CVE-2026-47066 — hackney
Fix: benoitc/hackney@e548abaCVE-2026-47066 is a CWE-835 vulnerability in hackney. A fix is available for hackney — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Infinite loop in Alt-Svc header parser in hackney
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-47066.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
hackneyReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Hex packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
CVE-2026-47066 is an infinite loop (CWE-835) in hackney's Alt-Svc response header parser (src/hackney_altsvc.erl). When an HTTP server returns an Alt-Svc header whose value begins with a non-token byte (e.g. !, @, =, ;), the parser enters a tight tail-recursive loop that pins an Erlang scheduler at 100% CPU and permanently hangs the calling connection process. Because the parser is invoked synchronously on every HTTP response, any attacker-controlled origin can trigger the hang with a single-byte header value.
Details
1. Parser dispatch
parse_and_cache/3 is called inside the hackney connection process on each HTTP response. It collects all Alt-Svc header values via collect_altsvc_headers/1, concatenates them, and passes the result to parse/1, which calls parse_entries(Header, []).
2. Failed token consumption
parse_entries/2 → parse_entry/1 → parse_protocol/1 → parse_token(Data, <<>>). The function parse_token/2 pattern-matches leading bytes: alphanumeric, -, _, whitespace, and comma all have explicit clauses. Any other byte (e.g. !) falls through to the catch-all:
parse_token(Rest, <<>>) -> {undefined, Rest}.
This returns the input unchanged — no byte is consumed.
3. No-progress loop
parse_entry propagates {undefined, Rest} back to parse_entries/2, which calls skip_comma(Rest). Because the first byte is not ,, skip_comma also returns Rest unchanged. parse_entries then recurses with the identical buffer:
parse_entries(Data, Acc) % Data identical to previous iteration
Erlang tail recursion never preempts on a pure CPU loop, so the scheduler is pinned and the process never yields or returns.
4. Root cause
parse_entries/2 has no guard that detects zero-byte progress after a failed parse_entry call and no fallback to advance past the offending byte.
PoC
- Start an HTTP server that responds with the header
Alt-Svc: !(any single non-token byte suffices). - Issue any HTTP GET request via hackney to that server:
hackney:request(get, "http://attacker.example/", [], <<>>, []) - Observe that the call never returns; the Erlang scheduler hosting the connection process is pinned at 100% CPU indefinitely.
Alternatively, call the parser directly: hackney_altsvc:parse(<<"!">>) — the process hangs immediately.
Impact
Denial of service via unbounded CPU consumption. Any application using hackney 2.0.0-beta.1 through 4.0.0 that connects to attacker-controlled HTTP endpoints is affected. No authentication is required; a single response header byte is sufficient to hang the connection process. Fixed in hackney 4.0.1. CVSS v4.0 score: 8.7 (HIGH).
Resources
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 💧Hex | hackney | ≥ 2.0.0&&< 4.0.1 | 4.0.1mix deps.update hackney |
Affected Products
hackneybenoitcDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for hackney, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update hackney to 4.0.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-47066 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-47066 in your dependencies?
Find it across Hex, including transitive dependencies.