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GHSA-7232-97c6-j525

MEDIUM

Canonical LXD Source Container Identification Vulnerability via cmdline Spoofing in devLXD Server

Also known asCVE-2025-54288GO-2025-4001
Published
Oct 2, 2025
Updated
Feb 4, 2026
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
3 / 3
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk23th percentile+0.26%
0.00%0.27%0.55%0.82%0.1%0.3%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

3 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/canonical/lxd🐹github.com/canonical/lxd🐹github.com/canonical/lxd

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

In LXD's devLXD server, the source container identification process uses process cmdline (command line) information, allowing attackers to impersonate other containers by spoofing process names.

The core issue lies in the findContainerForPID function in lxd/api_devlxd.go. This function identifies senders through two steps as shown below:

  1. cmdline-based identification: Check while tracing back through parent processes, and if it starts with [lxc monitor], extract the project name and container name from that process name in the format projectName_containerName.
  2. PID namespace-based identification: If not found in Step 1, check against all containers' PID namespaces.

https://github.com/canonical/lxd/blob/43d5189564d27f6161b430ed258c8b56603c2759/lxd/api_devlxd.go#L166-L276

Attackers can exploit Step 1 processing to impersonate arbitrary containers across projects by spoofing process names.

Reproduction Steps

  1. Access devLXD server from a normal container (e.g., EEEE):
root@EEEE:~# curl --unix-socket /dev/lxd/sock http://lxd-host/1.0/meta-data
instance-id: 9f928574-2561-4eff-af82-a68e57d3c68b
local-hostname: EEEE
  1. Use exec -a to spoof process name and impersonate another container (DDDD):
root@EEEE:~# bash -c "exec -a '[lxc monitor]' curl --unix-socket /dev/lxd/sock http://lxd-host/1.0/meta-data -x 'test-project_DDDD'"
instance-id: 1bb2f1c3-3ad2-4cd6-9965-67b14c3582cc
local-hostname: DDDD

This attack successfully obtains metadata (instance-id, local-hostname) of another container DDDD from within container EEEE.

Risk

This vulnerability allows attackers to perform the following actions:

  1. Theft of other containers' metadata information Obtaining other containers' information via devLXD API's /1.0/meta-data endpoint: https://github.com/canonical/lxd/blob/43d5189564d27f6161b430ed258c8b56603c2759/lxd/devlxd.go#L295-L304

  2. Obtaining other containers' configuration information via devLXD API's /1.0/config and /1.0/config/{key} endpoints: https://github.com/canonical/lxd/blob/43d5189564d27f6161b430ed258c8b56603c2759/lxd/devlxd.go#L175-L221 https://github.com/canonical/lxd/blob/43d5189564d27f6161b430ed258c8b56603c2759/lxd/devlxd.go#L228-L267

  3. Obtaining other containers' device information via devLXD API's /1.0/devices endpoint: https://github.com/canonical/lxd/blob/43d5189564d27f6161b430ed258c8b56603c2759/lxd/devlxd.go#L377-L395 Particularly in environments where multiple projects run containers on the same LXD host, inter-project information leakage may occur. The attack prerequisite is root privileges within any container.

Countermeasures

While containers basically run in separate PID namespaces, based on investigation, the [lxc monitor] process runs in the same PID namespace as the LXD execution process. Therefore, the problem can be resolved by modifying the implementation to use cmdline information only when the PID namespace of the target process matches the PID namespace of the process running LXD.

Patches

LXD SeriesStatus
6Fixed in LXD 6.5
5.21Fixed in LXD 5.21.4
5.0Ignored - Not critical
4.0Ignored - EOL and not critical

References

Reported by GMO Flatt Security Inc.

Affected Packages

3 total 3 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/canonical/lxd4.0&&< 5.21.45.21.4
🐹Gogithub.com/canonical/lxd6.0&&< 6.56.5
🐹Gogithub.com/canonical/lxd0.0.0-20200331193331-03aab09f5b5c&&< 0.0.0-20250827065555-0494f5d47e410.0.0-20250827065555-0494f5d47e41

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/canonical/lxd. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/canonical/lxd to 5.21.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7232-97c6-j525 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7232-97c6-j525 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-7232-97c6-j525. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact In LXD's devLXD server, the source container identification process uses process cmdline (command line) information, allowing attackers to impersonate other containers by spoofing process names. The core issue lies in the findContainerForPID function in `lxd/api_devlxd.go`. This function identifies senders through two steps as shown below: 1. cmdline-based identification: Check while tracing back through parent processes, and if it starts with `[lxc monitor]`, extract the project name and container name from that process name in the format projectName_containerName. 2. PID namesp
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-7232-97c6-j525 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-7232-97c6-j525 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.