CVE-2026-30886 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) CWE-639 vulnerability in github.com/QuantumNous/new-api. A fix is available for github.com/QuantumNous/new-api — see the affected versions and patch details below.
New API: IDOR in VideoProxy allows cross-user video content access via missing ownership check
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-30886.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
github.com/QuantumNous/new-apiReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The video proxy endpoint GET /v1/videos/:task_id/content is vulnerable to an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR). Any authenticated user who knows another user's task_id can retrieve that user's generated video content because the handler queries tasks by task_id alone and does not verify ownership.
Affected Component
- Endpoint:
GET /v1/videos/:task_id/content - Route middleware:
TokenOrUserAuth() - Vulnerable handler:
controller.VideoProxy
Details
VideoProxy fetches the task with:
task, exists, err := model.GetByOnlyTaskId(taskID)
GetByOnlyTaskId performs a database lookup using only task_id:
err = DB.Where("task_id = ?", taskId).First(&task).Error
The authenticated user's ID is available in request context, but VideoProxy does not use it. This allows any authenticated user to request /v1/videos/<foreign_task_id>/content and access another user's video if they know a valid task ID.
Other task-fetch paths already enforce ownership correctly via:
model.GetByTaskId(userId, taskId)
Impact
An authenticated attacker who knows another user's task_id can:
- Download video content belonging to another user
- Bypass tenant isolation for generated media assets
- Cause the server to fetch upstream video content for a task the attacker does not own
For Gemini tasks, the proxy also uses task.PrivateData.Key when contacting the upstream provider. In addition, full upstream response headers are forwarded back to the requester.
Proof of Concept
curl -o stolen_video.mp4 \
"https://<instance>/v1/videos/<victim_task_id>/content" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer sk-<attacker_token>"
Expected result:
- Response returns
200 OK - Response body contains the victim's video content
Recommended Fix
Replace the task lookup in VideoProxy with an ownership-checked query:
userId := c.GetInt("id")
task, exists, err := model.GetByTaskId(userId, taskID)
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/QuantumNous/new-api | all versions | 0.11.4-alpha.2go get github.com/QuantumNous/new-api@v0.11.4-alpha.2 |
Affected Products
new apinewapiDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/QuantumNous/new-api, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/QuantumNous/new-api to 0.11.4-alpha.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-30886 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-30886 in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.