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vm2: External module allowlist uses a raw prefix test, so a prefix-sharing sibling package is treated as allowlistedGHSA-7q3f-wx44-378m

MEDIUMFix: patriksimek/vm2@6ac3916

GHSA-7q3f-wx44-378m is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.2) Path Traversal vulnerability in vm2. A fix is available for vm2 — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-92945
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 23, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-7q3f-wx44-378m.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs19th percentile — riskier than 19% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.26%0.52%0.78%0.3%0.3%Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-7q3f-wx44-378m by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 394,803 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

899other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
vm2npm
669Kdownloads / week

Description

Summary

isPathAllowedForModule decides whether a resolved path belongs to an allowlisted external module using a raw string prefix test. node_modules/foo2 starts with node_modules/foo, so a package whose name merely shares a prefix with an allowlisted one is treated as being inside it, and a relative require from the allowlisted package reaches it even with transitive loading disabled.

Where it is

lib/resolver-compat.js, lines 122 to 132, quoted from HEAD 7a1f5100b96f48d34e0fe104ab37c0acc5944f92:

isPathAllowedForModule(path, mod) {
    if (!super.isPathAllowed(path)) return false;
    if (mod) {
        if (mod.allowTransitive) return true;
        if (path.startsWith(mod.path)) {
            const rem = path.slice(mod.path.length);
            if (!/(?:^|[\\/])node_modules(?:$|[\\/])/.test(rem)) return true;
        }
    }
    return this.externals.some(regex => regex.test(path));
}

With mod.path of .../node_modules/foo and a resolved path of .../node_modules/foo2/index.js, startsWith is true and rem is 2/index.js, which contains no node_modules segment, so the function returns true.

The node_modules test in rem is what stops a genuine transitive dependency from slipping through. It does not stop a sibling, because a sibling's remainder never contains that segment.

Impact

Code running in NodeVM under an external module allowlist with transitive: false can reach a package that was not allowlisted, provided an allowlisted package performs a relative require to a prefix-sharing sibling.

Two preconditions are worth stating plainly rather than leaving implicit. The deployment must already have such a package layout, and an allowlisted package must have a reachable code path that does the relative require. This is not something the attacker creates; it is something they find. That narrows it considerably, and it is why I have not scored it higher.

Reachability

NodeVM.run at lib/nodevm.js:506 executes the script. require comes from createRequireForModule at lib/setup-node-sandbox.js:168-172 and reaches the resolver callback at lib/nodevm.js:380-384. LegacyResolver.resolveFull at lib/resolver-compat.js:145-160 sets currMod for direct requires, the relative specifier resolves through DefaultResolver.resolveFull and tryFile at lib/resolver.js:327-330, and the authorization decision lands on the function above.

Suggested fix

Require a separator after the prefix, so a sibling cannot match:

if (path === mod.path || path.startsWith(mod.path + path.sep)) {

That is the same anchoring the rem regex already applies to node_modules, applied one level earlier.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmvm2all versions3.11.7npm install vm2@3.11.7

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for vm2, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update vm2 to 3.11.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7q3f-wx44-378m is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatModerate

Moderate impact. This vulnerability in the `vm2` component, present in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform and Red Hat Developer Hub, allows for a module allowlist bypass. Exploitation requires an attacker to perform relative module imports from an already allowlisted package when transitive loading is disabled,…

Workaround published by Red Hat
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for GHSA-7q3f-wx44-378m (CC BY 4.0)

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary `isPathAllowedForModule` decides whether a resolved path belongs to an allowlisted external module using a raw string prefix test. `node_modules/foo2` starts with `node_modules/foo`, so a package whose name merely shares a prefix with an allowlisted one is treated as being inside it, and a relative require from the allowlisted package reaches it even with transitive loading disabled. ## Where it is `lib/resolver-compat.js`, lines 122 to 132, quoted from HEAD `7a1f5100b96f48d34e0fe104ab37c0acc5944f92`: ```js isPathAllowedForModule(path, mod) { if (!super.isPathAllowed(path))
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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