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CVE-2026-62992 — smarty

Fix: smarty-php/smarty@99c048c

CVE-2026-62992 is a Path Traversal vulnerability in smarty/smarty. A fix is available for smarty/smarty — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Smarty: Symlink path traversal out of trusted directories

Also known asGHSA-f6wf-28g6-769x
Published
Updated
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 4, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-62992.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs45th percentile — riskier than 45% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.34%0.69%1.03%0.4%0.5%0.5%0.5%Sep 26Nov 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
🐘smarty/smarty🐘smarty/smarty

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

When Smarty's Security policy is enabled, secure_dir (and the configured template/trusted directories) restrict which local files a template may read via {include} and {fetch}. The trust check in Security::_checkDir() resolved the requested path with Smarty::_realpath(), which normalizes the path as a string only and does not follow symbolic links. A symlink placed inside a trusted directory therefore passed the trust check, while the underlying file_get_contents() followed it to an arbitrary file outside the sandbox (e.g. /etc/passwd).

Impact

An attacker able to (a) cause a symlink to exist inside a trusted directory (e.g. a user-upload area located within the template path) and (b) cause a template to reference that path can read arbitrary files readable by the PHP process, escaping the secure_dir boundary. Confidentiality impact only.

Patches

Fixed in 5.8.2. Security::_checkDir() now resolves the requested file with native realpath() and re-validates the canonical, symlink-free path against the trusted directories (which are canonicalized the same way, so legitimate symlinked deployment paths such as a Capistrano current symlink or macOS /var → /private/var keep working). It falls back to string normalization only when the file does not yet exist on disk.

Workarounds

Ensure no untrusted symlinks can be created within any directory listed in secure_dir/the trusted template directories; restrict write access to those directories to trusted processes only.

References

  • Fix commit: 99c048c
  • CWE-22

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistsmarty/smarty≥ 5.0.0&&< 5.8.25.8.2composer require smarty/smarty:^5.8.2
🐘Packagistsmarty/smartyall versions4.5.7composer require smarty/smarty:^4.5.7

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for smarty/smarty, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update smarty/smarty to 5.8.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-62992 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.

Frequently Asked Questions

When Smarty's Security policy is enabled, secure_dir (and the configured template/trusted directories) restrict which local files a template may read via {include} and {fetch}. The trust check in Security::_checkDir() resolved the requested path with Smarty::_realpath(), which normalizes the path as a string only and does not follow symbolic links. A symlink placed inside a trusted directory therefore passed the trust check, while the underlying file_get_contents() followed it to an arbitrary file outside the sandbox (e.g. /etc/passwd). ## Impact An attacker able to (a) cause a symlink to exi
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-62992: smarty — Fixed in 5.8.2