GHSA-4m6c-649p-f6gf
MEDIUMGHSA-4m6c-649p-f6gf is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.9) vulnerability in s9y/serendipity. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-4m6c-649p-f6gf is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Serendipity has a Host Header Injection allows authentication cookie scoping to attacker-controlled domain in functions_config.inc.php
Blast Radius
s9y/serendipityReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The serendipity_setCookie() function uses $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'] without validation as the domain parameter of setcookie(). An attacker can force authentication cookies — including session tokens and auto-login tokens — to be scoped to an attacker-controlled domain, facilitating session hijacking.
Details
In include/functions_config.inc.php:726:
function serendipity_setCookie($name, $value, $securebyprot = true, ...) {
$host = $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST']; // ← attacker-controlled, no validation
if ($securebyprot) {
if ($pos = strpos($host, ":")) {
$host = substr($host, 0, $pos); // strips port only
}
}
setcookie("serendipity[$name]", $value, [
'domain' => $host, // ← poisoned domain
'httponly' => $httpOnly,
'samesite' => 'Strict'
]);
}
This function is called during login with sensitive cookies:
// functions_config.inc.php:455-498
serendipity_setCookie('author_autologintoken', $rnd, true, false, true);
serendipity_setCookie('author_username', $user);
serendipity_setCookie('author_token', $hash);
If an attacker can influence the Host header at login time (e.g. via MITM, reverse proxy misconfiguration, or load balancer), authentication cookies are issued scoped to the attacker's domain instead of the legitimate one.
PoC
curl -v -X POST \
-H "Host: attacker.com" \
-d "serendipity[user]=admin&serendipity[pass]=admin" \
http://[TARGET]/serendipity_admin.php 2>&1 | grep -i "set-cookie"
Expected output:
Set-Cookie: serendipity[author_token]=; domain=attacker.com; HttpOnly
Impact
- Session fixation — attacker pre-sets a cookie scoped to their domain, then tricks the victim into authenticating, inheriting the poisoned token
- Token leakage —
author_autologintokenscoped to wrong domain may be sent to attacker-controlled infrastructure - Privilege escalation — if admin logs in under a poisoned Host header, their admin token is compromised
Suggested Fix
Validate HTTP_HOST against the configured $serendipity['url'] before use:
function serendipity_setCookie($name, $value, ...) {
global $serendipity;
$configured = parse_url($serendipity['url'], PHP_URL_HOST);
$host = preg_replace('/:[0-9]+$/', '', $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST']);
$host = ($host === $configured) ? $host : $configured;
setcookie("serendipity[$name]", $value, [
'domain' => $host,
...
]);
}
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | s9y/serendipity | all versions | 2.6.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for s9y/serendipity. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update s9y/serendipity to 2.6.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-4m6c-649p-f6gf is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-4m6c-649p-f6gf is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-4m6c-649p-f6gf. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-4m6c-649p-f6gf in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-4m6c-649p-f6gf across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.