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HIGH severity

CVE-2026-42584 — netty-codec-http

HIGH

CVE-2026-42584 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.3) CWE-444 vulnerability in io.netty:netty-codec-http. A fix is available for io.netty:netty-codec-http — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Netty: HttpClientCodec response desynchronization

Also known asGHSA-57rv-r2g8-2cj3
Published
Updated
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 8, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-42584.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.8%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs58th percentile — riskier than 58% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.45%0.89%1.34%0.0%0.8%Jun 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
☕io.netty:netty-codec-http☕io.netty:netty-codec-http

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

If HttpClientCodec is configured, there are use cases when a response body from one request, can be parsed as another's.

Details

HttpClientCodec pairs each inbound response with an outbound request by queue.poll() once per response, including for 1xx. If the client pipelines GET then HEAD and the server sends 103, then 200 with GET body, then 200 for HEAD, the queue pairs HEAD with the first 200. The HEAD rule then skips reading that message’s body, so the GET entity bytes stay on the stream and the following 200 is parsed from the wrong offset.

Prerequisites

  • HTTP/1.1 pipelining
  • HEAD in the pipeline
  • The server sends 1xx

PoC

    @Test
    public void test() {
        EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpClientCodec());

        assertTrue(channel.writeOutbound(new DefaultFullHttpRequest(HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.GET, "/1")));
        ByteBuf request = channel.readOutbound();
        request.release();
        assertNull(channel.readOutbound());

        assertTrue(channel.writeOutbound(new DefaultFullHttpRequest(HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.HEAD, "/2")));
        request = channel.readOutbound();
        request.release();
        assertNull(channel.readOutbound());

        String responseStr = "HTTP/1.1 103 Early Hints\r\n\r\n" +
                "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Length: 5\r\n\r\nhello" +
                "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\n";
        assertTrue(channel.writeInbound(Unpooled.copiedBuffer(responseStr, CharsetUtil.US_ASCII)));

        // Response 1
        HttpResponse response = channel.readInbound();
        assertEquals(HttpResponseStatus.EARLY_HINTS, response.status());
        LastHttpContent last = channel.readInbound();
        assertEquals(0, last.content().readableBytes());
        last.release();

        // Response 2
        response = channel.readInbound();
        assertEquals(HttpResponseStatus.OK, response.status());
        last = channel.readInbound();
        assertEquals(0, last.content().readableBytes());
        last.release();

        // Response 3
        FullHttpResponse response1 = channel.readInbound();
        assertTrue(response1.decoderResult().isFailure());
        assertEquals(0, response1.content().readableBytes());
        response1.release();

        assertFalse(channel.finish());
    }

Impact

Integrity/availability of HTTP parsing on that connection, unsafe reuse of the socket.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
☕Mavenio.netty:netty-codec-http≥ 4.2.0.Alpha1&&< 4.2.13.Final4.2.13.Finalio.netty:netty-codec-http:4.2.13.Final
☕Mavenio.netty:netty-codec-httpall versions4.1.133.Finalio.netty:netty-codec-http:4.1.133.Final

Affected Products

1 product · 2 configurations
Application
nettynetty
≥ 4.2.0 && < 4.2.13
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.netty:netty-codec-http, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update io.netty:netty-codec-http to 4.2.13.Final or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-42584 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatImportant

Important: A flaw in Netty's HttpClientCodec allows a remote attacker to cause data confusion. By sending a specially crafted sequence of HTTP responses, an attacker can cause subsequent HTTP responses to be parsed incorrectly, potentially leading to information disclosure or data integrity issues in applications…

ProductFixed inAdvisory
AMQ Clients 2026.Q3netty-codec-httpRHSA-2026:69459
Cryostat 4 on RHEL 9cryostat/cryostat-reports-rhel9:4.2.0-10RHSA-2026:28010
Red Hat AMQ Broker 7.13.6netty-codec-httpRHSA-2026:66545
Red Hat AMQ Broker 7.14.1netty-codec-httpRHSA-2026:66488
Red Hat build of Apache Camel 4.18.1.P1 for Spring Boot 3.5.16netty-codec-httpRHSA-2026:37390
Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.4.13see advisoryRHSA-2026:30049
Red Hat build of Quarkus 3.27.4.redhatio.netty/netty-codec-http:4.1.133.Final-redhat-00002RHSA-2026:23808
Red Hat build of Quarkus 3.33.2.redhatio.netty/netty-codec-http:4.1.133.Final-redhat-00002RHSA-2026:24502

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary If HttpClientCodec is configured, there are use cases when a response body from one request, can be parsed as another's. ### Details HttpClientCodec pairs each inbound response with an outbound request by `queue.poll()` once per response, including for `1xx`. If the client pipelines GET then HEAD and the server sends 103, then 200 with GET body, then 200 for HEAD, the queue pairs HEAD with the first 200. The HEAD rule then skips reading that message’s body, so the GET entity bytes stay on the stream and the following 200 is parsed from the wrong offset. Prerequisites - HTTP/1.1
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-42584: netty-codec-http — Fixed in 4.2.13.Final