Strapi has a rate limit bypass on users-permissions plugin via attacker-controlled email keyingGHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw
Fix: strapi/strapi#24818GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw is a CWE-307 vulnerability in @strapi/plugin-users-permissions. A fix is available for @strapi/plugin-users-permissions — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
@strapi/plugin-users-permissionsnpmDescription
Summary of CVE-2025-64526 Vulnerability Details
- CVE: CVE-2025-64526
- CVSS v3.1 Vector:
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N(6.9 — Medium) - Affected Versions:
@strapi/plugin-users-permissions<=5.44.0 - How to Patch: Immediately update your Strapi to >=5.45.0
Description of CVE-2025-64526
In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from ctx.request.body.email, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an email field (/auth/local, /auth/reset-password, /auth/change-password). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary email value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts.
The rate-limit key was constructed as ${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}, where userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. /auth/forgot-password, /auth/local/register), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (identifier for login, code for password reset, currentPassword for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the value and obtain a unique key on every request.
The patch maintains an allow-list of routes that legitimately key on the email field and excludes that key component on every other route the middleware is mounted on. OAuth callback paths (/connect/*) are treated identifier-less. On routes outside the allow-list, the middleware now falls back to a fixed identifier-less key, ensuring per-IP throttling remains effective even when the request body is attacker-controlled.
IoC's for CVE-2025-64526
Indicators that an instance running an unpatched version may have been exploited:
- Unusually high volumes of
POSTrequests to/api/auth/local,/api/auth/reset-password, or/api/auth/change-passwordfrom a single IP within a 5-minute window without 429 (Too Many Requests) responses - Request bodies on
/api/auth/localcontaining bothidentifierANDemailfields whereemailvaries per request. Body shape regex:"identifier"\s*:\s*"[^"]*",\s*"email"\s*:\s*"[^"]*" - Request bodies on
/api/auth/reset-passwordcontaining an unexpectedemailfield alongsidecode. Body shape regex:"code"\s*:\s*"[^"]*",.*"email"\s*: - Server logs showing many distinct rate-limit key prefixes for the same IP+route combination within the rate-limit window
- Successful authentication or password reset following hundreds of preceding 401/400 responses from the same IP
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @strapi/plugin-users-permissions | all versions | 5.45.0npm install @strapi/plugin-users-permissions@5.45.0 |
Affected Products
strapistrapiDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @strapi/plugin-users-permissions, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update @strapi/plugin-users-permissions to 5.45.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.