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GHSA-7c2g-p23p-4jg3

MEDIUM

Vikjuna: Webhook BasicAuth Credentials Exposed to Read-Only Project Collaborators via API

Also known asCVE-2026-33677GO-2026-4846
Published
Mar 25, 2026
Updated
Mar 26, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk21th percentile+0.25%
0.00%0.27%0.53%0.80%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.3%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹code.vikunja.io/api

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The GET /api/v1/projects/:project/webhooks endpoint returns webhook BasicAuth credentials (basic_auth_user and basic_auth_password) in plaintext to any user with read access to the project. While the existing code correctly masks the HMAC secret field, the BasicAuth fields added in a later migration were not given the same treatment. This allows read-only collaborators to steal credentials intended for authenticating against external webhook receivers.

Details

When listing project webhooks, the ReadAll method in pkg/models/webhooks.go (line 203) only requires project read access:

// pkg/models/webhooks.go:203-244
func (w *Webhook) ReadAll(s *xorm.Session, a web.Auth, _ string, page int, perPage int) (result interface{}, resultCount int, numberOfTotalItems int64, err error) {
	p := &Project{ID: w.ProjectID}
	can, _, err := p.CanRead(s, a)  // Only requires read permission
	if err != nil {
		return nil, 0, 0, err
	}
	if !can {
		return nil, 0, 0, ErrGenericForbidden{}
	}

	// ... fetches webhooks from DB ...

	for _, webhook := range ws {
		webhook.Secret = ""  // HMAC secret is masked
		// BasicAuthUser and BasicAuthPassword are NOT masked
		if createdBy, has := users[webhook.CreatedByID]; has {
			webhook.CreatedBy = createdBy
		}
	}

	return ws, len(ws), total, err
}

The Webhook struct defines both fields with JSON serialization tags, so they are included in API responses:

// pkg/models/webhooks.go:63-64
BasicAuthUser     string `xorm:"null" json:"basic_auth_user"`
BasicAuthPassword string `xorm:"null" json:"basic_auth_password"`

The BasicAuth fields were added in migration 20260123000717 ("Add basic auth to webhooks"), but the credential masking logic at line 238 was not updated to include these new fields.

The same issue exists in the user webhook listing at pkg/routes/api/v1/user_webhooks.go:65, where Secret is masked but BasicAuth fields are not. This is lower impact since users only see their own webhooks.

PoC

  1. As User A (project admin), create a project and a webhook with BasicAuth credentials:
# Create a webhook with BasicAuth on project 1
curl -X PUT "http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects/1/webhooks" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_A" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "target_url": "https://external-service.example.com/hook",
    "events": ["task.created"],
    "secret": "my-hmac-secret",
    "basic_auth_user": "service-account",
    "basic_auth_password": "S3cretP@ssw0rd!"
  }'
  1. As User B (read-only collaborator on the same project), list webhooks:
curl -s "http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects/1/webhooks" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_B" | jq '.[0] | {secret, basic_auth_user, basic_auth_password}'
  1. Expected output (secret is masked, but BasicAuth is leaked):
{
  "secret": "",
  "basic_auth_user": "service-account",
  "basic_auth_password": "S3cretP@ssw0rd!"
}

Impact

  • Credential theft: Any user with read-only access to a project can steal BasicAuth credentials configured on that project's webhooks. These credentials may grant access to external services (CI/CD systems, notification endpoints, third-party APIs).
  • Lateral movement: Stolen credentials could be reused to authenticate against external systems that the webhook receiver protects.
  • Broad exposure surface: Credentials are exposed to all project readers, including users granted access through team shares and link shares (with read+ permission level).

Recommended Fix

In pkg/models/webhooks.go, add masking for BasicAuth fields alongside the existing Secret masking (around line 237):

for _, webhook := range ws {
	webhook.Secret = ""
	webhook.BasicAuthUser = ""
	webhook.BasicAuthPassword = ""
	if createdBy, has := users[webhook.CreatedByID]; has {
		webhook.CreatedBy = createdBy
	}
}

Apply the same fix in pkg/routes/api/v1/user_webhooks.go (around line 64):

for _, w := range ws {
	w.Secret = ""
	w.BasicAuthUser = ""
	w.BasicAuthPassword = ""
	if createdBy, has := users[w.CreatedByID]; has {
		w.CreatedBy = createdBy
	}
}

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gocode.vikunja.io/apiall versions2.2.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for code.vikunja.io/api. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update code.vikunja.io/api to 2.2.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7c2g-p23p-4jg3 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7c2g-p23p-4jg3 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-7c2g-p23p-4jg3. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The `GET /api/v1/projects/:project/webhooks` endpoint returns webhook BasicAuth credentials (`basic_auth_user` and `basic_auth_password`) in plaintext to any user with read access to the project. While the existing code correctly masks the HMAC `secret` field, the BasicAuth fields added in a later migration were not given the same treatment. This allows read-only collaborators to steal credentials intended for authenticating against external webhook receivers. ## Details When listing project webhooks, the `ReadAll` method in `pkg/models/webhooks.go` (line 203) only requires proje
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-7c2g-p23p-4jg3 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-7c2g-p23p-4jg3 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-7c2g-p23p-4jg3: api (Medium 6.5) | O3 Security