How severe is GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3?

GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3 has a CVSS score of 7.3/10, rated HIGH. Immediate patching is strongly recommended.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3?

GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3 affects the following packages: io.netty:netty-codec-http (Maven), io.netty:netty-codec-http (Maven). Ecosystems affected: Maven.

How do I fix GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3?

Update io.netty:netty-codec-http to 4.2.13.Final or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3 in my Maven dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.netty:netty-codec-http. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

When was GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3 published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3 was published on May 7, 2026 and was last updated on May 14, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

☕ Maven

GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3

HIGH

GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.3) vulnerability in io.netty:netty-codec-http. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Netty has HttpClientCodec response desynchronization

Also known asCVE-2026-42584

Published

May 7, 2026

Updated

May 14, 2026

Affected

2 pkgs

Patched

2 / 2

Exploits

None indexed

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected

☕io.netty:netty-codec-http☕io.netty:netty-codec-http

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

If HttpClientCodec is configured, there are use cases when a response body from one request, can be parsed as another's.

Details

HttpClientCodec pairs each inbound response with an outbound request by queue.poll() once per response, including for 1xx. If the client pipelines GET then HEAD and the server sends 103, then 200 with GET body, then 200 for HEAD, the queue pairs HEAD with the first 200. The HEAD rule then skips reading that message’s body, so the GET entity bytes stay on the stream and the following 200 is parsed from the wrong offset.

Prerequisites

HTTP/1.1 pipelining
HEAD in the pipeline
The server sends 1xx

PoC

    @Test
    public void test() {
        EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpClientCodec());

        assertTrue(channel.writeOutbound(new DefaultFullHttpRequest(HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.GET, "/1")));
        ByteBuf request = channel.readOutbound();
        request.release();
        assertNull(channel.readOutbound());

        assertTrue(channel.writeOutbound(new DefaultFullHttpRequest(HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.HEAD, "/2")));
        request = channel.readOutbound();
        request.release();
        assertNull(channel.readOutbound());

        String responseStr = "HTTP/1.1 103 Early Hints\r\n\r\n" +
                "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Length: 5\r\n\r\nhello" +
                "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\n";
        assertTrue(channel.writeInbound(Unpooled.copiedBuffer(responseStr, CharsetUtil.US_ASCII)));

        // Response 1
        HttpResponse response = channel.readInbound();
        assertEquals(HttpResponseStatus.EARLY_HINTS, response.status());
        LastHttpContent last = channel.readInbound();
        assertEquals(0, last.content().readableBytes());
        last.release();

        // Response 2
        response = channel.readInbound();
        assertEquals(HttpResponseStatus.OK, response.status());
        last = channel.readInbound();
        assertEquals(0, last.content().readableBytes());
        last.release();

        // Response 3
        FullHttpResponse response1 = channel.readInbound();
        assertTrue(response1.decoderResult().isFailure());
        assertEquals(0, response1.content().readableBytes());
        response1.release();

        assertFalse(channel.finish());
    }

Impact

Integrity/availability of HTTP parsing on that connection, unsafe reuse of the socket.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
☕Maven	`io.netty:netty-codec-http`	≥ 4.2.0.Alpha1&&< 4.2.13.Final	4.2.13.Final
☕Maven	`io.netty:netty-codec-http`	all versions	4.1.133.Final

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.netty:netty-codec-http. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update io.netty:netty-codec-http to 4.2.13.Final or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary If HttpClientCodec is configured, there are use cases when a response body from one request, can be parsed as another's. ### Details HttpClientCodec pairs each inbound response with an outbound request by `queue.poll()` once per response, including for `1xx`. If the client pipelines GET then HEAD and the server sends 103, then 200 with GET body, then 200 for HEAD, the queue pairs HEAD with the first 200. The HEAD rule then skips reading that message’s body, so the GET entity bytes stay on the stream and the following 200 is parsed from the wrong offset. Prerequisites - HTTP/1.1

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3 across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

Scan my dependencies How O3 SCA works