CVE-2026-42072 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.8) CWE-1392 vulnerability in github.com/orneryd/nornicdb. A fix is available for github.com/orneryd/nornicdb — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Nornicdb: Improper Network Binding in NornicDB Bolt Server allows unauthorized remote access
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-42072.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-42072 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 378,156 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/orneryd/nornicdbReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The --address CLI flag (and NORNICDB_ADDRESS / server.host config key) is plumbed through to the HTTP server correctly but never reaches the Bolt server config. The Bolt listener therefore always binds to the wildcard address (all interfaces), regardless of what the user configures.
On a LAN, this exposes the graph database — with its default admin:password credentials — to any device sharing the network.
Version
nornicdb v1.0.39- Built from commit
afe7c9donmain - Platform: macOS (darwin 25.4.0, arm64)
Reproduction
$ nornicdb serve --address 127.0.0.1 --bolt-port 7687 --http-port 7474 ...
Output claims Bolt is on localhost:
Bolt server listening on bolt://localhost:7687
But the actual socket:
$ netstat -an -p tcp | grep 7687
tcp46 0 0 *.7687 *.* LISTEN
$ lsof -iTCP:7687 -sTCP:LISTEN -n -P
nornicdb ... IPv6 ... TCP *:7687 (LISTEN)
HTTP port is correctly bound:
tcp4 127.0.0.1.7474 *.* LISTEN
Reachable from another host on the LAN:
$ nc -z 192.168.x.y 7687
Connection to 192.168.x.y port 7687 [tcp/*] succeeded!
Setting NORNICDB_BOLT_ADDRESS=127.0.0.1 or server.host: "127.0.0.1" in config.yaml has no effect on the Bolt listener.
Root Cause
In pkg/bolt/server.go:774-776:
func (s *Server) ListenAndServe() error {
addr := fmt.Sprintf(":%d", s.config.Port)
listener, err := net.Listen("tcp", addr)
...
}
bolt.Config (line 474) has no Host/Address/Addr field — only Port. The CLI flag --address is stored in a local variable in cmd/nornicdb/main.go:80 and used to format user-facing log output (line 637–644), but is never copied into boltConfig at line 600–609 when Bolt is initialized.
Since ListenAndServe calls net.Listen("tcp", ":7687") with an empty host, Go binds the wildcard socket on all interfaces.
Suggested Fix
- Add a
Host stringfield tobolt.Config(default"127.0.0.1", matching the CLI flag default). - In
cmd/nornicdb/main.goaround line 601, wire it through:boltConfig.Host = address boltConfig.Port = boltPort - In
pkg/bolt/server.go:775, use the host:addr := net.JoinHostPort(s.config.Host, strconv.Itoa(s.config.Port))
Security Impact
- Default
admin:passwordcredentials + wildcard binding = anyone on the same WiFi can issue arbitrary Cypher queries (read, write, delete nodes) against NornicDB instances running with default setup. - Users following the README will reasonably assume
--address 127.0.0.1(the documented default) binds both protocols to localhost. - Workaround: host-firewall rules (e.g. macOS
pf) blocking non-loopback → 7687. Not discoverable from the docs.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/orneryd/nornicdb | all versions | 1.0.42-hotfixgo get github.com/orneryd/nornicdb@v1.0.42-hotfix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/orneryd/nornicdb, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/orneryd/nornicdb to 1.0.42-hotfix or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-42072 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-42072 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2026-42072. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-42072 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2026-42072 across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.