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HIGH severity

CVE-2026-30827 — express-rate-limit

HIGHFix: express-rate-limit/express-rate-limit@14e5388

CVE-2026-30827 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-770 vulnerability in express-rate-limit. A fix is available for express-rate-limit — see the affected versions and patch details below.

express-rate-limit: IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses bypass per-client rate limiting (all IPv4 clients share one bucket on dual-stack servers)

Also known asGHSA-46wh-pxpv-q5gq
Published
Updated
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
3 / 3
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 6, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-30827.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk+0.03%
Lower risk than most CVEs44th percentile — riskier than 44% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.34%0.68%1.02%0.0%0.5%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

3 pkgs affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

3Kother npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
express-rate-limitnpm
95.8Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

The default keyGenerator in express-rate-limit applies IPv6 subnet masking (/56 by default) to all addresses that net.isIPv6() returns true for. This includes IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (::ffff:x.x.x.x), which Node.js returns as request.ip on dual-stack servers.

Because the first 80 bits of all IPv4-mapped addresses are zero, a /56 (or any /32 to /80) subnet mask produces the same network key (::/56) for every IPv4 client. This collapses all IPv4 traffic into a single rate-limit bucket: one client exhausting the limit causes HTTP 429 for all other IPv4 clients.

Details

Root Cause

In source/ip-key-generator.ts:

export function ipKeyGenerator(ip: string, ipv6Subnet: number | false = 56) {
  if (ipv6Subnet && isIPv6(ip)) {
    return `${new Address6(`${ip}/${ipv6Subnet}`).startAddress().correctForm()}/${ipv6Subnet}`
  }
  return ip
}

net.isIPv6('::ffff:192.168.1.1') returns true, so IPv4-mapped addresses enter the subnet masking path. With a /56 prefix, the start address for any ::ffff:x.x.x.x is ::, producing the key ::/56.

Proof of Concept

const { isIPv6 } = require('net');
const { Address6 } = require('ip-address');

function ipKeyGenerator(ip, ipv6Subnet = 56) {
  if (ipv6Subnet && isIPv6(ip)) {
    return `${new Address6(`${ip}/${ipv6Subnet}`).startAddress().correctForm()}/${ipv6Subnet}`;
  }
  return ip;
}

console.log(ipKeyGenerator('::ffff:192.168.1.1', 56)); // ::/56
console.log(ipKeyGenerator('::ffff:10.0.0.1', 56));    // ::/56
console.log(ipKeyGenerator('::ffff:8.8.8.8', 56));     // ::/56
// ALL produce '::/56' — same bucket

End-to-End Validation

On a dual-stack Express server (app.listen(port, '::')), tested with Express 5.2.1:

  • request.ip for IPv4 clients is ::ffff:127.0.0.1
  • Rate limit key resolves to ::/56
  • After limit requests from any IPv4 client, all other IPv4 clients receive 429

When This Occurs

  • Node.js dual-stack servers (default on Linux when listening on ::)
  • Any environment where request.ip contains IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses
  • Only affects the default keyGenerator (custom key generators are not affected)

Impact

  • Denial of Service: A single client can block all IPv4 traffic by exhausting the shared rate limit
  • Affects default configuration: No special options needed to trigger this

Affected Versions

All versions of express-rate-limit between v8.0.0 and v8.2.1.

Fix

This issue was fixed in commit 14e53888cdfd1b9798faf5b634c4206409e27fc4. This fix has been included in release v8.3.0, and backported to all affected minor versions in the form of releases v8.2.2, v8.1.1, and v8.0.2.

Affected Packages

3 total 3 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmexpress-rate-limit≥ 8.2.0&&< 8.2.28.2.2npm install express-rate-limit@8.2.2
📦npmexpress-rate-limit≥ 8.1.0&&< 8.1.18.1.1npm install express-rate-limit@8.1.1
📦npmexpress-rate-limit≥ 8.0.0&&< 8.0.28.0.2npm install express-rate-limit@8.0.2

Affected Products

1 product · 3 configurations
Application
express-rate-limitexpress-rate-limit_project
≥ 8.2.0 && < 8.2.2
1 version
8.1.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for express-rate-limit, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update express-rate-limit to 8.2.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-30827 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatModerate
Workaround published by Red Hat
Restrict network access to applications utilizing the express-rate-limit middleware to trusted clients or networks. Implementing firewall rules or network access controls can prevent untrusted actors from exploiting the shared rate-limit bucket vulnerability affecting IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses on dual-stack servers.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2026-30827 (CC BY 4.0)
ProductFixed inAdvisory
Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6ansible-automation-platform-tech-preview/mcp-server-rhel9:1774268173RHSA-2026:6309
Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6ansible-automation-platform-tech-preview/mcp-server-rhel9:1774268173RHSA-2026:6404
Red Hat OpenShift Dev Spaces 3.28devspaces/openvsx-rhel9:1779528224RHSA-2026:21772

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The default `keyGenerator` in express-rate-limit applies IPv6 subnet masking (`/56` by default) to all addresses that `net.isIPv6()` returns true for. This includes IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (`::ffff:x.x.x.x`), which Node.js returns as `request.ip` on dual-stack servers. Because the first 80 bits of all IPv4-mapped addresses are zero, a `/56` (or any `/32` to `/80`) subnet mask produces the same network key (`::/56`) for **every** IPv4 client. This collapses all IPv4 traffic into a single rate-limit bucket: one client exhausting the limit causes HTTP 429 for all other IPv4 client
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-30827 in your dependencies?

Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2026-30827: express-rate-limit DoS — Fixed in 8.2.2