picklescan vulnerable to arbitrary file create using logging.FileHandlerGHSA-m7j5-r2p5-c39r
Fix: mmaitre314/picklescan#60GHSA-m7j5-r2p5-c39r is a Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in picklescan. A fix is available for picklescan — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-m7j5-r2p5-c39r.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
picklescanReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Unsafe pickle deserialization allows unauthenticated attackers to perform Arbitrary File Creation. By chaining the logging.FileHandler class, an attacker can bypass RCE-focused blocklists to create empty files on the server. The vulnerability allows creating zero-byte files in arbitrary locations but does not permit overwriting or modifying existing files.
Details
The application deserializes untrusted pickle data. While RCE keywords may be blocked, the exploit abuses standard library features:
logging.FileHandler: The exploit instantiates this class using its default behavior (append mode).
Behavior on Existing Files: If the target file already exists, the handler opens it without modifying its content, resulting in no impact to existing data.
Behavior on Non-Existent Files: If the target file does not exist, the handler creates a new zero-byte file with the specified name.
PoC
import pickle
class WriteFile:
def __reduce__(self):
from logging import FileHandler
return (FileHandler, ('evil.log',))
with open("bypass_write.pkl", "wb") as f:
pickle.dump(WriteFile(), f)
handler = pickle.loads(pickle.dumps(WriteFile()))
<img width="1201" height="140" alt="313e1cfacbe700e27b6875e49808c52a" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8873bb54-0f98-41aa-8e7c-a38a245ca428" />
Impact
This primitive can be used for Filesystem Pollution or Logic Disruption. For example, an attacker could create specific "lock files" (e.g., maintenance.lock, .lock) that the application checks for, potentially triggering a Denial of Service (DoS) or preventing the application from starting.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | picklescan | all versions | 1.0.1pip install --upgrade 'picklescan==1.0.1' |
Affected Products
picklescanmmaitre314Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for picklescan, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update picklescan to 1.0.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-m7j5-r2p5-c39r is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Do not deserialise data from untrusted sources: where the format allows it, restrict deserialisation to an explicit allowlist of expected types, and prefer a data-only format (JSON, Protobuf) over one that can reconstruct arbitrary objects until you can upgrade.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-m7j5-r2p5-c39r in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.