GHSA-3jcg-vx7f-j6qf
LOWThe fuels-ts typescript SDK has no awareness of to-be-spent transactions
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
@fuel-ts/accountReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects npm packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Brief/Intro
The typescript SDK has no awareness of to-be-spent transactions causing some transactions to fail or silently get pruned as they are funded with already used UTXOs.
The Typescript SDK provides the fund function which retrieves UTXOs, which belong to the owner and can be used to fund the request in question, from fuel's graphql api. These then get added to the request making it possible to send it to the network as it now has inputs which can be spent by its outputs. Now this works when a user only wants to fund one transaction per block as in the next block, the spent UTXO will not exist anymore. However if a user wants to fund multiple transactions within one block, the following can happen:
It is important to note, that the graphql API will return a random UTXO which has enough value to fund the transaction in question.
- user has 2 spendable
UTXOsin their wallet which can cover all expenses - user funds transaction
tAwith an input gotten from the APIiA - user submits
tAto fuel iAis still in possession of the user as no new block has been produced- user funds a transaction
tBand gets the same inputiAfrom the API - user tries to submit transaction
tBto fuel but now one of the following can happen:- if the recipient and all other parameters are the same as in
tA, submission will fail astBwill have the sametxHashastA - if the parameters are different, there will be a collision in the
txpoolandtAwill be removed from thetxpool
- if the recipient and all other parameters are the same as in
Vulnerability Details
The problem occurs, because the fund function in fuels-ts/packages/account/src/account.ts gets the needed ressources statelessly with the function getResourcesToSpend without taking into consideration already used UTXOs:
async fund<T extends TransactionRequest>(request: T, params: EstimatedTxParams): Promise<T> {
// [...]
let missingQuantities: CoinQuantity[] = [];
Object.entries(quantitiesDict).forEach(([assetId, { owned, required }]) => {
if (owned.lt(required)) {
missingQuantities.push({
assetId,
amount: required.sub(owned),
});
}
});
let needsToBeFunded = missingQuantities.length > 0;
let fundingAttempts = 0;
while (needsToBeFunded && fundingAttempts < MAX_FUNDING_ATTEMPTS) {
const resources = await this.getResourcesToSpend(
missingQuantities,
cacheRequestInputsResourcesFromOwner(request.inputs, this.address)
); // @audit-issue here we do not exclude ids we already got and used for another transaction in the current block
request.addResources(resources);
// [...]
}
// [...]
return request;
}
Impact Details
This issue will lead to unexpected SDK behaviour. Looking at the scenario in Brief/Intro, it could have the following impacts for users:
- A transaction does not get included in the
txpool/ in a block - A previous transaction silently gets removed from the
txpooland replaced with a new one
Recommendation
I would recommend adding a buffer to the Account class, in which retrieved resources are saved. These can then be provided to getResourcesToSpend to be excluded from future queries but need to be removed from the buffer if their respective transaction fails to be included, in order to be able to use those resources again in such cases.
Proof of Concept
The following PoC transfers 100 coins from wallet2 to wallet after which wallet2 has two UTXOs one with value 100 and one with a very high value (this is printed to the console). Afterwards, wallet will attempt transfering 80 coins back to wallet2 twice in one block, each in a separate transaction. This should work perfectly fine as wallet has two UTXOs where each can cover the cost of each respective transaction. Now when running this one of the following will happen:
- both transfers from
wallettowallet2get a differentUTXO. This is the case if execution is successful andwallet2has80coins more thanwalletin the end. - both transfers get the same
UTXO. In this case the script will fail and throw an error as then both transactions will have the same hash
In order to execute this PoC, please deploy a local node with a blocktime of 5secs as I wrote my PoC for that blocktime. Note that with a small change it will also work with other blocktimes. Then add the PoC to a file poc_resources.ts and compile it with tsc poc_resources.ts. Finally execute it with node poc_resources.js.
Since the choice which UTXO is taken as input is random, it might take a few tries to trigger the bug!
import { JsonAbi, Script, Provider, WalletUnlocked, Account, Predicate, Wallet, CoinQuantityLike, coinQuantityfy, EstimatedTxParams, BN, Coin, AbstractAddress, Address, Contract, ScriptTransactionRequest } from 'fuels';
const abi: JsonAbi = {
'encoding': '1',
'types': [
{
'typeId': 0,
'type': '()',
'components': [],
'typeParameters': null
}
],
'functions': [
{
'inputs': [],
'name': 'main',
'output': {
'name': '',
'type': 0,
'typeArguments': null
},
'attributes': null
}
],
'loggedTypes': [],
'messagesTypes': [],
'configurables': []
};
const FUEL_NETWORK_URL = 'http://127.0.0.1:4000/v1/graphql';
async function executeTransaction() {
const provider = await Provider.create(FUEL_NETWORK_URL);
const wallet: WalletUnlocked = Wallet.fromPrivateKey('0x37fa81c84ccd547c30c176b118d5cb892bdb113e8e80141f266519422ef9eefd', provider);
const wallet2: WalletUnlocked = Wallet.fromPrivateKey('0xde97d8624a438121b86a1956544bd72ed68cd69f2c99555b08b1e8c51ffd511c', provider);
const sleep = (ms: number) => new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, ms));
console.log("Balance wallet before: ", await wallet.getBalance());
console.log("Balance wallet2 before: ", await wallet2.getBalance());
wallet2.transfer(wallet.address, 100);
await sleep(5500);
await wallet.transfer(wallet2.address, 80);
console.log('wallet -> wallet2');
await wallet.transfer(wallet2.address, 80);
console.log('wallet -> wallet2');
console.log("Balance wallet after: ", await wallet.getBalance());
console.log("Balance wallet2 after: ", await wallet2.getBalance());
};
executeTransaction().catch(console.error);
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @fuel-ts/account | all versions | 0.93.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @fuel-ts/account. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update @fuel-ts/account to 0.93.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-3jcg-vx7f-j6qf is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-3jcg-vx7f-j6qf is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-3jcg-vx7f-j6qf. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-3jcg-vx7f-j6qf in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-3jcg-vx7f-j6qf across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.