GHSA-2hp7-65r3-wv54 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.8) vulnerability in github.com/orneryd/nornicdb. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-2hp7-65r3-wv54 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
NornicDB has Improper Network Binding in its Bolt Server, allowing unauthorized remote access
Real-World Exposure
github.com/orneryd/nornicdbReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The --address CLI flag (and NORNICDB_ADDRESS / server.host config key) is plumbed through to the HTTP server correctly but never reaches the Bolt server config. The Bolt listener therefore always binds to the wildcard address (all interfaces), regardless of what the user configures.
On a LAN, this exposes the graph database — with its default admin:password credentials — to any device sharing the network.
Version
nornicdb v1.0.39- Built from commit
afe7c9donmain - Platform: macOS (darwin 25.4.0, arm64)
Reproduction
$ nornicdb serve --address 127.0.0.1 --bolt-port 7687 --http-port 7474 ...
Output claims Bolt is on localhost:
Bolt server listening on bolt://localhost:7687
But the actual socket:
$ netstat -an -p tcp | grep 7687
tcp46 0 0 *.7687 *.* LISTEN
$ lsof -iTCP:7687 -sTCP:LISTEN -n -P
nornicdb ... IPv6 ... TCP *:7687 (LISTEN)
HTTP port is correctly bound:
tcp4 127.0.0.1.7474 *.* LISTEN
Reachable from another host on the LAN:
$ nc -z 192.168.x.y 7687
Connection to 192.168.x.y port 7687 [tcp/*] succeeded!
Setting NORNICDB_BOLT_ADDRESS=127.0.0.1 or server.host: "127.0.0.1" in config.yaml has no effect on the Bolt listener.
Root Cause
In pkg/bolt/server.go:774-776:
func (s *Server) ListenAndServe() error {
addr := fmt.Sprintf(":%d", s.config.Port)
listener, err := net.Listen("tcp", addr)
...
}
bolt.Config (line 474) has no Host/Address/Addr field — only Port. The CLI flag --address is stored in a local variable in cmd/nornicdb/main.go:80 and used to format user-facing log output (line 637–644), but is never copied into boltConfig at line 600–609 when Bolt is initialized.
Since ListenAndServe calls net.Listen("tcp", ":7687") with an empty host, Go binds the wildcard socket on all interfaces.
Suggested Fix
- Add a
Host stringfield tobolt.Config(default"127.0.0.1", matching the CLI flag default). - In
cmd/nornicdb/main.goaround line 601, wire it through:boltConfig.Host = address boltConfig.Port = boltPort - In
pkg/bolt/server.go:775, use the host:addr := net.JoinHostPort(s.config.Host, strconv.Itoa(s.config.Port))
Security Impact
- Default
admin:passwordcredentials + wildcard binding = anyone on the same WiFi can issue arbitrary Cypher queries (read, write, delete nodes) against NornicDB instances running with default setup. - Users following the README will reasonably assume
--address 127.0.0.1(the documented default) binds both protocols to localhost. - Workaround: host-firewall rules (e.g. macOS
pf) blocking non-loopback → 7687. Not discoverable from the docs.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/orneryd/nornicdb | all versions | 1.0.42-hotfix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/orneryd/nornicdb. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/orneryd/nornicdb to 1.0.42-hotfix or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-2hp7-65r3-wv54 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-2hp7-65r3-wv54 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-2hp7-65r3-wv54. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-2hp7-65r3-wv54 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-2hp7-65r3-wv54 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.