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GHSA-3rjw-m598-pq24

Cmov/CmovEq on aarch64 can produce wrong results if high-bits of registers are set

Also known asCVE-2026-50185
Published
Jul 2, 2026
Updated
Jul 3, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🦀cmov

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Description

Summary

The aarch64 implementations of Cmov and CmovEq seem to assume that the high bits when loading a value of size smaller than a register into a register are zero-extended. However, this is not the case and these bits are unspecified. This can result in a left.cmovz(&right, condition) not moving right into left, even if condition == 0.

Details

The Rust reference for inline assembly states that:

If a value is of a smaller size than the register it is allocated in then the upper bits of that register will have an undefined value for inputs [..]. Reference

If the high bits [8..] of the selector loaded into a register in the Cmov implementation or the high bits [16..] of self or other for CmovEq (specifically the implementation for u16 and i16) are set, the inline asm compares will produce a different result than the Rust code expects based on the narrow types.

In other words, the following assert fails, even though condition as u8 is zero:

let condition: u32 = black_box(1 << 8);
let mut left = 1;
let right = 2;
left.cmovz(&right, condition as u8);
assert_eq!(left, right);

Because the ninth bit is set in the original variable, this bit is also set when the truncated condition is loaded into the input register for the cmp, causing the csel to select the wrong value.

The problematic code is located in cmov/src/backends/aarch64.rs here for Cmov and here for CmovEq.

The following function:

#[unsafe(no_mangle)]
pub fn cmovz_wrong_output(left: &mut i32, right: i32, condition: u32) {
    left.cmovz(&right, condition as u8);
}

produces the assembly:

cmovz_wrong_output:
	.cfi_startproc
	ldr w8, [x0]
	//APP
	cmp w2, #0
	csel w8, w1, w8, eq
	//NO_APP
	str w8, [x0]
	ret

which compares the 32-bits of the condition value against 0, instead of the intended 8.

Similarly, the following function using cmoveq

#[unsafe(no_mangle)]
pub fn cmoveq_wrong_output(left: u32, right: u32, input: u8, output: &mut u8) {
    (left as u16).cmoveq(&(right as u16), input, output);
}

compiles to:

cmoveq_wrong_output:
	.cfi_startproc
	ldrb w8, [x3]
	and w9, w2, #0xff
	//APP
	eor w10, w0, w1
	cmp w10, #0
	csel w8, w9, w8, eq
	//NO_APP
	strb w8, [x3]
	ret

where 32 bits of left and right are compared instead of 16. The same happens for i16.

For CmovEq, it seems the u8/i8 impls are not affected, as they are calling u16::from in the implementation which causes the upper bits to be masked out.

PoC

The following two test cases fail on aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu when compiled with --release (the cmovz one even in debug) emulated with qemu.

> rustc --version
rustc 1.94.0 (4a4ef493e 2026-03-02)
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use core::hint::black_box;

    use cmov::{Cmov, CmovEq};

    #[test]
    fn cmovz_wrong_output() {
        // The black box is necessary here, as otherwise the compiler will 
        // provide a constant 0 to the csel
        let condition: u32 = black_box(1 << 8);
        let mut left = 1;
        let right = 2;
        // I added this debug_assert as a sanity check, but funnily it causes
        // the wrong cmov behavior in debug as well (as opposed to only in release mode without the debug_assert)
        debug_assert_eq!(0, condition as u8);
        left.cmovz(&right, condition as u8);
        assert_eq!(left, right);
    }

    #[test]
    fn cmoveq_wrong_output() {
        let input = 1;
        let mut output = 0;
        let left: u32 = black_box(1 << 16);
        let right: u32 = black_box(1 << 17);
        // asserting in release mode here would hide the bug, the debug_assert_eq is
        // a sanity check that these values SHOULD be equal
        debug_assert_eq!(left as u16, right as u16);
        (left as u16).cmoveq(&(right as u16), input, &mut output);
        assert_eq!(input, output);
    }
}

Impact

Under specific circumstances, this issue can cause Cmov/CmovEq to produce incorrect output on aarch64. However, whether this bug can actually manifest depends on the surrounding code that calls the relevant impls. In the PoC, a narrowing cast is required, which masks out the set bits from Rust's point of view, but which are then used in the inline assembly.

Additional Finding

PR #1299 fixed a different bug in the aarch64 backend but introduced a small error. The csel! macro expect a cmp expression as its first argument which is never used. The compare is always "cmp {0:w}, 0", even for csel64!, which intends to use cmp {0:x}, 0. Given the bug described above, this oversight actually reduces its impact slightly, as only the bits in position[8..32] can cause issues, even for those impls that use csel64!.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.iocmov0.1.1&&< 0.5.40.5.4

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for cmov. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update cmov to 0.5.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-3rjw-m598-pq24 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-3rjw-m598-pq24 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-3rjw-m598-pq24. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The aarch64 implementations of `Cmov` and `CmovEq` seem to assume that the high bits when loading a value of size smaller than a register into a register are zero-extended. However, this is not the case and these bits are unspecified. This can result in a `left.cmovz(&right, condition)` not moving `right` into `left`, even if `condition == 0`. ### Details The Rust reference for inline assembly states that: > If a value is of a smaller size than the register it is allocated in then the upper bits of that register will have an undefined value for inputs [..]. [Reference](https://
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-3rjw-m598-pq24 in your dependencies?

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