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HIGH severity

CVE-2026-69158 — atomic-server

HIGHFix: ontola/atomic-server@006ff29

CVE-2026-69158 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.6) Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in atomic-server. The records list no fixed version yet; check the vendor advisory below and apply the mitigations in the meantime.

Atomic Server: Unauthenticated full-response SSRF in Atomic-Server /bookmark endpoint

Also known asGHSA-ff87-73jp-f3v4
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
See advisory
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 18, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-69158.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🦀atomic-server

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Atomic-Server exposes a GET /bookmark endpoint that fetches an attacker-supplied URL server-side, parses the response, and reflects the fetched content back to the caller. The endpoint requires no authentication and performs no authorization of its own, and the underlying fetch helper applies no allow-list or private-IP deny-list. An unauthenticated attacker with network reach to the server can force it to issue arbitrary outbound HTTP GET requests to internal-only hosts (loopback services, internal admin panels, link-local cloud-metadata) and read the response body back. This is a full-response SSRF, not a blind one.

Root cause (source trace)

  1. The bookmark endpoint is registered unconditionally for every server: server/src/appstate.rs:69 (store.add_endpoint(plugins::bookmark::bookmark_endpoint())).
  2. An unauthenticated caller on the standard GET route becomes ForAgent::Public: server/src/helpers.rs:168-183 (get_client_agent).
  3. In get_resource_extended, when the subject matches an endpoint path the function returns via call_endpoint BEFORE the hierarchy::check_read authorization call: lib/src/db.rs:1010-1017 (if is_endpoint { return self.call_endpoint(...) }, and check_read sits just after at :1017, never reached).
  4. call_endpoint performs no authorization itself; it only matches the path and invokes the handler: lib/src/db.rs:662-706.
  5. The bookmark handler discards the caller (for_agent: _) and fetches the url query parameter directly: server/src/plugins/bookmark.rs:45-76 (let content = fetch_data(&path)?;).
  6. fetch_body validates only url.starts_with("http"): lib/src/client/helpers.rs:78-91. A repo-wide grep finds no is_loopback / is_private / 127.0.0.1 / 169.254 / localhost deny-list anywhere in lib/src or server/src, and no host allow-list.
  7. The fetched body is HTML-parsed and written into the resource name, description, image and preview (markdown) fields, which are returned to the caller: server/src/plugins/bookmark.rs:79-110. This is what makes it a full-response (not blind) SSRF; even plaintext internal responses are wrapped into the preview markdown.

Proof of concept (unauthenticated)

GET /bookmark?url=http://127.0.0.1:<internal-port>/&name=x        # internal loopback service
GET /bookmark?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/&name=x # IMDSv1 cloud metadata

No authentication headers. The returned resource reflects the fetched content in its name / description / preview fields, so the attacker reads the internal target's response body.

Proof of omission

The endpoint-dispatch path returns at lib/src/db.rs:1011 (return self.call_endpoint(...)) before the check_read call at :1017, and there is no authorization inside call_endpoint (:662-706). The handler discards the caller (for_agent: _, bookmark.rs:49), so the endpoint can never enforce per-agent access. fetch_body validates only url.starts_with("http") (helpers.rs:83); no loopback/private/link-local deny-list exists anywhere in the source. No corresponding SSRF/security entry exists in CHANGELOG.md.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker with network reach to the server can:

  • read internal-only HTTP services not exposed to the internet (admin panels, dashboards, unauthenticated microservices on loopback or the private network);
  • read cloud metadata reachable via plain GET (IMDSv1 and similar), enabling potential credential disclosure in affected deployments;
  • enumerate internal services / ports from the server's vantage point via differing timeout/error behaviour.

Because the response body is reflected, this is a high-value full-response SSRF. The only precondition is network reach to the server.

Severity: High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N = 8.6.

Honest caveats (do not refute the finding): the ureq client uses a 2-second timeout, which limits slow targets; AWS IMDSv2 requires a PUT token, so plain GET metadata retrieval may fail there. IMDSv1 and any internal HTTP service or admin panel that answers a plain GET remain fully reachable and reflected.

Remediation

Add a central SSRF guard inside fetch_body (lib/src/client/helpers.rs): resolve the target host and reject loopback, link-local, RFC1918 private, CGNAT and unique-local ranges, and reject non-http(s) schemes. Re-validate after DNS resolution (to prevent DNS-rebinding) and after each redirect hop. Enforce authorization on endpoint dispatch: run check_read (or a per-endpoint policy) for outbound-fetching endpoints instead of short-circuiting before it at lib/src/db.rs:1010-1012, and at minimum require an authenticated, authorized agent for /bookmark. Optionally add an operator-configurable allow-list of fetchable hosts.

Dedup

  • atomicdata-dev/atomic-server GitHub Security Advisories: no published advisories (re-verified 2026-07-03). No CVE/GHSA for atomic-server SSRF / the /bookmark endpoint.
  • Source re-verified on current develop 2026-07-03: the handler still discards the caller (for_agent: _) and calls fetch_data(url), and fetch_body still validates only url.starts_with("http") with no private-IP deny-list (still vulnerable).

Credit / disclosure

Reported by Ray Sabee, Whitehat Security (https://whitehatsecurity.nl/), GitHub @raysabee. Please credit "Ray Sabee / Whitehat Security / whitehatsecurity.nl" on the advisory and in any release notes. Coordinated disclosure: nothing will be published before a fix is available.

Note: two related findings exist in the same repo and can be handled in this advisory or alongside it: F-ATOMIC-SSRF-002 (a blind pre-auth SSRF in POST /import via the SAME fetch_body root cause, so one central fix covers both) and F-ATOMIC-LFI-001 (authenticated path-traversal file read in GET /download, a separate sink in download.rs).

Affected Packages

1 total
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.ioatomic-serverall versionsNo fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for atomic-server, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Remediation status

    The records we use list no patched version of atomic-server for CVE-2026-69158. Check the maintainer's advisory, and where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    Restrict outbound requests from the affected component to an allowlist of hosts, block access to link-local and internal address ranges at the network layer, and require authentication on internal services so a forged request cannot reach them unauthenticated.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary Atomic-Server exposes a `GET /bookmark` endpoint that fetches an attacker-supplied URL server-side, parses the response, and reflects the fetched content back to the caller. The endpoint requires no authentication and performs no authorization of its own, and the underlying fetch helper applies no allow-list or private-IP deny-list. An unauthenticated attacker with network reach to the server can force it to issue arbitrary outbound HTTP GET requests to internal-only hosts (loopback services, internal admin panels, link-local cloud-metadata) and read the response body back. This is
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-69158: atomic-server SSRF (High 8.6)