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MEDIUM severity

GHSA-4m6c-649p-f6gf s9y/serendipity

MEDIUM

GHSA-4m6c-649p-f6gf is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.9) CWE-565 vulnerability in s9y/serendipity. A fix is available for s9y/serendipity — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Serendipity has a Host Header Injection allows authentication cookie scoping to attacker-controlled domain in functions_config.inc.php

Also known asCVE-2026-39963
Published
Apr 14, 2026
Updated
Apr 15, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 21, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-4m6c-649p-f6gf.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs13th percentile — riskier than 13% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-4m6c-649p-f6gf plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 377,636 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐘s9y/serendipity

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The serendipity_setCookie() function uses $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'] without validation as the domain parameter of setcookie(). An attacker can force authentication cookies — including session tokens and auto-login tokens — to be scoped to an attacker-controlled domain, facilitating session hijacking.

Details

In include/functions_config.inc.php:726:

function serendipity_setCookie($name, $value, $securebyprot = true, ...) {
    $host = $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST']; // ← attacker-controlled, no validation

    if ($securebyprot) {
        if ($pos = strpos($host, ":")) {
            $host = substr($host, 0, $pos); // strips port only
        }
    }

    setcookie("serendipity[$name]", $value, [
        'domain'   => $host,   // ← poisoned domain
        'httponly' => $httpOnly,
        'samesite' => 'Strict'
    ]);
}

This function is called during login with sensitive cookies:

// functions_config.inc.php:455-498
serendipity_setCookie('author_autologintoken', $rnd, true, false, true);
serendipity_setCookie('author_username', $user);
serendipity_setCookie('author_token', $hash);

If an attacker can influence the Host header at login time (e.g. via MITM, reverse proxy misconfiguration, or load balancer), authentication cookies are issued scoped to the attacker's domain instead of the legitimate one.

PoC

curl -v -X POST \
  -H "Host: attacker.com" \
  -d "serendipity[user]=admin&serendipity[pass]=admin" \
  http://[TARGET]/serendipity_admin.php 2>&1 | grep -i "set-cookie"

Expected output:

Set-Cookie: serendipity[author_token]=; domain=attacker.com; HttpOnly

Impact

  • Session fixation — attacker pre-sets a cookie scoped to their domain, then tricks the victim into authenticating, inheriting the poisoned token
  • Token leakageauthor_autologintoken scoped to wrong domain may be sent to attacker-controlled infrastructure
  • Privilege escalation — if admin logs in under a poisoned Host header, their admin token is compromised

Suggested Fix

Validate HTTP_HOST against the configured $serendipity['url'] before use:

function serendipity_setCookie($name, $value, ...) {
    global $serendipity;
    $configured = parse_url($serendipity['url'], PHP_URL_HOST);
    $host = preg_replace('/:[0-9]+$/', '', $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST']);
    $host = ($host === $configured) ? $host : $configured;

    setcookie("serendipity[$name]", $value, [
        'domain' => $host,
        ...
    ]);
}

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagists9y/serendipityall versions2.6.0composer require s9y/serendipity:^2.6.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for s9y/serendipity, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update s9y/serendipity to 2.6.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-4m6c-649p-f6gf is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-4m6c-649p-f6gf can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-4m6c-649p-f6gf. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The `serendipity_setCookie()` function uses `$_SERVER['HTTP_HOST']` without validation as the `domain` parameter of `setcookie()`. An attacker can force authentication cookies — including session tokens and auto-login tokens — to be scoped to an attacker-controlled domain, facilitating session hijacking. ### Details In `include/functions_config.inc.php:726`: ```php function serendipity_setCookie($name, $value, $securebyprot = true, ...) { $host = $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST']; // ← attacker-controlled, no validation if ($securebyprot) { if ($pos = strpos($host, ":")) {
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-4m6c-649p-f6gf in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-4m6c-649p-f6gf across Packagist dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

GHSA-4m6c-649p-f6gf: PrivEsc (Medium 6.9) | O3 Security