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GHSA-46wh-pxpv-q5gq

HIGH

express-rate-limit: IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses bypass per-client rate limiting on servers with dual-stack network

Also known asCVE-2026-30827
Published
Mar 6, 2026
Updated
Mar 16, 2026
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
3 / 3
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk36th percentile+0.43%
0.00%0.32%0.64%0.95%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.5%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

3 pkgs affected
📦express-rate-limit📦express-rate-limit📦express-rate-limit

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects npm packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The default keyGenerator in express-rate-limit applies IPv6 subnet masking (/56 by default) to all addresses that net.isIPv6() returns true for. This includes IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (::ffff:x.x.x.x), which Node.js returns as request.ip on dual-stack servers.

Because the first 80 bits of all IPv4-mapped addresses are zero, a /56 (or any /32 to /80) subnet mask produces the same network key (::/56) for every IPv4 client. This collapses all IPv4 traffic into a single rate-limit bucket: one client exhausting the limit causes HTTP 429 for all other IPv4 clients.

Details

Root Cause

In source/ip-key-generator.ts:

export function ipKeyGenerator(ip: string, ipv6Subnet: number | false = 56) {
  if (ipv6Subnet && isIPv6(ip)) {
    return `${new Address6(`${ip}/${ipv6Subnet}`).startAddress().correctForm()}/${ipv6Subnet}`
  }
  return ip
}

net.isIPv6('::ffff:192.168.1.1') returns true, so IPv4-mapped addresses enter the subnet masking path. With a /56 prefix, the start address for any ::ffff:x.x.x.x is ::, producing the key ::/56.

Proof of Concept

const { isIPv6 } = require('net');
const { Address6 } = require('ip-address');

function ipKeyGenerator(ip, ipv6Subnet = 56) {
  if (ipv6Subnet && isIPv6(ip)) {
    return `${new Address6(`${ip}/${ipv6Subnet}`).startAddress().correctForm()}/${ipv6Subnet}`;
  }
  return ip;
}

console.log(ipKeyGenerator('::ffff:192.168.1.1', 56)); // ::/56
console.log(ipKeyGenerator('::ffff:10.0.0.1', 56));    // ::/56
console.log(ipKeyGenerator('::ffff:8.8.8.8', 56));     // ::/56
// ALL produce '::/56' — same bucket

End-to-End Validation

On a dual-stack Express server (app.listen(port, '::')), tested with Express 5.2.1:

  • request.ip for IPv4 clients is ::ffff:127.0.0.1
  • Rate limit key resolves to ::/56
  • After limit requests from any IPv4 client, all other IPv4 clients receive 429

When This Occurs

  • Node.js dual-stack servers (default on Linux when listening on ::)
  • Any environment where request.ip contains IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses
  • Only affects the default keyGenerator (custom key generators are not affected)

Impact

  • Denial of Service: A single client can block all IPv4 traffic by exhausting the shared rate limit
  • Affects default configuration: No special options needed to trigger this

Affected Versions

All versions of express-rate-limit between v8.0.0 and v8.2.1.

Fix

This issue was fixed in commit 14e53888cdfd1b9798faf5b634c4206409e27fc4. This fix has been included in release v8.3.0, and backported to all affected minor versions in the form of releases v8.2.2, v8.1.1, and v8.0.2.

Affected Packages

3 total 3 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmexpress-rate-limit8.2.0&&< 8.2.28.2.2
📦npmexpress-rate-limit8.1.0&&< 8.1.18.1.1
📦npmexpress-rate-limit8.0.0&&< 8.0.28.0.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for express-rate-limit. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update express-rate-limit to 8.2.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-46wh-pxpv-q5gq is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-46wh-pxpv-q5gq is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-46wh-pxpv-q5gq. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The default `keyGenerator` in express-rate-limit applies IPv6 subnet masking (`/56` by default) to all addresses that `net.isIPv6()` returns true for. This includes IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (`::ffff:x.x.x.x`), which Node.js returns as `request.ip` on dual-stack servers. Because the first 80 bits of all IPv4-mapped addresses are zero, a `/56` (or any `/32` to `/80`) subnet mask produces the same network key (`::/56`) for **every** IPv4 client. This collapses all IPv4 traffic into a single rate-limit bucket: one client exhausting the limit causes HTTP 429 for all other IPv4 client
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-46wh-pxpv-q5gq in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-46wh-pxpv-q5gq across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.