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MEDIUM severity

CVE-2025-55160 — Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU

MEDIUM

CVE-2025-55160 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.1) CWE-758 vulnerability in Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU. A fix is available for Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU — see the affected versions and patch details below.

ImageMagick Undefined Behavior (function-type-mismatch) in CloneSplayTree

Also known asGHSA-6hgw-6x87-578x
Published
Aug 13, 2025
Updated
Aug 12, 2026
Affected
18 pkgs
Patched
18 / 18
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 24, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2025-55160.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs33th percentile — riskier than 33% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2025-55160 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 378,567 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

18 pkgs affected
.NETMagick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU.NETMagick.NET-Q16-HDRI-AnyCPU.NETMagick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64.NETMagick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-x64.NETMagick.NET-Q16-HDRI-arm64.NETMagick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x64.NETMagick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x86.NETMagick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-arm64+10 more

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects NuGet packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

  • Target: ImageMagick (commit ecc9a5eb456747374bae8e07038ba10b3d8821b3)
  • Type: Undefined Behavior (function-type-mismatch) in splay tree cloning callback
  • Impact: Deterministic abort under UBSan (DoS in sanitizer builds). No crash in a non-sanitized build; likely low security impact.
  • Trigger: Minimal 2-byte input parsed via MagickWand, then coalescing.

Environment

OS: macOS (Apple Silicon/arm64) Homebrew clang version 20.1.8 Target: arm64-apple-darwin24.5.0 Thread model: posix InstalledDir: /opt/homebrew/Cellar/llvm/20.1.8/bin Configuration file: /opt/homebrew/etc/clang/arm64-apple-darwin24.cfg Homebrew ImageMagick: magick -version → ImageMagick 7.1.2-0 Q16-HDRI aarch64 pkg-config: MagickWand-7.Q16HDRI version 7.1.2 Library configure flags (capsule build): ./configure --disable-shared --enable-static --without-modules --without-magick-plus-plus --disable-openmp --without-perl --without-x --with-png=yes --without-jpeg --without-tiff --without-xml --without-lqr --without-gslib Harness compile flags: -fsanitize=fuzzer,address,undefined -fno-omit-frame-pointer pkg-config cflags/libs supplied: -I<...>/include/ImageMagick-7 -DMAGICKCORE_HDRI_ENABLE=1 -DMAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH=16 -DMAGICKCORE_CHANNEL_MASK_DEPTH=32 and linked against MagickWand-7.Q16HDRI and MagickCore-7.Q16HDRI Sanitizer runtime: ASan+UBSan defaults. Repro also with UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1:halt_on_error=1

PoC

  • Bytes (hex): 1c 02
  • Base64: HAI=
  • sha256 (optional): <fill in>

Reproduction

Create PoC:

printf '\x1c\x02' > poc.bin

Option A: libFuzzer harness

  • Run once: ./harness_ImageMagick_... -runs=1 ./poc.bin
  • Expected: UBSan aborts with function-type-mismatch at MagickCore/splay-tree.c:372:43.

Option B: standalone reproducer (C)

  • Compile (ensure PKG_CONFIG_PATH points to your ImageMagick if needed):

/opt/homebrew/opt/llvm/bin/clang -g -O1 -fsanitize=address,undefined $(/opt/homebrew/bin/pkg-config --cflags MagickWand-7.Q16HDRI) repro.c -o repro $(/opt/homebrew/bin/pkg-config --libs MagickWand-7.Q16HDRI)

  • Run:

UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1:halt_on_error=1 ./repro ./poc.bin Observed output (excerpt) MagickCore/splay-tree.c:372:43: runtime error: call to function ConstantString through pointer to incorrect function type 'void ()(void *)' string.c:680: note: ConstantString defined here #0 CloneSplayTree splay-tree.c:372 #1 CloneImageProfiles profile.c:159 #2 CloneImage image.c:832 #3 CoalesceImages layer.c:269 #4 MagickCoalesceImages magick-image.c:1665 #5 main repro.c:XX Root cause The splay tree clone callback expects a function pointer of type void *(*)(void *). ConstantString has a different signature (char *ConstantString(const char *)). Calling through the mismatched function type is undefined behavior in C and triggers UBSan’s function-type-mismatch. The path is exercised during coalescing: CloneImage → CloneImageProfiles → CloneSplayTree. Scope Reproduces with a minimal, sanitizer-instrumented, PNG-enabled build and delegates disabled (policy.xml), suggesting the issue is in MagickCore rather than external delegates. Suggested fix (sketch) Use a wrapper that matches the expected callback prototype, or adjust the splay-tree callback typedef for const-correctness. For example: static void *CloneStringShim(const void *p) { return (void *) ConstantString((const char *) p); }

/* When setting splay-tree clone_value, use CloneStringShim instead of ConstantString. */

Alternatively, update the clone callback typedefs to use const void* consistently (and return void*) and ensure callers pass a correctly typed wrapper.

Artifacts Minimised PoC: attached (poc.bin, 2 bytes; base64 HAI=) Harness source and exact build command (attached) Full UBSan trace (attached) Commit SHA and configure flags (above) Credits Discovered by: Lumina Mescuwa Method: libFuzzer + UBSan Verification

  • UBSan build: Reproduces with halt_on_error=1; aborts at MagickCore/splay-tree.c:372.
  • Non-sanitized Homebrew build (macOS arm64, clang 20.1.8): No crash; repro completes silently.

Affected Packages

18 total 18 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
.NETNuGetMagick.NET-Q16-AnyCPUall versions14.8.0dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU --version 14.8.0
.NETNuGetMagick.NET-Q16-HDRI-AnyCPUall versions14.8.0dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-AnyCPU --version 14.8.0
.NETNuGetMagick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64all versions14.8.0dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64 --version 14.8.0
.NETNuGetMagick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-x64all versions14.8.0dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-x64 --version 14.8.0
.NETNuGetMagick.NET-Q16-HDRI-arm64all versions14.8.0dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-arm64 --version 14.8.0
.NETNuGetMagick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x64all versions14.8.0dotnet add package Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x64 --version 14.8.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU to 14.8.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2025-55160 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2025-55160 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to CVE-2025-55160. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

UbuntuMEDIUM

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary - **Target:** ImageMagick (commit `ecc9a5eb456747374bae8e07038ba10b3d8821b3`) - **Type:** Undefined Behavior (function-type-mismatch) in splay tree cloning callback - **Impact:** Deterministic abort under UBSan (DoS in sanitizer builds). No crash in a non-sanitized build; likely low security impact. - **Trigger:** Minimal **2-byte** input parsed via MagickWand, then coalescing. ## Environment OS: macOS (Apple Silicon/arm64) Homebrew clang version 20.1.8 Target: arm64-apple-darwin24.5.0 Thread model: posix InstalledDir: /opt/homebrew/Cellar/llvm/20.1.8/bin Configuration file: /opt/ho
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2025-55160 in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds CVE-2025-55160 across NuGet dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

CVE-2025-55160: DoS (Medium 6.1) | O3 Security