \0. A header value like <<"benign\r\nAuthorization: Bearer token">> produces two distinct header lines on the wire. A path with an embedded \r\n rewrites the request line itself.

PoC

Call :hackney_ws.start_link/1 with headers: [{"X-User", "v\r\nAuthorization: Bearer attacker"}].
Connect to a raw TCP listener and capture the bytes hackney writes.
The request contains a standalone Authorization: Bearer attacker line that the upstream WebSocket server parses as a legitimate header.

Impact

Header injection / request smuggling in outbound WebSocket upgrades. Affects hackney 2.0.0 through 4.0.0 wherever host, path, headers, or protocols options are populated from network or user input. Consequences include forging authentication headers toward the upstream server, log and cache poisoning, and request smuggling through intermediary proxies. CVSS v4.0: 6.9 (MEDIUM).

Resources

Introduction commit: https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/690cecaf236fba49526da404a5bc889a24367a3e
Patch commit: https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/52310ca807e7b48441ba0e9129171f535313fdd1

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
💧Hex	`hackney`	≥ 2.0.0&&< 4.0.1	4.0.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for hackney. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update hackney to 4.0.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-f9vr-g2g2-x9fg is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-f9vr-g2g2-x9fg is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-f9vr-g2g2-x9fg. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary CRLF injection in hackney's WebSocket upgrade request builder (`src/hackney_ws.erl`). `init/1` copies the `host`, `path`, `headers`, and `protocols` options from the caller-supplied opts map verbatim into `#ws_data{}`, and `do_handshake/1` splices them directly into the raw HTTP/1.1 upgrade request by binary concatenation with no `\r\n` or `\0` stripping. A caller that passes any of these fields from untrusted input can inject arbitrary header lines into the outbound upgrade request. ### Details `do_handshake/1` builds the upgrade request at several concatenation sites: - **Hos

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-f9vr-g2g2-x9fg in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-f9vr-g2g2-x9fg across Hex dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

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