How severe is GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737 yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737?

GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737 affects the following packages: code.vikunja.io/api (Go). Ecosystems affected: Go.

How do I fix GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737?

Update code.vikunja.io/api to 2.6.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737 in my Go dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for code.vikunja.io/api, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

How do I mitigate GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Is GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

When was GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737 published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737 was published on October 9, 2026 and was last updated on October 19, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐹 Go

Not in CISA KEV

Vikunja: Assignee email addresses disclosed to read-only project members via the task assignees endpointGHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737

Fix: go-vikunja/vikunja#3688

GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737 is a security vulnerability in code.vikunja.io/api. A fix is available for code.vikunja.io/api — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asGO-2026-6723

Published

Oct 9, 2026

Updated

Oct 19, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Oct 19, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

🐹code.vikunja.io/api

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

TaskAssginee.ReadAll returns assignee user objects without blanking the Email field, disclosing assignee email addresses to any read-only project member. Every sibling path that returns user objects obfuscates the email; this one does not.

Details

pkg/models/task_assignees.go (~lines 306-344) does Select("users.*") and returns the result directly. User.Email is json:"email,omitempty", so a non-empty value always serializes. The endpoint gates on task.CanRead, so a read-only member passes. Sibling paths blank the field: pkg/models/tasks.go:530, pkg/models/project_users.go:216, pkg/models/teams.go:177, pkg/models/label_task.go:312, pkg/models/task_attachment.go:511. The omission here reads as an oversight, not a decision.

The same file's getRawTaskAssigneesForTasks (~line 56) also selects users.* but is safe because its only caller (addAssigneesToTasks) blanks the email afterwards.

PoC (verified at runtime against v2.5.0, v1 and v2)

GET /api/v1/tasks/{id}/assignees   (reader with permission:0)
-> [{"id":37,"username":"...","email":"[email protected]", ...}]

Same leak on GET /api/v2/tasks/{id}/assignees (routes through the identical model method). Contrast: GET /api/v1/projects/{id}/projectusers and the project task-embed both return the same users with no email.

Impact

Disclosure of assignees' email addresses to users who should only see usernames. Read-only.

Fix

Blank Email on each returned user in TaskAssginee.ReadAll before returning, matching the sibling paths. Covers v1 and v2 at once.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐹Go	`code.vikunja.io/api`	all versions	2.6.0`go get code.vikunja.io/api@v2.6.0`

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for code.vikunja.io/api, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update code.vikunja.io/api to 2.6.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary `TaskAssginee.ReadAll` returns assignee user objects without blanking the `Email` field, disclosing assignee email addresses to any read-only project member. Every sibling path that returns user objects obfuscates the email; this one does not. ### Details `pkg/models/task_assignees.go` (~lines 306-344) does `Select("users.*")` and returns the result directly. `User.Email` is `json:"email,omitempty"`, so a non-empty value always serializes. The endpoint gates on `task.CanRead`, so a read-only member passes. Sibling paths blank the field: `pkg/models/tasks.go:530`, `pkg/models/proje

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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