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CVE-2026-73626 — jupyterlab

Fix: jupyterlab/jupyterlab#19184

CVE-2026-73626 is a CWE-284 vulnerability in jupyterlab. A fix is available for jupyterlab — see the affected versions and patch details below.

JupyterLab before 4.6.2 Authentication Bypass via PyPIExtensionManager

Also known asBIT-jupyterlab-2026-73626GHSA-whvh-wf3x-g77j
Published
Updated
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 24, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-73626.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs29th percentile — riskier than 29% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.29%0.58%0.86%0.2%0.4%0.4%Sep 26Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
🐍jupyterlab🐍jupyterlab

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

The extension allowlist/blocklist check inside PyPIExtensionManager.install() was not enforced due to a missing await. For purposes of JupyterLab this was a secondary defense-in-depth check: install() was intended to enforce the allowlist/blocklist itself for any future uses and users calling this method directly (in addition to the separate check handling requests arriving through the HTTP API). The only runtime symptom was a RuntimeWarning: coroutine 'is_install_allowed' was never awaited.

This has security implications only for deployments that combine all of the following:

  • a custom extension or downstream integration that imports PyPIExtensionManager and calls install() directly with a package name influenced by untrusted user input (the stock JupyterLab HTTP handler is not affected - it performs its own awaited allowlist check before calling install());
  • an allowlist/blocklist configured with the intent of restricting which packages users can install;
  • the (default) PyPI Extension Manager enabled; and
  • kernels and terminals disabled or delegated to remote hosts, so that the custom extension's install() call is the only available package-install vector (otherwise a user with kernel access can install packages directly regardless of this check)

Impact

Low. No exposure for stock JupyterLab: the HTTP API and Extension Manager UI enforce the listing through a separate, correctly awaited check. The gap affected only custom extensions or downstream integrations that called the public install() method directly and relied on it to self-enforce.

Patches

JupyterLab v4.6.2 and v4.5.10 contain the patch.

Users of applications that depend on JupyterLab, such as Notebook v7+, should update jupyterlab package too.

Workarounds

No action is required for deployments that only expose extension management through the JupyterLab HTTP API / Extension Manager UI, as that path was already enforcing the listing via the handler's own check. Deployments wanting to disable programmatic extension installation entirely can switch to the read-only extension manager:

--LabApp.extension_manager=readonly

or the following traitlet:

c.LabApp.extension_manager = 'readonly'

You can confirm that the read-only manager is in use from GUI:

<img width="293" height="293" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8016c809-633e-4ed0-a5bc-6bc4793caa0f" />

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIjupyterlab≥ 4.6.0&&< 4.6.24.6.2pip install --upgrade 'jupyterlab==4.6.2'
🐍PyPIjupyterlaball versions4.5.10pip install --upgrade 'jupyterlab==4.5.10'

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for jupyterlab, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update jupyterlab to 4.6.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-73626 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

The extension allowlist/blocklist check inside `PyPIExtensionManager.install()` was not enforced due to a missing await. For purposes of JupyterLab this was a secondary defense-in-depth check: `install()` was intended to enforce the allowlist/blocklist itself for any future uses and users calling this method directly (in addition to the separate check handling requests arriving through the HTTP API). The only runtime symptom was a `RuntimeWarning: coroutine 'is_install_allowed' was never awaited.` This has security implications only for deployments that combine all of the following: - a cust
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-73626 in your dependencies?

Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2026-73626: jupyterlab — Fixed in 4.6.2