GHSA-p77j-g7h5-r2vw — geolens

GeoLens 1.2.4 fixes a set of vulnerabilities, the most serious of which allow authenticated or anonymous users to obtain data and metadata for datasets they are not authorized to access.

Impact

• Private record metadata disclosure. Record contact, keyword, and distribution sub-resource endpoints did not re-authorize the backing dataset, so any authenticated user could read a private record's contact details (PII), keywords, and distributions. (Runtime-proven.)
• Private tile data via shared caches. Private raster and vector tiles were served with shared-cache (Cache-Control: public) headers, so a shared cache (a CDN or the bundled reverse proxy) could retain private tile bytes and replay them to later unauthenticated requests, including unpublished public-dataset previews.
• Private dataset title enumeration. The map visibility-check endpoint did not authorize read access to the map, allowing any editor to enumerate the titles of non-public datasets in any map by ID — including private maps owned by other users.
• SSRF via DNS rebinding. URL validation for user-supplied service URLs (probes, STAC/OGC API sources, manifest downloads) resolved DNS once and then let the HTTP client re-resolve at connect time, allowing a low-TTL domain to pass validation as a public address and connect to an internal/metadata address.
• Token leak + header injection in service preview. The remote-service preview path passed the authorization token to GDAL via the process environment without sanitization, leaking it through /proc/<pid>/environ and allowing CRLF header injection.
• Unauthenticated STAC search DoS. POST /search did not cap the size of GeoJSON intersects geometries (the GET sibling did).
• API key written to access logs. The bundled reverse proxy logged the api_key query-string credential in cleartext.
• Security posture coupled to a logging flag. API documentation exposure and the Secure flag on the OAuth session cookie were keyed off the LOG_JSON logging flag rather than an explicit environment setting, so a production deployment at the default could expose /docs and emit a non-Secure session cookie.
• Missing Content-Security-Policy (defense-in-depth). The web application shipped no script-src/default-src CSP, leaving no containment for token exfiltration if an XSS issue were introduced.
• Weak default install credentials. The installer kept the published default database password and could silently retain the default admin password on a headless install.

Patches

Upgrade to GeoLens 1.2.4. No configuration changes are required for the authorization and cache fixes. Operators on a public, TLS-terminated deployment should additionally set ENVIRONMENT=production to make the production security posture explicit; deployments that do not set it retain their prior behavior.

Workarounds

None for the authorization/cache disclosure flaws — upgrading is required. The SSRF and STAC-DoS surfaces can be partially mitigated at the network/proxy layer (egress filtering to block link-local metadata addresses; a request-size limit on POST /search), but the code fix is the durable remedy.

References

• Release: https://github.com/geolens-io/geolens/releases/tag/v1.2.4
• Pull request: https://github.com/geolens-io/geolens/pull/243
• Prior related advisory: GHSA-p23g-mvhj-jh3j