How severe is GHSA-3g2j-vm47-x4mj?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-3g2j-vm47-x4mj yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-3g2j-vm47-x4mj?

GHSA-3g2j-vm47-x4mj affects the following packages: github.com/canonical/lxd (Go). Ecosystems affected: Go.

How do I fix GHSA-3g2j-vm47-x4mj?

Update github.com/canonical/lxd to 0.0.0-20251110144034-698854d0164f or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-3g2j-vm47-x4mj is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-3g2j-vm47-x4mj in my Go dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/canonical/lxd. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-3g2j-vm47-x4mj if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-3g2j-vm47-x4mj?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-3g2j-vm47-x4mj is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-3g2j-vm47-x4mj actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-3g2j-vm47-x4mj yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

When was GHSA-3g2j-vm47-x4mj published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-3g2j-vm47-x4mj was published on November 13, 2025 and was last updated on November 18, 2025. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐹 Go

GHSA-3g2j-vm47-x4mj

LXD vulnerable to a local privilege escalation through custom storage volumes

Also known asGO-2025-4121

Published

Nov 13, 2025

Updated

Nov 18, 2025

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

🐹github.com/canonical/lxd

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

This affects any LXD user in an environment where an unprivileged user may have root access to a container with an attached custom storage volume that has the security.shifted property set to true as well as access to the host as an unprivileged user.

The most common case for this would be systems using lxd-user with the less privileged lxd group to provide unprivileged users with an isolated restricted access to LXD. Such users may be able to create a custom storage volume with the necessary property (depending on kernel and filesystem support) and can then write a setuid binary from within the container which can be executed as an unprivileged user on the host to gain root privileges.

Patches

Patches for this issue are available:

LXD 6 series: https://github.com/canonical/lxd/pull/16904
LXD 5.21 LTS series: https://github.com/canonical/lxd/pull/16922
LXD 5.0 LTS series: https://github.com/canonical/lxd/pull/16923
LXD 4.0 LTS series: https://github.com/canonical/lxd/pull/16924

The first commit changes the permissions for any new storage pool, the later commit adds a patch that applies it on startup to all existing storage pools.

These fixes are also available in the associated candidate snap channels for each LTS series:

5.21/candidate (5.21.4-8a3cf61)
5.0/candidate (5.0.5-5c60378)
4.0/candidate (4.0.10-35a8127)

We will be preparing intermediate releases to the associated stable snap channels shortly.

Workarounds

Permissions can be manually restricted until a patched version of LXD is deployed.

This is done with:

sudo nsenter --mount=/run/snapd/ns/lxd.mnt -- chmod 0700 /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/storage-pools/*/{custom*,virtual-machines*,images}
sudo nsenter --mount=/run/snapd/ns/lxd.mnt -- chmod 0711 /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/storage-pools/*/{containers*,buckets*}

Those are the same permissions which will be applied by the patched LXD for both new and existing storage pools.

References

This was reported to Incus publicly on Github here:

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐹Go	`github.com/canonical/lxd`	all versions	0.0.0-20251110144034-698854d0164f

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/canonical/lxd. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/canonical/lxd to 0.0.0-20251110144034-698854d0164f or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-3g2j-vm47-x4mj is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-3g2j-vm47-x4mj is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-3g2j-vm47-x4mj. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

**Impact** This affects any LXD user in an environment where an unprivileged user may have root access to a container with an attached custom storage volume that has the `security.shifted` property set to `true` as well as access to the host as an unprivileged user. The most common case for this would be systems using `lxd-user` with the less privileged lxd group to provide unprivileged users with an isolated restricted access to LXD. Such users may be able to create a custom storage volume with the necessary property (depending on kernel and filesystem support) and can then write a setuid b

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-3g2j-vm47-x4mj in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-3g2j-vm47-x4mj across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

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