CVE-2023-6476 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) CWE-770 vulnerability in github.com/cri-o/cri-o. A fix is available for github.com/cri-o/cri-o — see the affected versions and patch details below.
CRI-O's pods can break out of resource confinement on cgroupv2
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2023-6476.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
github.com/cri-o/cri-o🐹github.com/cri-o/cri-o🐹github.com/cri-o/cri-oReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
All versions of CRI-O running on cgroupv2 nodes.
Unchecked access to an experimental annotation allows a container to be unconfined. Back in 2021, support was added to support an experimental annotation that allows a user to request special resources in cgroupv2. It was supposed to be gated by an experimental annotation: io.kubernetes.cri-o.UnifiedCgroup, which was supposed to be filtered from the list of allowed annotations . However, there is a bug in this code which allows any user to specify this annotation, regardless of whether it's enabled on the node. The consequences of this are a pod can specify any amount of memory/cpu and get it, circumventing the kubernetes scheduler, and potentially be able to DOS a node.
Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to? 1.29.1, 1.28.3, 1.27.3
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading? use cgroupv1
References
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/cri-o/cri-o | ≥ 1.29.0&&< 1.29.1 | 1.29.1go get github.com/cri-o/cri-o@v1.29.1 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/cri-o/cri-o | ≥ 1.28.0&&< 1.28.3 | 1.28.3go get github.com/cri-o/cri-o@v1.28.3 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/cri-o/cri-o | all versions | 1.27.3go get github.com/cri-o/cri-o@v1.27.3 |
Affected Products
openshift container platformredhatDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/cri-o/cri-o, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/cri-o/cri-o to 1.29.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2023-6476 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.
Fixing This On Your OS
If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.
There are two main factors reduce the severity of this vulnerability to Moderate: * A potential attacker must already have valid credentials * The OpenShift environment must already be configured to use an experimental feature
| Product | Fixed in | Advisory |
|---|---|---|
| Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.13 | cri-o-0:1.26.4-6.1.rhaos4.13.git9eb9cf3.el8 | RHSA-2024:0195 |
| Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.14 | cri-o-0:1.27.2-7.rhaos4.14.git1cc7a64.el8 | RHSA-2024:0207 |
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2023-6476 in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.