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LOW severity

iSponsorBlockTV: SSRF via Malicious SSDP Response Spoofing in Local Device DiscoveryGHSA-56v3-jrq2-4q9m

LOWFix: dmunozv04/iSponsorBlockTV@7d31511

GHSA-56v3-jrq2-4q9m is a low-severity (CVSS 3.5) Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in isponsorblocktv. A fix is available for isponsorblocktv — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-77597
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 19, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-56v3-jrq2-4q9m.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs5th percentile — riskier than 5% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍isponsorblocktv

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

iSponsorBlockTV discovers local smart TV devices via SSDP (Simple Service Discovery Protocol). The LOCATION URL from SSDP responses is used to fetch device capabilities without URL validation. A local network attacker can craft a malicious SSDP response with a LOCATION pointing to any internal HTTP service, causing SSRF when the application fetches device information.

Details

In src/iSponsorBlockTV/dial_client.py:92-96, upon receiving an SSDP M-SEARCH response, the code extracts the LOCATION header and makes an HTTP GET request to that URL to retrieve DIAL device description XML. The URL is not validated against expected device IP ranges, expected schemes, or private/internal IP blocklists. Any device on the LAN (or a rogue WiFi access point) can respond to SSDP M-SEARCH queries with a LOCATION pointing to internal services.

Impact

Blind SSRF against internal network services; access to home router admin interfaces, smart home controllers, NAS admin pages, and other local services; potential credential disclosure from fetched responses. It'd be able to either:

  • show a debug log line - __main__ - DEBUG - Discovered device at <attacker controlled URL>, processing... (which is normally disabled and won't be shown in the actual configurator since textual doesn't show logs unless running in dev mode and launching a second terminal to inspect log output), and make a single GET request to an "attacker controlled" url which does not leak any information back to iSponsorBlockTV itself and swallows any sort of error (parsing or an invalid response from not being a real DIAL server) (dial_client.py L131-L133)
  • make single POST request to a partly "attacker controlled" url since it'll always have the suffix /YouTube appended (dial_client.py L139) , with predefined headers {"Origin": "https://www.youtube.com","Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",} (dial_client.py L158-L161) and a predefined payload {"pairingCode": <random 12 digit code>, "theme": "cl"} which also does not leak any information back to iSponsorBlockTV itself and swallows any sort of error (parsing or an invalid response from not being a real DIAL server with a YouTube app running on it) (dial_client.py L162)

Fix

Validate SSDP LOCATION URLs: allow only http{s}:// scheme, extract the IP address, and verify it matches the SSDP sender's IP address. Reject LOCATION values pointing to private IP ranges other than the expected device subnet. (Done on v2.11.0)

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIisponsorblocktvall versions2.11.0pip install --upgrade 'isponsorblocktv==2.11.0'

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for isponsorblocktv, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update isponsorblocktv to 2.11.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-56v3-jrq2-4q9m is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Restrict outbound requests from the affected component to an allowlist of hosts, block access to link-local and internal address ranges at the network layer, and require authentication on internal services so a forged request cannot reach them unauthenticated.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary iSponsorBlockTV discovers local smart TV devices via SSDP (Simple Service Discovery Protocol). The `LOCATION` URL from SSDP responses is used to fetch device capabilities without URL validation. A local network attacker can craft a malicious SSDP response with a `LOCATION` pointing to any internal HTTP service, causing SSRF when the application fetches device information. ### Details In `src/iSponsorBlockTV/dial_client.py:92-96`, upon receiving an SSDP M-SEARCH response, the code extracts the `LOCATION` header and makes an HTTP GET request to that URL to retrieve DIAL device descr
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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