GHSA-6hgw-6x87-578x
MEDIUMImageMagick has Undefined Behavior (function-type-mismatch) in CloneSplayTree
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU.NETMagick.NET-Q16-HDRI-AnyCPU.NETMagick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64.NETMagick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-x64.NETMagick.NET-Q16-HDRI-arm64.NETMagick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x64.NETMagick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x86.NETMagick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-arm64+10 moreReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects NuGet packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
- Target: ImageMagick (commit
ecc9a5eb456747374bae8e07038ba10b3d8821b3) - Type: Undefined Behavior (function-type-mismatch) in splay tree cloning callback
- Impact: Deterministic abort under UBSan (DoS in sanitizer builds). No crash in a non-sanitized build; likely low security impact.
- Trigger: Minimal 2-byte input parsed via MagickWand, then coalescing.
Environment
OS: macOS (Apple Silicon/arm64)
Homebrew clang version 20.1.8
Target: arm64-apple-darwin24.5.0
Thread model: posix
InstalledDir: /opt/homebrew/Cellar/llvm/20.1.8/bin
Configuration file: /opt/homebrew/etc/clang/arm64-apple-darwin24.cfg
Homebrew ImageMagick: magick -version → ImageMagick 7.1.2-0 Q16-HDRI aarch64
pkg-config: MagickWand-7.Q16HDRI version 7.1.2
Library configure flags (capsule build):
./configure --disable-shared --enable-static --without-modules --without-magick-plus-plus --disable-openmp --without-perl --without-x --with-png=yes --without-jpeg --without-tiff --without-xml --without-lqr --without-gslib
Harness compile flags:
-fsanitize=fuzzer,address,undefined -fno-omit-frame-pointer
pkg-config cflags/libs supplied:
-I<...>/include/ImageMagick-7
-DMAGICKCORE_HDRI_ENABLE=1 -DMAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH=16 -DMAGICKCORE_CHANNEL_MASK_DEPTH=32
and linked against MagickWand-7.Q16HDRI and MagickCore-7.Q16HDRI
Sanitizer runtime:
ASan+UBSan defaults. Repro also with UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1:halt_on_error=1
PoC
- Bytes (hex):
1c 02 - Base64:
HAI= - sha256 (optional): <fill in>
Reproduction
Create PoC:
printf '\x1c\x02' > poc.bin
Option A: libFuzzer harness
- Run once:
./harness_ImageMagick_... -runs=1 ./poc.bin - Expected: UBSan aborts with function-type-mismatch at
MagickCore/splay-tree.c:372:43.
Option B: standalone reproducer (C)
- Compile (ensure
PKG_CONFIG_PATHpoints to your ImageMagick if needed):
/opt/homebrew/opt/llvm/bin/clang -g -O1 -fsanitize=address,undefined $(/opt/homebrew/bin/pkg-config --cflags MagickWand-7.Q16HDRI) repro.c -o repro $(/opt/homebrew/bin/pkg-config --libs MagickWand-7.Q16HDRI)
- Run:
UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1:halt_on_error=1 ./repro ./poc.bin
Observed output (excerpt)
MagickCore/splay-tree.c:372:43: runtime error: call to function ConstantString through pointer to incorrect function type 'void ()(void *)'
string.c:680: note: ConstantString defined here
#0 CloneSplayTree splay-tree.c:372
#1 CloneImageProfiles profile.c:159
#2 CloneImage image.c:832
#3 CoalesceImages layer.c:269
#4 MagickCoalesceImages magick-image.c:1665
#5 main repro.c:XX
Root cause
The splay tree clone callback expects a function pointer of type void *(*)(void *). ConstantString has a different signature (char *ConstantString(const char *)). Calling through the mismatched function type is undefined behavior in C and triggers UBSan’s function-type-mismatch.
The path is exercised during coalescing: CloneImage → CloneImageProfiles → CloneSplayTree.
Scope
Reproduces with a minimal, sanitizer-instrumented, PNG-enabled build and delegates disabled (policy.xml), suggesting the issue is in MagickCore rather than external delegates.
Suggested fix (sketch)
Use a wrapper that matches the expected callback prototype, or adjust the splay-tree callback typedef for const-correctness. For example:
static void *CloneStringShim(const void *p) {
return (void *) ConstantString((const char *) p);
}
/* When setting splay-tree clone_value, use CloneStringShim instead of ConstantString. */
Alternatively, update the clone callback typedefs to use const void* consistently (and return void*) and ensure callers pass a correctly typed wrapper.
Artifacts Minimised PoC: attached (poc.bin, 2 bytes; base64 HAI=) Harness source and exact build command (attached) Full UBSan trace (attached) Commit SHA and configure flags (above) Credits Discovered by: Lumina Mescuwa Method: libFuzzer + UBSan Verification
- UBSan build: Reproduces with
halt_on_error=1; aborts atMagickCore/splay-tree.c:372. - Non-sanitized Homebrew build (macOS arm64, clang 20.1.8): No crash; repro completes silently.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| .NETNuGet | Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU | all versions | 14.8.0 |
| .NETNuGet | Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-AnyCPU | all versions | 14.8.0 |
| .NETNuGet | Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64 | all versions | 14.8.0 |
| .NETNuGet | Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-x64 | all versions | 14.8.0 |
| .NETNuGet | Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-arm64 | all versions | 14.8.0 |
| .NETNuGet | Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x64 | all versions | 14.8.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU to 14.8.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-6hgw-6x87-578x is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-6hgw-6x87-578x is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-6hgw-6x87-578x. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-6hgw-6x87-578x in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-6hgw-6x87-578x across NuGet dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.