Netty has HttpClientCodec response desynchronizationGHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3
HIGHGHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.3) CWE-444 vulnerability in io.netty:netty-codec-http. A fix is available for io.netty:netty-codec-http — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
io.netty:netty-codec-http☕io.netty:netty-codec-httpReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
If HttpClientCodec is configured, there are use cases when a response body from one request, can be parsed as another's.
Details
HttpClientCodec pairs each inbound response with an outbound request by queue.poll() once per response, including for 1xx. If the client pipelines GET then HEAD and the server sends 103, then 200 with GET body, then 200 for HEAD, the queue pairs HEAD with the first 200. The HEAD rule then skips reading that message’s body, so the GET entity bytes stay on the stream and the following 200 is parsed from the wrong offset.
Prerequisites
- HTTP/1.1 pipelining
- HEAD in the pipeline
- The server sends 1xx
PoC
@Test
public void test() {
EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpClientCodec());
assertTrue(channel.writeOutbound(new DefaultFullHttpRequest(HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.GET, "/1")));
ByteBuf request = channel.readOutbound();
request.release();
assertNull(channel.readOutbound());
assertTrue(channel.writeOutbound(new DefaultFullHttpRequest(HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.HEAD, "/2")));
request = channel.readOutbound();
request.release();
assertNull(channel.readOutbound());
String responseStr = "HTTP/1.1 103 Early Hints\r\n\r\n" +
"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Length: 5\r\n\r\nhello" +
"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\n";
assertTrue(channel.writeInbound(Unpooled.copiedBuffer(responseStr, CharsetUtil.US_ASCII)));
// Response 1
HttpResponse response = channel.readInbound();
assertEquals(HttpResponseStatus.EARLY_HINTS, response.status());
LastHttpContent last = channel.readInbound();
assertEquals(0, last.content().readableBytes());
last.release();
// Response 2
response = channel.readInbound();
assertEquals(HttpResponseStatus.OK, response.status());
last = channel.readInbound();
assertEquals(0, last.content().readableBytes());
last.release();
// Response 3
FullHttpResponse response1 = channel.readInbound();
assertTrue(response1.decoderResult().isFailure());
assertEquals(0, response1.content().readableBytes());
response1.release();
assertFalse(channel.finish());
}
Impact
Integrity/availability of HTTP parsing on that connection, unsafe reuse of the socket.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☕Maven | io.netty:netty-codec-http | ≥ 4.2.0.Alpha1&&< 4.2.13.Final | 4.2.13.Finalio.netty:netty-codec-http:4.2.13.Final |
| ☕Maven | io.netty:netty-codec-http | all versions | 4.1.133.Finalio.netty:netty-codec-http:4.1.133.Final |
Affected Products
nettynettyDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.netty:netty-codec-http, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update io.netty:netty-codec-http to 4.2.13.Final or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Fixing This On Your OS
If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.
Important: A flaw in Netty's HttpClientCodec allows a remote attacker to cause data confusion. By sending a specially crafted sequence of HTTP responses, an attacker can cause subsequent HTTP responses to be parsed incorrectly, potentially leading to information disclosure or data integrity issues in applications…
| Product | Fixed in | Advisory |
|---|---|---|
| AMQ Clients 2026.Q3 | netty-codec-http | RHSA-2026:69459 |
| Cryostat 4 on RHEL 9 | cryostat/cryostat-reports-rhel9:4.2.0-10 | RHSA-2026:28010 |
| Red Hat AMQ Broker 7.13.6 | netty-codec-http | RHSA-2026:66545 |
| Red Hat AMQ Broker 7.14.1 | netty-codec-http | RHSA-2026:66488 |
| Red Hat build of Apache Camel 4.18.1.P1 for Spring Boot 3.5.16 | netty-codec-http | RHSA-2026:37390 |
| Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.4.13 | see advisory | RHSA-2026:30049 |
| Red Hat build of Quarkus 3.27.4.redhat | io.netty/netty-codec-http:4.1.133.Final-redhat-00002 | RHSA-2026:23808 |
| Red Hat build of Quarkus 3.33.2.redhat | io.netty/netty-codec-http:4.1.133.Final-redhat-00002 | RHSA-2026:24502 |
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3 in your dependencies?
Find it across Maven, including transitive dependencies.