CVE-2026-47071 — hackney
Fix: benoitc/hackney@5ccdab7CVE-2026-47071 is a Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in hackney. A fix is available for hackney — see the affected versions and patch details below.
SOCKS5 TLS upgrade ignores caller timeout in hackney
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-47071.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
hackneyReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Hex packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The SOCKS5 transport in src/hackney_socks5.erl correctly applies the caller-supplied timeout to the SOCKS5 negotiation phase, but then upgrades the tunnel to TLS using ssl:connect/2 (the two-argument form), which defaults to infinity. The Timeout value is in scope at that call site but is never forwarded. A hostile or man-in-the-middled SOCKS5 proxy that completes the SOCKS5 handshake normally and then stalls the TLS exchange will pin the connecting Erlang process and socket indefinitely, regardless of any connect_timeout or recv_timeout options the caller set.
Details
In src/hackney_socks5.erl, line 65, after the SOCKS5 negotiation succeeds, the code calls:
ssl:connect(Socket, SSLOpts)
The three-argument form ssl:connect/3 takes a timeout; the two-argument form used here defaults to infinity. The variable Timeout (already used for SOCKS5 recv calls earlier in the same function) is simply not passed. The bytes that drive the TLS handshake on the upstream side of the tunnel come from whatever endpoint the proxy connects to. A hostile proxy can complete SOCKS5 normally, then either stay silent or send a partial ServerHello and stop, keeping ssl:connect/2 blocked forever. No certificate forgery is needed.
PoC
- Stand up a SOCKS5 proxy that completes the SOCKS5 greeting and CONNECT reply normally, then goes silent (never sends a TLS ServerHello).
- Issue an HTTPS request through it via hackney with
connect_timeoutandrecv_timeoutset to a short value (e.g. 2000 ms). - Observe the calling process remains blocked well past the configured timeout, consuming a process and socket until killed externally.
Impact
Denial of service via unbounded process and socket consumption. Affects hackney 0.10.0 through 4.0.0 for any HTTPS request routed through a SOCKS5 proxy. The connect_timeout and recv_timeout options give a false sense of safety since they are not honored during the TLS upgrade. CVSS v4.0: 8.2 (HIGH).
Resources
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 💧Hex | hackney | ≥ 0.10.0&&< 4.0.1 | 4.0.1mix deps.update hackney |
Affected Products
hackneybenoitcDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for hackney, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update hackney to 4.0.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-47071 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-47071 in your dependencies?
Find it across Hex, including transitive dependencies.