GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw
Fix: strapi/strapi#24818GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw is a CWE-307 vulnerability in @strapi/plugin-users-permissions. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Strapi has a rate limit bypass on users-permissions plugin via attacker-controlled email keying
Real-World Exposure
@strapi/plugin-users-permissionsReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects npm packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary of CVE-2025-64526 Vulnerability Details
- CVE: CVE-2025-64526
- CVSS v3.1 Vector:
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N(6.9 — Medium) - Affected Versions:
@strapi/plugin-users-permissions<=5.44.0 - How to Patch: Immediately update your Strapi to >=5.45.0
Description of CVE-2025-64526
In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from ctx.request.body.email, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an email field (/auth/local, /auth/reset-password, /auth/change-password). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary email value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts.
The rate-limit key was constructed as ${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}, where userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. /auth/forgot-password, /auth/local/register), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (identifier for login, code for password reset, currentPassword for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the value and obtain a unique key on every request.
The patch maintains an allow-list of routes that legitimately key on the email field and excludes that key component on every other route the middleware is mounted on. OAuth callback paths (/connect/*) are treated identifier-less. On routes outside the allow-list, the middleware now falls back to a fixed identifier-less key, ensuring per-IP throttling remains effective even when the request body is attacker-controlled.
IoC's for CVE-2025-64526
Indicators that an instance running an unpatched version may have been exploited:
- Unusually high volumes of
POSTrequests to/api/auth/local,/api/auth/reset-password, or/api/auth/change-passwordfrom a single IP within a 5-minute window without 429 (Too Many Requests) responses - Request bodies on
/api/auth/localcontaining bothidentifierANDemailfields whereemailvaries per request. Body shape regex:"identifier"\s*:\s*"[^"]*",\s*"email"\s*:\s*"[^"]*" - Request bodies on
/api/auth/reset-passwordcontaining an unexpectedemailfield alongsidecode. Body shape regex:"code"\s*:\s*"[^"]*",.*"email"\s*: - Server logs showing many distinct rate-limit key prefixes for the same IP+route combination within the rate-limit window
- Successful authentication or password reset following hundreds of preceding 401/400 responses from the same IP
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @strapi/plugin-users-permissions | all versions | 5.45.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @strapi/plugin-users-permissions. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update @strapi/plugin-users-permissions to 5.45.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.