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📦 npm

GHSA-7ww6-75fj-jcj7

MEDIUM

Cross-site Scripting in Auth0 Lock

Also known asCVE-2022-29172
Published
May 24, 2022
Updated
Nov 8, 2023
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk43th percentile+0.36%
0.00%0.36%0.71%1.07%0.2%0.6%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

auth0-locknpm
22Kdownloads / week

Description

Overview

In versions before and including 11.32.2, when the “additional signup fields” feature is configured, a malicious actor can inject invalidated HTML code into these additional fields, which is then stored in the service user_metdata payload (using the name property).

Verification emails, when applicable, are generated using this metadata. It is therefor possible for an actor to craft a malicious link by injecting HTML, which is then rendered as the recipient's name within the delivered email template.

Am I affected?

You are impacted by this vulnerability if you are using auth0-lock version 11.32.2 or lower and are using the “additional signup fields” feature in your application.

How to fix that?

Upgrade to version 11.33.0.

Will this update impact my users?

Additional signup fields that have been added to the signup tab on Lock will have HTML tags stripped from user input from version 11.33.0 onwards. The user will not receive any validation warning or feedback, but backend data will no longer include HTML.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmauth0-lockall versions11.33.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for auth0-lock. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update auth0-lock to 11.33.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7ww6-75fj-jcj7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7ww6-75fj-jcj7 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-7ww6-75fj-jcj7. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Overview In versions before and including `11.32.2`, when the “additional signup fields” feature [is configured](https://github.com/auth0/lock#additional-sign-up-fields), a malicious actor can inject invalidated HTML code into these additional fields, which is then stored in the service `user_metdata` payload (using the `name` property). Verification emails, when applicable, are generated using this metadata. It is therefor possible for an actor to craft a malicious link by injecting HTML, which is then rendered as the recipient's name within the delivered email template. ### Am I affec
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-7ww6-75fj-jcj7 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-7ww6-75fj-jcj7 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.