GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) CWE-639 vulnerability in github.com/QuantumNous/new-api. A fix is available for github.com/QuantumNous/new-api — see the affected versions and patch details below.
New API: IDOR in VideoProxy allows cross-user video content access via missing ownership check
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 379,145 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/QuantumNous/new-apiReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The video proxy endpoint GET /v1/videos/:task_id/content is vulnerable to an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR). Any authenticated user who knows another user's task_id can retrieve that user's generated video content because the handler queries tasks by task_id alone and does not verify ownership.
Affected Component
- Endpoint:
GET /v1/videos/:task_id/content - Route middleware:
TokenOrUserAuth() - Vulnerable handler:
controller.VideoProxy
Details
VideoProxy fetches the task with:
task, exists, err := model.GetByOnlyTaskId(taskID)
GetByOnlyTaskId performs a database lookup using only task_id:
err = DB.Where("task_id = ?", taskId).First(&task).Error
The authenticated user's ID is available in request context, but VideoProxy does not use it. This allows any authenticated user to request /v1/videos/<foreign_task_id>/content and access another user's video if they know a valid task ID.
Other task-fetch paths already enforce ownership correctly via:
model.GetByTaskId(userId, taskId)
Impact
An authenticated attacker who knows another user's task_id can:
- Download video content belonging to another user
- Bypass tenant isolation for generated media assets
- Cause the server to fetch upstream video content for a task the attacker does not own
For Gemini tasks, the proxy also uses task.PrivateData.Key when contacting the upstream provider. In addition, full upstream response headers are forwarded back to the requester.
Proof of Concept
curl -o stolen_video.mp4 \
"https://<instance>/v1/videos/<victim_task_id>/content" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer sk-<attacker_token>"
Expected result:
- Response returns
200 OK - Response body contains the victim's video content
Recommended Fix
Replace the task lookup in VideoProxy with an ownership-checked query:
userId := c.GetInt("id")
task, exists, err := model.GetByTaskId(userId, taskID)
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/QuantumNous/new-api | all versions | 0.11.4-alpha.2go get github.com/QuantumNous/new-api@v0.11.4-alpha.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/QuantumNous/new-api, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/QuantumNous/new-api to 0.11.4-alpha.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.