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picklescan vulnerable to arbitrary file create using logging.FileHandlerGHSA-m7j5-r2p5-c39r

Fix: mmaitre314/picklescan#60

GHSA-m7j5-r2p5-c39r is a Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in picklescan. A fix is available for picklescan — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-56304PYSEC-2026-225
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 3, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-m7j5-r2p5-c39r.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs39th percentile — riskier than 39% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.31%0.63%0.94%0.3%0.4%Jul 26Oct 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍picklescan

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Unsafe pickle deserialization allows unauthenticated attackers to perform Arbitrary File Creation. By chaining the logging.FileHandler class, an attacker can bypass RCE-focused blocklists to create empty files on the server. The vulnerability allows creating zero-byte files in arbitrary locations but does not permit overwriting or modifying existing files.

Details

The application deserializes untrusted pickle data. While RCE keywords may be blocked, the exploit abuses standard library features:

logging.FileHandler: The exploit instantiates this class using its default behavior (append mode).

Behavior on Existing Files: If the target file already exists, the handler opens it without modifying its content, resulting in no impact to existing data.

Behavior on Non-Existent Files: If the target file does not exist, the handler creates a new zero-byte file with the specified name.

PoC

import pickle

class WriteFile:
    def __reduce__(self):
        from logging import FileHandler
        return (FileHandler, ('evil.log',))
    
with open("bypass_write.pkl", "wb") as f:
    pickle.dump(WriteFile(), f)

handler = pickle.loads(pickle.dumps(WriteFile()))
<img width="1201" height="140" alt="313e1cfacbe700e27b6875e49808c52a" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8873bb54-0f98-41aa-8e7c-a38a245ca428" />

Impact

This primitive can be used for Filesystem Pollution or Logic Disruption. For example, an attacker could create specific "lock files" (e.g., maintenance.lock, .lock) that the application checks for, potentially triggering a Denial of Service (DoS) or preventing the application from starting.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIpicklescanall versions1.0.1pip install --upgrade 'picklescan==1.0.1'

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
picklescanmmaitre314
< 1.0.1
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for picklescan, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update picklescan to 1.0.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-m7j5-r2p5-c39r is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Do not deserialise data from untrusted sources: where the format allows it, restrict deserialisation to an explicit allowlist of expected types, and prefer a data-only format (JSON, Protobuf) over one that can reconstruct arbitrary objects until you can upgrade.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Unsafe pickle deserialization allows unauthenticated attackers to perform Arbitrary File Creation. By chaining the logging.FileHandler class, an attacker can bypass RCE-focused blocklists to create empty files on the server. The vulnerability allows creating zero-byte files in arbitrary locations but does not permit overwriting or modifying existing files. ### Details The application deserializes untrusted pickle data. While RCE keywords may be blocked, the exploit abuses standard library features: logging.FileHandler: The exploit instantiates this class using its default behavio
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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