zaino-state has a Non-Finalized State Reorg — No Cycle Detection or Depth LimitGHSA-3whf-vgf2-9w6g
Fix: zingolabs/zaino#1172GHSA-3whf-vgf2-9w6g is a security vulnerability in zaino-state. A fix is available for zaino-state — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Real-World Exposure
zaino-stateReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
NonFinalizedState::handle_reorg is a recursive, unbounded async function that traverses parent blocks until it finds a common ancestor on the main chain. It has no recursion depth limit and no cycle detection. A malicious or buggy validator can serve a block whose previous_block_hash points back to itself (or forms a cycle with other blocks), causing handle_reorg to infinite-loop, consuming 100% CPU and never making sync progress. Additionally, update() contains an .expect("empty snapshot impossible") that panics if the non-finalized snapshot becomes empty after trimming finalized blocks.
Details
Location: packages/zaino-state/src/chain_index/non_finalised_state.rs:443-489
async fn handle_reorg(
&self,
working_snapshot: &mut NonfinalizedBlockCacheSnapshot,
block: &impl Block,
) -> Result<IndexedBlock, SyncError> {
let prev_block = match working_snapshot
.get_block_by_hash_bytes_in_serialized_order(block.prev_hash_bytes_serialized_order())
.cloned()
{
Some(prev_block) => {
if !working_snapshot
.heights_to_hashes
.values()
.any(|hash| hash == prev_block.hash())
{
Box::pin(self.handle_reorg(working_snapshot, &prev_block)).await? // <-- LINE 459
} else {
prev_block
}
}
None => {
let prev_block = self
.source
.get_block(HashOrHeight::Hash(
zebra_chain::block::Hash::from_bytes_in_serialized_order(
block.prev_hash_bytes_serialized_order(),
),
))
.await
.map_err(|e| { ... })?
.ok_or(SyncError::ValidatorConnectionError(...))?;
Box::pin(self.handle_reorg(working_snapshot, &*prev_block)).await? // <-- LINE 483
}
};
let indexed_block = block.to_indexed_block(&prev_block, self).await?;
working_snapshot.add_block_new_chaintip(indexed_block.clone());
Ok(indexed_block)
}
Infinite loop via self-referencing block:
- A compromised validator serves a block
BwhereB.prev_hash == B.hash. handle_reorgis called withB.get_block_by_hash_bytes_in_serialized_order(B.prev_hash)findsBitself inworking_snapshot.blocks.- Check: is
B.hashinworking_snapshot.heights_to_hashes? IfBis a new chaintip not yet on the main chain, no. - Recurse with
prev_block=B(the exact same block). - This repeats forever. The async recursion builds a new
Box::pinfuture each iteration, consuming heap memory and CPU.
Stack exhaustion via deep reorg:
A deep reorg of >1000 blocks would recurse >1000 times. Each async recursion creates a new Box::pin future on the heap. While this won't exhaust the native stack immediately, it will allocate unbounded heap memory and CPU time, effectively DoS-ing the sync task.
.expect("empty snapshot impossible") panic:
Location: packages/zaino-state/src/chain_index/non_finalised_state.rs:543-548
new_snapshot.remove_finalized_blocks(finalized_height);
let best_block = &new_snapshot
.blocks
.values()
.max_by_key(|block| block.chainwork())
.cloned()
.expect("empty snapshot impossible"); // <-- LINE 548
If finalized_height is greater than or equal to all blocks in new_snapshot.blocks, remove_finalized_blocks retains only blocks at or above that height. If none exist, new_snapshot.blocks becomes empty. The .expect() then panics. While the comment claims this is "impossible," defensive programming dictates it is reachable under corruption or edge-case sync conditions.
PoC
- Run a regtest.
- Serve a block where
header.previous_block_hash == block.hash(). - Zaino's
NonFinalizedState::syncentershandle_reorgand infinite-loops. - Sync never completes. CPU usage pegs to 100%. No new blocks are served to clients.
Fix
- Add an explicit recursion depth limit (e.g., max 1000 iterations) and return
SyncError::ReorgFailureif exceeded:const MAX_REORG_DEPTH: usize = 1000; - Track visited hashes in a
HashSet<BlockHash>during traversal to detect cycles and abort with an error. - Replace
.expect("empty snapshot impossible")with a properErr(UpdateError::DatabaseHole)or similar error return.
Additional Attack Vectors
- Deep reorg DoS: A miner with significant hash power (or a compromised validator) triggers a deep reorg. Zaino spends excessive CPU and memory in
handle_reorg, starving the async runtime and stalling response serving. - Fork-choice manipulation: By serving cyclic or very deep sidechains, an attacker can keep Zaino stuck in reorg handling indefinitely, preventing it from ever serving the real best chain.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🦀crates.io | zaino-state | all versions | 0.4.1cargo update -p zaino-state --precise 0.4.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for zaino-state, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update zaino-state to 0.4.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-3whf-vgf2-9w6g is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-3whf-vgf2-9w6g in your dependencies?
Find it across crates.io, including transitive dependencies.