GHSA-cc8w-r4qh-3v65
HIGHGHSA-cc8w-r4qh-3v65 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.1) CWE-863 vulnerability in code.gitea.io/gitea. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-cc8w-r4qh-3v65 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Gitea: Git Smart HTTP Skips Repository Token Scopes for Bearer Tokens
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-cc8w-r4qh-3v65.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-cc8w-r4qh-3v65 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 360,482 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
code.gitea.io/giteaReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Gitea v1.26.1 enforces repository-scoped access-token permissions on repository operations. In the Git Smart HTTP path, however, this check runs only when the token is presented via HTTP Basic authentication — CheckRepoScopedToken() returns early unless ctx.IsBasicAuth is true — so the same token sent as Authorization: Bearer <token> bypasses the scope check entirely.
As a result, a PAT or OAuth2 token presented as a Bearer credential can clone or fetch private repositories without the read:repository scope, and likewise reach the Git push without write:repository.
Details
Git Smart HTTP routes allow both Basic auth and OAuth2/Bearer auth:
// routers/web/web.go
addOwnerRepoGitHTTPRouters(
m,
repo.HTTPGitEnabledHandler,
webAuth.AllowBasic,
webAuth.AllowOAuth2,
repo.CorsHandler(),
optSignInFromAnyOrigin,
context.UserAssignmentWeb(),
)
The Git HTTP authorization path calls CheckRepoScopedToken() before falling through to normal repository RBAC:
// routers/web/repo/githttp.go
if askAuth {
if !ctx.IsSigned {
ctx.HTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized)
return nil
}
context.CheckRepoScopedToken(ctx, repo, auth_model.GetScopeLevelFromAccessMode(accessMode))
if ctx.Written() {
return nil
}
// normal repository RBAC follows
}
However, CheckRepoScopedToken() only enforces token scopes for Basic-authenticated requests:
// services/context/permission.go
func CheckRepoScopedToken(ctx *Context, repo *repo_model.Repository, level auth_model.AccessTokenScopeLevel) {
if !ctx.IsBasicAuth || ctx.Data["IsApiToken"] != true {
return
}
scope, ok := ctx.Data["ApiTokenScope"].(auth_model.AccessTokenScope)
if ok {
requiredScopes := auth_model.GetRequiredScopes(level, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryRepository)
// public-only and required repository scope checks follow
}
}
The Bearer/OAuth2 auth path still records the token scope:
// services/auth/oauth2.go
accessTokenScope, uid := GetOAuthAccessTokenScopeAndUserID(ctx, tokenSHA)
if uid != 0 {
store.GetData()["IsApiToken"] = true
store.GetData()["ApiTokenScope"] = accessTokenScope
}
Bearer PATs also set IsApiToken=true and ApiTokenScope, but ctx.IsBasicAuth remains false because the selected auth method is OAuth2/Bearer rather than Basic. The scope is therefore available but ignored.
PoC
This test creates a token for user2 with only read:notification, then requests Git Smart HTTP refs for user2/repo2, which is private. The same token is rejected over Basic auth, but succeeds over Bearer auth.
func TestPOCGitSmartHTTPBearerTokenBypassesRepositoryScope(t *testing.T) {
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
repo := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: 2, OwnerName: "user2", Name: "repo2"})
assert.True(t, repo.IsPrivate)
session := loginUser(t, "user2")
token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadNotification)
url := "/user2/repo2/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack"
basicReq := NewRequest(t, "GET", url)
basicReq.SetBasicAuth(token, "x-oauth-basic")
MakeRequest(t, basicReq, http.StatusForbidden)
bearerReq := NewRequest(t, "GET", url).AddTokenAuth(token)
resp := MakeRequest(t, bearerReq, http.StatusOK)
assert.Contains(t, resp.Body.String(), "refs/heads/master")
}
Impact
Any Gitea instance exposing Git Smart HTTP is affected when users use PATs or OAuth2 tokens as Bearer tokens. The attacker still needs a token for a user who has normal repository RBAC, so this does not grant access to repositories the token owner could not otherwise access.
The vulnerability breaks the access-token scope boundary. A token intended only for unrelated scopes, such as read:notification, can clone or fetch private repository contents over Git Smart HTTP. The same root cause can affect write flows because git-receive-pack also calls the same repository scope check before normal write RBAC.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | code.gitea.io/gitea | all versions | 1.26.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for code.gitea.io/gitea. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update code.gitea.io/gitea to 1.26.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-cc8w-r4qh-3v65 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-cc8w-r4qh-3v65 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-cc8w-r4qh-3v65. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-cc8w-r4qh-3v65 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-cc8w-r4qh-3v65 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.