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GHSA-7x63-xv5r-3p2x

CRITICAL

GHSA-7x63-xv5r-3p2x is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.1) vulnerability in github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-7x63-xv5r-3p2x is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

OAuth2 Proxy has an Authentication Bypass via X-Forwarded-Uri Header Spoofing

Also known asBIT-oauth2-proxy-2026-40575CVE-2026-40575GO-2026-5236
Published
Apr 15, 2026
Updated
Jul 21, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

A configuration-dependent authentication bypass exists in OAuth2 Proxy.

Deployments are affected when all of the following are true:

  • OAuth2 Proxy is configured with --reverse-proxy
  • and at least one rule is defined with --skip_auth_routes or the legacy --skip-auth-regex

OAuth2 Proxy may trust a client-supplied X-Forwarded-Uri header when --reverse-proxy is enabled and --skip-auth-route or --skip-auth-regex is configured. An attacker can spoof this header so OAuth2 Proxy evaluates authentication and skip-auth rules against a different path than the one actually sent to the upstream application.

This can result in an unauthenticated remote attacker bypassing authentication and accessing protected routes without a valid session.

Patches

This issue is addressed as part of the newly introduced --trusted-proxy-ip flag in v7.15.2. If you leave it unset, OAuth2 Proxy will continue to trust ALL source IPs (0.0.0.0/0) for backwards compatibility, which means a client may still be able to spoof forwarded headers. Therefore after upgrading we urge you to use the new --trusted-proxy-ip flag to set the IPs or CIDR ranges of the reverse proxies that are allowed to send X-Forwarded-* headers and furthermore implement the mitigation steps outlined below to properly configure your load balancer infrastructure.

Mitigation

  • Strip any client-provided X-Forwarded-Uri header at the reverse proxy or load balancer level

  • Explicitly overwrite X-Forwarded-Uri with the actual request URI before forwarding requests to OAuth2 Proxy

    Example nginx mitigation for the auth subrequest:

      location /internal-auth/ {
        internal; # Ensure external users can't access this path
    
        # Make sure the OAuth2 Proxy knows where the original request came from.
        proxy_set_header Host       $host;
        proxy_set_header X-Real-IP  $remote_addr;
        # set the value to the actual $request_uri and therefore strip any user provided X-Forwarded-Uri
        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Uri $request_uri;
    
        proxy_pass http://oauth2-proxy:4180/;
      }
    
  • Restrict direct client access to OAuth2 Proxy so it can only be reached through a trusted reverse proxy

  • Remove or narrow --skip-auth-route / --skip-auth-regex rules where possible

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v77.5.0&&< 7.15.27.15.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7 to 7.15.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7x63-xv5r-3p2x is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7x63-xv5r-3p2x is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-7x63-xv5r-3p2x. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact A configuration-dependent authentication bypass exists in OAuth2 Proxy. Deployments are affected when all of the following are true: * OAuth2 Proxy is configured with `--reverse-proxy` * and at least one rule is defined with `--skip_auth_routes` or the legacy `--skip-auth-regex` OAuth2 Proxy may trust a client-supplied `X-Forwarded-Uri` header when `--reverse-proxy` is enabled and `--skip-auth-route` or `--skip-auth-regex` is configured. An attacker can spoof this header so OAuth2 Proxy evaluates authentication and skip-auth rules against a different path than the one actually s
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-7x63-xv5r-3p2x in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-7x63-xv5r-3p2x across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.