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Not in CISA KEV
MEDIUM severity

GHSA-98fx-66cf-fc7c

MEDIUMFix: surrealdb/surrealdb@500f406

GHSA-98fx-66cf-fc7c is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) vulnerability in surrealdb. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-98fx-66cf-fc7c is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

SurrealDB: Scraping a TABLE with no available PERMISSIONS to current auth level

Published
Jul 1, 2026
Updated
Jul 1, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Jul 1, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🦀surrealdb

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

A vulnerability was discovered where the user-supplied WHERE clause in a SELECT statement is evaluated against the full record data before PERMISSIONS FOR SELECT WHERE determines whether the principal is authorised to access that record. A side-effecting expression in the WHERE clause can exfiltrate record contents before the permission check runs. The same ordering bug affects the SET, MERGE, CONTENT and PATCH clauses of update-variant statements (UPDATE, UPSERT-update, INSERT ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE, RELATE-update).

This vulnerability is confined to the attacker's current database. It does not cross namespace or database isolation boundaries.

Impact

An authenticated user — including Record and Scope users — can read the full contents of any table in the database they are authenticated against, bypassing PERMISSIONS FOR SELECT WHERE restrictions on those tables.

The most direct exfiltration method requires scripting functions to be enabled (--allow-scripting / -A). However, exfiltration via SurrealQL's THROW statement is also feasible without scripting functions, and timing-based side-channel extraction is possible in all configurations.

All tables within the attacker's current database, regardless of table-level PERMISSIONS FOR SELECT WHERE restrictions on those tables, are vulnerable to this attack. Tables in other databases within the same namespace, or within other namespaces, are not vulnerable.

Patches

A patch has been introduced that runs check_permissions_table before any user-supplied expression is evaluated against the record. A new check_pre_update helper centralises this ordering on every update-variant code path. Regression tests covering WHERE, SET, MERGE, CONTENT, INSERT ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE, and RELATE with THROW side-effects are included.

  • Versions 3.1.0 and later are not affected by this issue.

Workarounds

Affected users who are unable to update may want to:

  • Disable scripting functions if not required — remove the -A / --allow-scripting flag. This blocks the most direct exfiltration method but does not fully mitigate the vulnerability, as THROW-based and timing-based exfiltration remain possible.
  • Limit query access — restrict the ability of untrusted principals to run arbitrary SELECT queries with user-controlled WHERE clauses.
  • Use namespace/database isolation instead of table-level permissions as the primary security boundary where feasible, since the vulnerability is in table-level permission enforcement, not namespace or database isolation.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.iosurrealdball versions3.1.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for surrealdb. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update surrealdb to 3.1.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-98fx-66cf-fc7c is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-98fx-66cf-fc7c is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-98fx-66cf-fc7c. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

A vulnerability was discovered where the user-supplied `WHERE` clause in a `SELECT` statement is evaluated against the full record data before `PERMISSIONS FOR SELECT WHERE` determines whether the principal is authorised to access that record. A side-effecting expression in the `WHERE` clause can exfiltrate record contents before the permission check runs. The same ordering bug affects the `SET`, `MERGE`, `CONTENT` and `PATCH` clauses of update-variant statements (`UPDATE`, `UPSERT-update`, `INSERT ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE`, `RELATE-update`). This vulnerability is confined to the attacker's cu
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-98fx-66cf-fc7c in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-98fx-66cf-fc7c across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.