GHSA-2cgq-h8xw-2v5j
HIGHGHSA-2cgq-h8xw-2v5j is a high-severity (CVSS 7.2) CWE-77 vulnerability in github.com/cri-o/cri-o. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-2cgq-h8xw-2v5j is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
CRI-O vulnerable to an arbitrary systemd property injection
Blast Radius
github.com/cri-o/cri-o🐹github.com/cri-o/cri-o🐹github.com/cri-o/cri-oReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
On CRI-O, it looks like an arbitrary systemd property can be injected via a Pod annotation:
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: poc-arbitrary-systemd-property-injection
annotations:
# I believe that ExecStart with an arbitrary command works here too,
# but I haven't figured out how to marshalize the ExecStart struct to gvariant string.
org.systemd.property.SuccessAction: "'poweroff-force'"
spec:
containers:
- name: hello
image: [quay.io/podman/hello](http://quay.io/podman/hello)
This means that any user who can create a pod with an arbitrary annotation may perform an arbitrary action on the host system.
Tested with CRI-O v1.24 on minikube. I didn't test the latest v1.29 because it is incompatible with minikube: https://github.com/kubernetes/minikube/pull/18367
Thanks to Cédric Clerget (GitHub ID @cclerget) for finding out that CRI-O just passes pod annotations to OCI annotations: https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/pull/3923#discussion_r1532292536
CRI-O has to filter out annotations that have the prefix "org.systemd.property."
See also:
- https://github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec/blob/main/features.md#unsafe-annotations-in-configjson
- https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/pull/4217
Workarounds
Unfortunately, the only workarounds would involve an external mutating webhook to disallow these annotations
References
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/cri-o/cri-o | ≥ 1.29.0&&< 1.29.4 | 1.29.4 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/cri-o/cri-o | ≥ 1.28.0&&< 1.28.6 | 1.28.6 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/cri-o/cri-o | all versions | 1.27.6 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/cri-o/cri-o. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/cri-o/cri-o to 1.29.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-2cgq-h8xw-2v5j is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-2cgq-h8xw-2v5j is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-2cgq-h8xw-2v5j. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-2cgq-h8xw-2v5j in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-2cgq-h8xw-2v5j across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.