How severe is CVE-2024-3154?

CVE-2024-3154 has a CVSS score of 7.2/10, rated HIGH. Immediate patching is strongly recommended.

Which packages are affected by CVE-2024-3154?

CVE-2024-3154 affects the following packages: github.com/cri-o/cri-o (Go), github.com/cri-o/cri-o (Go), github.com/cri-o/cri-o (Go). Ecosystems affected: Go.

How do I fix CVE-2024-3154?

Update github.com/cri-o/cri-o to 1.29.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2024-3154 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect CVE-2024-3154 in my Go dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/cri-o/cri-o, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

How do I mitigate CVE-2024-3154 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.

Is CVE-2024-3154 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for CVE-2024-3154 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for CVE-2024-3154?

CVE-2024-3154 has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 1.4%, placing it in the 73th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is CVE-2024-3154?

CVE-2024-3154 is classified as CWE-77 (CWE-77). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation.

When was CVE-2024-3154 published, and has it been updated?

CVE-2024-3154 was published on April 26, 2024 and was last updated on October 28, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐹

🐹 Go

Not in CISA KEV

HIGH severity

CVE-2024-3154 — cri-o

HIGHFix: opencontainers/runc#4217

CVE-2024-3154 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.2) CWE-77 vulnerability in github.com/cri-o/cri-o. A fix is available for github.com/cri-o/cri-o — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Cri-o: arbitrary command injection via pod annotation

Also known asGHSA-2cgq-h8xw-2v5jGO-2024-2791

Published

Apr 26, 2024

Updated

Oct 28, 2026

Affected

3 pkgs

Patched

3 / 3

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Nov 3, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2024-3154.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

1.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk0.00%

Lower risk than most CVEs73th percentile — riskier than 73% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

3 pkgs affected

🐹github.com/cri-o/cri-o🐹github.com/cri-o/cri-o🐹github.com/cri-o/cri-o

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

On CRI-O, it looks like an arbitrary systemd property can be injected via a Pod annotation:

---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: poc-arbitrary-systemd-property-injection
  annotations:
    # I believe that ExecStart with an arbitrary command works here too,
    # but I haven't figured out how to marshalize the ExecStart struct to gvariant string.
    org.systemd.property.SuccessAction: "'poweroff-force'"
spec:
  containers:
    - name: hello
      image: [quay.io/podman/hello](http://quay.io/podman/hello)

This means that any user who can create a pod with an arbitrary annotation may perform an arbitrary action on the host system.

Tested with CRI-O v1.24 on minikube. I didn't test the latest v1.29 because it is incompatible with minikube: https://github.com/kubernetes/minikube/pull/18367

Thanks to Cédric Clerget (GitHub ID @cclerget) for finding out that CRI-O just passes pod annotations to OCI annotations: https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/pull/3923#discussion_r1532292536

CRI-O has to filter out annotations that have the prefix "org.systemd.property."

Workarounds

Unfortunately, the only workarounds would involve an external mutating webhook to disallow these annotations

References

Affected Packages

3 total 3 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐹Go	`github.com/cri-o/cri-o`	≥ 1.29.0&&< 1.29.4	1.29.4`go get github.com/cri-o/cri-o@v1.29.4`
🐹Go	`github.com/cri-o/cri-o`	≥ 1.28.0&&< 1.28.6	1.28.6`go get github.com/cri-o/cri-o@v1.28.6`
🐹Go	`github.com/cri-o/cri-o`	all versions	1.27.6`go get github.com/cri-o/cri-o@v1.27.6`

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/cri-o/cri-o, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/cri-o/cri-o to 1.29.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2024-3154 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatImportant

Product	Fixed in	Advisory
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.12	`cri-o-0:1.25.5-16.2.rhaos4.12.gitcb09013.el8`	RHSA-2024:2784
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.13	`cri-o-0:1.26.5-16.2.rhaos4.13.git67e2a9d.el8`	RHSA-2024:3496
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.14	`cri-o-0:1.27.6-2.rhaos4.14.gitb3bd0bf.el8`	RHSA-2024:2672
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.15	`cri-o-0:1.28.6-2.rhaos4.15.git77bbb1c.el8`	RHSA-2024:2669

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact On CRI-O, it looks like an arbitrary systemd property can be injected via a Pod annotation: ``` --- apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: name: poc-arbitrary-systemd-property-injection annotations: # I believe that ExecStart with an arbitrary command works here too, # but I haven't figured out how to marshalize the ExecStart struct to gvariant string. org.systemd.property.SuccessAction: "'poweroff-force'" spec: containers: - name: hello image: [quay.io/podman/hello](http://quay.io/podman/hello) ``` This means that any user who can create a pod with an arbit