CVE-2025-54288 — lxd
CVE-2025-54288 is a CWE-290 vulnerability in github.com/canonical/lxd. A fix is available for github.com/canonical/lxd — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Source Container Identification Vulnerability via cmdline Spoofing in devLXD Server
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2025-54288.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/canonical/lxd🐹github.com/canonical/lxd🐹github.com/canonical/lxdReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
In LXD's devLXD server, the source container identification process uses process cmdline (command line) information, allowing attackers to impersonate other containers by spoofing process names.
The core issue lies in the findContainerForPID function in lxd/api_devlxd.go.
This function identifies senders through two steps as shown below:
- cmdline-based identification: Check while tracing back through parent processes, and if it starts with
[lxc monitor], extract the project name and container name from that process name in the format projectName_containerName. - PID namespace-based identification: If not found in Step 1, check against all containers' PID namespaces.
Attackers can exploit Step 1 processing to impersonate arbitrary containers across projects by spoofing process names.
Reproduction Steps
- Access devLXD server from a normal container (e.g., EEEE):
root@EEEE:~# curl --unix-socket /dev/lxd/sock http://lxd-host/1.0/meta-data
instance-id: 9f928574-2561-4eff-af82-a68e57d3c68b
local-hostname: EEEE
- Use exec -a to spoof process name and impersonate another container (DDDD):
root@EEEE:~# bash -c "exec -a '[lxc monitor]' curl --unix-socket /dev/lxd/sock http://lxd-host/1.0/meta-data -x 'test-project_DDDD'"
instance-id: 1bb2f1c3-3ad2-4cd6-9965-67b14c3582cc
local-hostname: DDDD
This attack successfully obtains metadata (instance-id, local-hostname) of another container DDDD from within container EEEE.
Risk
This vulnerability allows attackers to perform the following actions:
-
Theft of other containers' metadata information Obtaining other containers' information via devLXD API's /1.0/meta-data endpoint: https://github.com/canonical/lxd/blob/43d5189564d27f6161b430ed258c8b56603c2759/lxd/devlxd.go#L295-L304
-
Obtaining other containers' configuration information via devLXD API's /1.0/config and /1.0/config/{key} endpoints: https://github.com/canonical/lxd/blob/43d5189564d27f6161b430ed258c8b56603c2759/lxd/devlxd.go#L175-L221 https://github.com/canonical/lxd/blob/43d5189564d27f6161b430ed258c8b56603c2759/lxd/devlxd.go#L228-L267
-
Obtaining other containers' device information via devLXD API's /1.0/devices endpoint: https://github.com/canonical/lxd/blob/43d5189564d27f6161b430ed258c8b56603c2759/lxd/devlxd.go#L377-L395 Particularly in environments where multiple projects run containers on the same LXD host, inter-project information leakage may occur. The attack prerequisite is root privileges within any container.
Countermeasures
While containers basically run in separate PID namespaces, based on investigation, the [lxc monitor] process runs in the same PID namespace as the LXD execution process. Therefore, the problem can be resolved by modifying the implementation to use cmdline information only when the PID namespace of the target process matches the PID namespace of the process running LXD.
Patches
| LXD Series | Status |
|---|---|
| 6 | Fixed in LXD 6.5 |
| 5.21 | Fixed in LXD 5.21.4 |
| 5.0 | Ignored - Not critical |
| 4.0 | Ignored - EOL and not critical |
References
Reported by GMO Flatt Security Inc.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/canonical/lxd | ≥ 4.0&&< 5.21.4 | 5.21.4go get github.com/canonical/lxd@v5.21.4 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/canonical/lxd | ≥ 6.0&&< 6.5 | 6.5go get github.com/canonical/lxd@v6.5 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/canonical/lxd | ≥ 0.0.0-20200331193331-03aab09f5b5c&&< 0.0.0-20250827065555-0494f5d47e41 | 0.0.0-20250827065555-0494f5d47e41go get github.com/canonical/lxd@v0.0.0-20250827065555-0494f5d47e41 |
Affected Products
lxdcanonicalDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/canonical/lxd, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/canonical/lxd to 5.21.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2025-54288 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2025-54288 in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.