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GHSA-c5c4-8r6x-56w3

MEDIUM

GHSA-c5c4-8r6x-56w3 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.8) CWE-863 vulnerability in github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-c5c4-8r6x-56w3 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

OAuth2 Proxy has an Authorization Bypass in Email Domain Validation via Malformed Multi-@ Email Claims

Also known asBIT-oauth2-proxy-2026-40574CVE-2026-40574GO-2026-5314
Published
Apr 15, 2026
Updated
Jul 21, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

An authorization bypass exists in OAuth2 Proxy as part of the email_domain enforcement option. An attacker may be able to authenticate with an email claim such as [email protected]@company.com and satisfy an allowed domain check for company.com, even though the claim is not a valid email address.

The issue ONLY affects deployments that rely on email_domain restrictions and accept email claim values from identity providers or claim mappings that do not strictly enforce normal email syntax. The practical risk ONLY exists in self-hosted or custom OIDC environments and federated setups where unexpected claim values can reach oauth2-proxy. Standard hosted providers that enforce valid email formatting ARE NOT effected.

Patches

Users should upgrade to v7.15.2 or later once available.

Workarounds

The most effective workaround is to ensure the configured identity provider cannot emit malformed or attacker-controlled email claim values.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7all versions7.15.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7 to 7.15.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-c5c4-8r6x-56w3 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-c5c4-8r6x-56w3 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-c5c4-8r6x-56w3. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact An authorization bypass exists in OAuth2 Proxy as part of the `email_domain` enforcement option. An attacker may be able to authenticate with an email claim such as `[email protected]@company.com` and satisfy an allowed domain check for `company.com`, even though the claim is not a valid email address. The issue **ONLY** affects deployments that rely on `email_domain` restrictions and accept email claim values from identity providers or claim mappings that do not strictly enforce normal email syntax. The practical risk ONLY exists in self-hosted or custom OIDC environments and fed
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-c5c4-8r6x-56w3 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-c5c4-8r6x-56w3 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.