How severe is GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc?

GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc has a CVSS score of 6.5/10, rated MEDIUM. Review your exposure and patch according to your risk tolerance.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc?

GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc affects the following packages: github.com/QuantumNous/new-api (Go). Ecosystems affected: Go.

How do I fix GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc?

Update github.com/QuantumNous/new-api to 0.11.4-alpha.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc in my Go dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/QuantumNous/new-api. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc?

GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.3%, placing it in the 19th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc?

GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc is classified as CWE-639 (CWE-639). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation.

When was GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc was published on March 23, 2026 and was last updated on March 26, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐹 Go

GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc

MEDIUM

New API: IDOR in VideoProxy allows cross-user video content access via missing ownership check

Also known asCVE-2026-30886GO-2026-4814

Published

Mar 23, 2026

Updated

Mar 26, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk19th percentile+0.23%

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

🐹github.com/QuantumNous/new-api

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The video proxy endpoint GET /v1/videos/:task_id/content is vulnerable to an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR). Any authenticated user who knows another user's task_id can retrieve that user's generated video content because the handler queries tasks by task_id alone and does not verify ownership.

Affected Component

Endpoint: GET /v1/videos/:task_id/content
Route middleware: TokenOrUserAuth()
Vulnerable handler: controller.VideoProxy

Details

VideoProxy fetches the task with:

task, exists, err := model.GetByOnlyTaskId(taskID)

GetByOnlyTaskId performs a database lookup using only task_id:

err = DB.Where("task_id = ?", taskId).First(&task).Error

The authenticated user's ID is available in request context, but VideoProxy does not use it. This allows any authenticated user to request /v1/videos/<foreign_task_id>/content and access another user's video if they know a valid task ID.

Other task-fetch paths already enforce ownership correctly via:

model.GetByTaskId(userId, taskId)

Impact

An authenticated attacker who knows another user's task_id can:

Download video content belonging to another user
Bypass tenant isolation for generated media assets
Cause the server to fetch upstream video content for a task the attacker does not own

For Gemini tasks, the proxy also uses task.PrivateData.Key when contacting the upstream provider. In addition, full upstream response headers are forwarded back to the requester.

Proof of Concept

curl -o stolen_video.mp4 \
  "https://<instance>/v1/videos/<victim_task_id>/content" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer sk-<attacker_token>"

Expected result:

Response returns 200 OK
Response body contains the victim's video content

Recommended Fix

Replace the task lookup in VideoProxy with an ownership-checked query:

userId := c.GetInt("id")
task, exists, err := model.GetByTaskId(userId, taskID)

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐹Go	`github.com/QuantumNous/new-api`	all versions	0.11.4-alpha.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/QuantumNous/new-api. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/QuantumNous/new-api to 0.11.4-alpha.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The video proxy endpoint `GET /v1/videos/:task_id/content` is vulnerable to an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR). Any authenticated user who knows another user's `task_id` can retrieve that user's generated video content because the handler queries tasks by `task_id` alone and does not verify ownership. ## Affected Component - Endpoint: `GET /v1/videos/:task_id/content` - Route middleware: `TokenOrUserAuth()` - Vulnerable handler: `controller.VideoProxy` ## Details `VideoProxy` fetches the task with: ```go task, exists, err := model.GetByOnlyTaskId(taskID) ``` `GetByOnl

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc in your dependencies?

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